OHIO STATE
LAW JOURNAL
Volume 11 Autumn, 1950 Number 4
Ohio’s Reported Decisions—An Integrated
Survey
Ervin H. Pollack* and J. Russell Leach**
Ohio, like New York and Pennsylvania, is a state whose
judicial decisions have been variously published and extensively
duplicated. The opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court alone may be
found in more than seven hundred and seventy volumes, yet the
official sets comprise only one hundred and seventy-one volumes.
Although much of this reporting is duplication, many opinions of
the Supreme Court are found only in private publications, since
the reporting of the official sets is selective and limited. The unoffi-
cial decisions are constantly referred to in Ohio, notwithstanding
the edict of the Ohio General Assembly! that only officially re-
ported cases “shall be recognized and receive the official sanction”
of the courts.
In view of this practice and the volume of Ohio judicial de-
cisions which have been published in reports and legal periodicals.
this article attempts to survey the extensive repositories of Ohio
court law. No attempt is made at this time to include non-legal
periodicals and newspapers which occasionally published court
opinions. The bringing to light of the few decisions which were
published in newspapers during the early years of the state is
deserving of independent treatment; therefore, these publications
are not included in this study. One further limitation is employed:
annotated, selected, and special reports, such as the Public Utilities
Reports and the American Law Reports, are not listed, although
these publications include Ohio decisions. Since their coverage is
generally national in scope and the printing of Ohio cases in them
is not representative of original reporting, these materials are
omitted from this survey.
Generally, the publications reviewed are arranged chronolog-
* Associate Professor of Law and Law Librarian, College of Law, The
Ohio State University.
** Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 Onto Gen. Cone § 1483.
413
414 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
ically under the courts reported. Reference is only made to the
courts incidentally; therefore, the reader should direct his interest
elsewhere for detailed, historical studies of the Ohio judicial
system.’
The Ohio Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions
The Ohio Supreme Court was established by the Ohio Con-
stitution of 18023 and modified and continued by the Constitution
of 1851.4 The court first consisted of three judges’ but was in-
creased over the years to its current aggregate of a chief justice
and six judges.® Originally, the jurisdiction of the court was
determined by the general assembly but this has been changed
so that today the jurisdiction is determined generally by the Consti-
tution.’ From 1816 to 1852, the judges were required to ride the
circuit, holding a term once a year in each county, and during
the early years more often acted as a trial court rather than under
their appellate authority.®
In 1875, a constitutional provision was adopted establishing
a Supreme Court Commission to assist the Supreme Court in
clearing its docket and giving the assembly authority to establish
similar commissions should the docket of the Supreme Court
again become crowded.’ The first Commission sat from 1876 to
1879 and a second Commission served from 1883 to 1885. While
the Constitution still provides authority for such commissions,
later revisions of the jurisdiction of the Court have seemingly
made the provision obsolete. The Commissions’ decisions were
published with those of the Supreme Court.
Given below are the various publications which include the
opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court.
Tappan’s Reports, in one volume, was originally published
in 1831. The volume primarily reports opinions of Judge Benjamin
Tappan, the President Judge of the Common Pleas Courts in the
Fifth Circuit of the state. It does, however, contain one Supreme
Court opinion; that of Judge McLean in the case of Landerback
v. Moore’® which is a landmark case involving a suit for slander.
This opinion was rendered in 1817 and is the earliest Supreme
Court case published in any standard legal publication.
2See Amer, The Growth and Development of the Ohio Judicial System,
in 1 MarsHatt, A History or THE Courts AND LAwyers oF Ouro, Chap. XIII
(1934); Aumann, The Development of the Judicial System of Ohio, 41 Onto
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HistTortcaL Society PusiicaTions 195 (1932).
3 Art. 3.
4 Art. 4.
5 ConsTITUTION OF OnrIo, 1802, Art. 3
6 CONSTITUTION OF OnxrIO, 1851, Art. 4
7 Ibid.
8 Aumann, supra, 202.
9 Art. 4 § 21.
10 Tapp. 317.
§ 2.
§ 2
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 415
Wright’s Reports, in one volume, reports four hundred and
ninety-eight Supreme Court cases in which Judge John C. Wright
participated from 1831 to 1834. Although five of these opinions
were reported in the Ohio Reports, Judge Wright again reported
them to correct errors. The great majority of these cases were
heard on the circuit.
The Ohio Reports, in twenty volumes, constitutes Ohio’s first
set of official court reports. It reports selected cases heard on the
circuit and in special session. The practice in the later volumes
was to omit all circuit cases and report only those of the special
session, at which times the court was known as the Supreme
Court in Bank. This practice may have been influenced by the
holding over of some of the more important or complex circuit
cases to the special sessions.'! The cases reported in the set cover
the period from 1821 to 1852, at which time Ohio’s second Consti-
tution became effective.
The Ohio Reports, Century Edition, consists of reprints of the
official Ohio Reports with annotations mene by the publisher,
the Laning Company.
The Ohio Reports, Extra Annotated, is a set in which the
original plates were used to reproduce copies of the official set
and includes at the end of each volume annotations prepared by
George F. Longsdorf. This series was published by the W. H. An-
derson Company.
The Western Law Journal, in ten volumes, published reports
of cases in the Supreme, District, Common Pleas and Probate
Courts, the Cincinnati and Cleveland Superior Courts, and the
Cincinnati Commercial Court. These cases, covering a period
from 1840 to 1853, are reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint,
volume 1.
The Ohio State Reports, the current official set, began pub-
lication in 1852 and succeeded the Ohio Reports. This publication
prints the opinions of the Supreme Court, as established by the
constitution of 1851 and continued by later amendments. To date,
one hundred and fifty-one bound volumes have been published.
These reports have no official advance sheets.
The Ohio State Reports, Century Edition, consists of reprints
of the official set from volumes 1 through 60, covering the period
to 1899. This publication was annotated by its publishers, the
Laning Company, and was a companion set to the Ohio Reports,
Century Edition.
11 The requirement that the judges hold court in each county resulted in
their traveling on horseback for six months of each year. Since the same
legal issues were settled differently by the various judges sitting in divers
counties, much confusion in the law resulted. This was obviated substan-
tially by having the court sit in bank. See Aumann, supra at 203.
416 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The Ohio State Reports, Extra Annotated, was a companion set
to the Ohio Reports, Extra Annotated. Published by the W. H.
Anderson Company, it consists of the first eighty-four volumes
of the official Ohio State Reports and covers the period 1853
to 1912.
The American Law Register, a Philadelphia publication, re-
ported cases from the Supreme, District, Common Pleas, Probate,
Cincinnati Superior, and Montgomery County Superior Courts.
Volume 3 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint republished these cases
with the exception of those found in other Ohio reports or reprinted
elsewhere in the set. This, of course, excluded most of the Supreme
Court cases, since they were printed in the official reports. The
Reprint covers thirty-four volumes of the Register from 1853 to
1885, volumes 1 through 9 of the old series and volumes 1 through
25 of the new.
The Weekly Law Bulletin, in sixty-six volumes, reported
cases in the Ohio courts from 1876 to 1921. In addition to Supreme
Court cases, this periodical reported the opinions of the following
courts: District, Circuit, Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas, Pro-
bate, Cincinnati Superior, Cincinnati Insolvency, Municipal or
Police, and Federal. The opinions in volumes 1 through 30 of the
Bulletin, except for those of the Supreme Court, were reprinted
in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volumes 7 through 11. Due to the
title and ownership changes and publication consolidations, this
periodical has been known by various names. It was originally
called the Weekly Cincinnati Law Bulletin and was published by
Carl G. Jahn at Cincinnati. In 1883, at volume 10, the word “Cin-
cinnati” was dropped from its title and it was called The Weekly
Law Bulletin. In 1885, the Bulletin combined with the Ohio Law
Journal, a periodical published at Columbus. The combined volumes
continued the volume number of the Bulletin, but were called the
Weekly Law Bulletin and the Ohio Law Journal. The periodical
continued without change until 1902, when the Jahn publications
were sold to The Laning Company of Norwalk, Ohio, the pub-
lisher of the Ohio Legal News, a competing periodical. The next
volume was numbered “47” and the new publication was called
the Ohio Law Bulletin. It continued the Weekly Law Bulletin,
Ohio Law Journal and Ohio Legal News, preserving the features
of the Bulletin and the News. In August, 1909, the Laning Com-
pany sold the Bulletin to the American Publishers Company of
Norwalk, and W. T. Tossell, the former assistant editor, became
its editor. No name changes were involved and the periodical
continued as before. In February, 1917, the ownership again
changed; this time it was sold to the Ohio Law Publishing Company
of Norwalk, but no editorial or policy changes were made. In 1921
the final volume, number 66, was issued and the periodical merged
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 417
with a competing publication, The Ohio Law Reporter, published
by The Ohio Law Reporter Company of Cincinnati. The com-
bined publication was entitled The Ohio Law Bulletin and Re-
porter; however, this title did not receive popular usage and the
Bulletin died a natural death.
The North Eastern Reporter, in two hundred volumes, printed
opinions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals as well as
those of the courts of the states of New York, Massachusetts, Indi-
ana, and Illinois. This key-numbered publication of the West
Publishing Company covered the period 1885 to 1936.
The North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, a current pub-
lication, is a continuation of the North Eastern Reporter. In ad-
dition to the court opinions published in the First Series this set,
beginning with volume 67 in 1946, has included opinions from the
Ohio Common Pleas, Probate, and Municipal Courts. The set is
kept current by advance sheets. Its Ohio Edition included the
Ohio Supplement, which is discussed below under the Common
Pleas and Probate Courts.
The Ohio Supreme Court Decisions (Unreported Cases) is
a one volume publication containing records, briefs and holdings
of the Supreme Court from 1889 to 1899. Syllabi were added by
the publishers, The Laning Company, giving the points of law
deduced. No opinions in these cases were ever rendered by the
court.
The Ohio Legal News, sometimes called the Toledo Legal News,
published opinions of the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court for
the Sixth Judical District, the Common Pleas and Probate Courts
of Lucas County, the Federal Courts in the Toledo area, and se-
lected opinions of other Ohio and out-of-state courts. The News
was primarily a periodical and only the first two volumes, cover-
ing the period 1894 to 1895, reported cases. As mentioned above,
this publication merged with the Weekly Law Bulletin.
The Ohio Decisions, a set which is more fully discussed under
the Common Pleas and Probate Courts, contains certain Supreme
Court and Supreme Court Commission cases not included in the
official reports. This set, however, was intended to supplement the
official reports of the Supreme Court and primarily reported opin-
ions of the nisi prius courts.
The Ohio Law Reporter, a periodical, published the unreported
Supreme Court opinions in its first two volumes.'? Later volumes
of this periodical published opinions of other Ohio and federal
courts.
The Ohio Opinions, another current series, reports opinions of
the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas Courts, Pro-
12 A more complete account of this publication will be found in a later
discussion under the heading “The Federal Courts.”
418 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Voi. 11
bate Courts, Municipal Courts, and Federal Courts which bear on
Ohio law. The Opinions, a cooperative venture of The Ohio Law
Reporter Company and The W. H. Anderson Company, began in
1934 and to date forty bound volumes have been issued. The set
has annotations to earlier cases in point and to Ohio Jurisprudence.
The first volumes of the Opinions succeeded the last volume, num-
ber 40, of the old Ohio Law Reporter and volume 32 of the Ohio
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series. The Ohio Opinions is kept current
by a weekly supplement, which, although called the Ohio Law Re-
porter, carries the volume number and pagination of the future
bound volumes of the Ohio Opinions. The advance sheet Reporter
also includes a periodical index and other miscellaneous features,
yet its function is restricted to that of an advance sheet.
The Gongwer State Reports is a current mimeograph service
which provides information regarding cases filed in the Ohio Su-
preme Court. A synopsis of the case, its history and issues are pro-
vided for each case filed. In addition, it reports the decisions on
all cases and prints digests of the opinions of the court.
The Ohio Bar, a publication of the Ohio State Bar Associ-
ation, contains advance opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, Courts
of Appeals, nisi prius and federal courts. The advance opinions
have the pagination of the future bound volumes of the Ohio State
Reports, Ohio Appellate Reports, and the Ohio Law Abstract.
The District Courts
The District Courts were established by the Constitution of
1851 and were discontinued by a constitutional amendment of 1883
which created the Circuit Courts.'’ A creature of compromise, the
District Courts never enjoyed any degree of popularity. One group
advocated an independent intermediate court and favored relieving
the Supreme Court judges of the burdensome task of circuit rid-
ing. The adversaries of this proposal opposed a separate inter-
mediate court and favored the increasing of the membership of
the Supreme Court. They feared that the Supreme Court would
assume dictatorial characteristics if it only sat in bank, losing its
direct contact with the people. A compromise was effected which
provided for intermediate district courts manned by one Supreme
Court judge and two or three Common Pleas judges, any three of
whom were a quorum. Soon after the District Courts were es-
tablished, it was held in King v. Safford'* that a District Court
composed of three Common Pleas judges, without the presence of
a Supreme Court judge, was a lawful and constitutional District
Court. Although this ruling was beneficial to the functions of the
Supreme Court, it destroyed the remaining prestige of the District
Courts.
13 Art. 4.
1419 Ohio St. 587 (1869).
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 419
No official reports of the District Courts were published; how-
ever, their opinions appeared in a number of periodicals and were
subsequently republished in reprints.
The Ohio Decisions Reprint, in the first nine volumes, printed
the opinions of the District Courts. A Laning publication, it con-
sists of thirteen volumes. The Ohio Decisions Reprint was an at-
tempt to compile from the various reports and periodicals all the
case law of Ohio not found in the official reports for the period
1840 to 1855.
The following table lists the publications from which cases are
republished and their location in the Reprint.
Ohio Decisions
Reprints Sets Reported
Volume 1 Western Law Journal, ten volumes
Volume 2 Western Law Monthly, five volumes
Volume 3 Weekly Law Gazette, six volumes
Daily Law and Bank Bulletin, three volumes
American Law Register, thirty-four volumes
Ohio Law Journal, five volumes
Volume 4 Cleveland Law Record, one volume
Cleveland Law Reporter, two volumes
Volume 5 American Law Record, volumes 1-6
Volume 6 American Law Record, volumes 7-15
Volume 7 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 1-4
Volume 8 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 5-9
Volume 9 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 10-17
Volume 10 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 18-23
Volume 11 Weekly Law Bulletin, volumes 24-30
Volume 12 Handy’s Reports, two volumes
Disney’s Reports, volume 1
Volume 13 Disney’s Reports, volume 2
Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter, two volumes
In reprinting these opinions, the Laning Company omitted
opinions of federal and out-of-state courts and officially published
Ohio Supreme Court cases. The Reprint is independently cited;
however, it also includes the original pagination from the reprinted
sets for reference or citation purposes. Periodical matter, of course,
was omitted in the Reprint and many syllabi were added to the
opinions. The reprinted sets are considered in detail in this article
under their individual titles.
The Western Law Journal, in volumes 8 through 10, printed
opinions of the District Courts from 1851 to 1853.'5
The Cleveland Law Register, in one volume, printed one Di-
strict Court opinion, rendered in 1855. It primarily reported opinions
of the Circuit, Common Pleas, and Probate Courts of the Cleveland
area from 1899 to 1893. This publication, also called the Cleveland
15 This periodical has already been described under the heading “The
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
420 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
Law Register Reports, was a weekly supplement to the Daily Law
Register of Cleveland.
The Cleveland Law Record, in one volume, published opinions
of the District and Common Pleas Courts from 1855 to 1856. These
opinions, selected especially from the District Court of Cuyahoga
County, were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 4.
The Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin, in one volume, reported
opinions of the District, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati
Superior Courts from 1857 to 1858. This volume is a unit of a series
of publications of R. B. and W. W. Warden of Cincinnati. The first
opinions were printed in The Daily Court Bulletin of Cincinnati.
The Wardens soon thereafter began compiling material from the
Daily and issuing a weekly publication, called the Weekly Law and
Bank Bulletin. This periodical is also known as Warden’s Law and
Bank Bulletin, Warden’s Weekly Law Bulletin, and Law and Bank
Bulletin. When one volume of the Bulletin was completed, its name
was changed to The Weekly Law Gazette. The opinions of the
Bulletin and the Gazette were reprinted in volume 3 of the Ohio
Decisions Reprint.
The Weekly Law Gazette, in four volumes, continued publish-
ing the opinions of the same courts as did the Weekly Law and Bank
Bulletin. No volume number one of this set was issued; the Bul-
letin served as that volume. The series continued through volume
5 and covered the period 1856 to 1860.
The Western Law Monthly, in five volumes covering the period
1858 to 1863, reported cases of the District, Common Pleas, Probate,
Cincinnati Superior, Franklin County Superior, out-of-state, and
federal courts. The Ohio decisions in this Monthly were reprinted
in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 2. This periodical was pub-
lished by members of the faculty of the defunct Union Law College
of Cleveland.
The Cincinnati Municipal Decisions, a one volume publication,
is devoted to cases involving municipal corporations decided by the
Cincinnati Superior and Hamilton County District Courts from 1862
to 1875.
The American Law Record, in fifteen volumes, published
opinions of the District, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati
Superior Courts. These opinions were reprinted in volumes 6 and
7 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint. The Record was published at
Cincinnati and reported opinions for the period 1872 to 1886.
The Weekly Law Bulletin contains District Courts decisions.'®
The Cleveland Law Reporter, in two volumes covering the
period from 1877 to 1879, reported opinions of the District, Common
Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior Courts. These opinions were
reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 4. The Reporter
16 Ibid.
OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 421
1950]
was a weekly publication edited by J. G. Pomerene at Cleveland,
Ohio.
The Ohio Law Journal, in five volumes, printed opinions of the
District, Common Pleas, and Probate Courts. These opinions dating
from 1880 to 1884 were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint,
volume 3. The Journal was a weekly pericdical published at Colum-
bus, and, as noted previously, merged with the Weekly Law Bul-
letin.
The Circuit Courts
The lack of success of the District Courts was fully felt by 1880.
Their deficiencies were among the prime forces which influenced
prominent attorneys to organize the Ohio State Bar Association in
July, 1880. During the organizational meeting and succeeding special
and annual meetings of the Association, various plans were offered
and discussed to improve the judicial system in the state. As an
initial program of the organized bar of Ohio, the study of the District
Courts which resulted in their abolishment and the establishment
of the Circuit Courts and the second Supreme Court Commission,
proved very fruitful. The new Circuit Courts were created by an
amendment to the Constitution of Ohio '’ and resulted in the first
separate intermediate courts in the state. Thus, the judges of the
Supreme and Common Pleas Courts were relieved of the responsi-
bilities of serving on two courts and new judges were appointed and
elected as provided by the general assembly. The assembly was
authorized to fix and charige the number and boundaries of the
circuits and to prescribe the jurisdiction of the new courts. The
Circuit Courts began functioning in 1885 and soon gained the con-
fidence of the bar and the people of Ohio.
The opinions of the Circuit Courts were published in the
various reports given below.
The Cleveland Law Register includes Circuit Court decisions.'*®
The Ohio Circuit Court Reports (Jahn), in twenty-two volumes,
reported opinions of the Circuit Courts from 1885 to 1901. This set,
a companion to the Weekly Law Bulletin, was merged with the Lan-
ing publication, the Ohio Circuit Decisions, when the Jahn publica-
tions were purchased by the Laning Company.
The Ohio Circuit Decisions, in twelve volumes, covered the
same cases and period as did the above Reports. The Decisions,
published some time later, reprinted the opinions which had been
published in the Reports, adding other cases which had been omitted
from the Reports.
17 Art. 4.
18 A more complete discussion of this publication appears under the head-
ing “The District Courts.”
422 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The Ohio Legal News also included Circuit Courts decisions.'°
The Ohio Decisions, in three volumes, reported opinions of
the Circuit, Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior
Courts. This set was recalled by the publishers and the opinions
were republished in the Ohio Circuit Decisions and the Ohio De-
cisions. This set is differentiated from the republished Ohio De-
cisions volumes by its citation, “Ohio Lower Dec.” The opinions
reported were rendered from 1894 to 1896.
Iddings’ Term Reports, in one volume, digested but did not
print the complete opinions of the Circuit, Common Pleas and Pro-
bate Courts of Montgomery County, and of other counties of the
Second Judicial District. This volume was the work of Daniel W.
Iddings, former Law Librarian of Montgomery County, and includ-
ed cases from 1899 to 1900.
The Ohio Circuit Court Decisions, in twenty-two volumes, was
the successor to the Jahn publication, the Ohio Circuit Court Re-
ports, and the Laning publication, the Ohio Circuit Decisions. The
publishers of this set cited the first volume “13 — 23 O. C. C.” This
unique method of citation did not gain favor, however, and the
volumes were generally referred to by the title of one or the other
of its predecessors. This accounts for such citations as 45 Ohio Cir-
cuit Court Reports or 24 Ohio Circuit Decisions. The set covered
cases from 1901 to 1918 and ended with volume “13 — 45.” The
last twelve volumes of the Decisions also contain cases decided by
the Courts of Appeals and earlier Circuit Courts opinions which
had been omitted. Its publication was terminated at the instance of
the Ohio State Bar Association and for competitive reasons, since
two other sets of reports of the Courts of Appeals were then being
published. The Bar obtained an agreement from these publishers
- and the publishers of the Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports to with-
draw their publications in favor of the one official set.
The Ohio Circuit Court Reports (New Series) reported cases
from 1903 to 1917, in twenty-six volumes. Volumes 17 through 26
also include reports of the Courts of Appeals. A product of the Ohio
Law Reporter Company, this set began publication shortly after the
merger of the Jahn and Laning publications. This series was suc-
ceeded by volumes 27 through 32 of the Ohio Court of Appeals Re-
ports.
The Court of Appeals
By a constitutional amendment” in 1912, the Circuit Courts
were replaced by Courts of Appeals. Significant changes were
made in the judical system by the Constitutional Convention of
1912. These modifications generally related to the jurisdiction of
19 Ibid.
20 Art. 4.
OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 423
1950]
the various courts and the replacement of legislative determinations
by self-executing constitutional provisions. Although many of the
constitutional amendments were fundamental, the change to Courts
of Appeals was essentially one of nomenclature, since they were
but continuations of the Circuit Courts.
The opinions of the Courts of Appeals are contained in the fol-
lowing reports and periodicals:
The Ohio Circuit Court Decisions and the Ohio Circuit Court
Reports (New Series) include decisions of the Courts of Appeals.?!
The Ohio Appellate Reports is the first and only official series
of Ohio intermediate appellate court reports. The first volume was
issued in 1913, and to date, eighty-five bound volumes have been
published.
The Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports was a continuation of
the Ohio Circuit Court Reports. The first volume of this series was
numbered 27 and the set reported cases from 1915 to 1922. This
publication ended in 1922 with volume 32 by agreement between
its publishers, the Ohio Law Reporter Company, the Laning Com-
pany and the bar. The publication of the decisions as official re-
ports of Ohio was continued under contract by the Ohio Law Re-
porter Company.
The Ohio Law Abstract, a current publication, reports cases
of the Courts of Appeals, Common Pleas, Probate, Municipal, and
Federal Courts. A product of The Law Abstract Company, a Lan-
ing concern, the series began publication in 1923 with the printing
of syllabi, digests, and “epitomized opinions” rather than the full
texts. At present, fifty-six bound volumes have been published
The early practice of summarizing the cases was discontinued, and
the series now constitutes one of the three sources for locating the
full texts of unofficially reported appellate and nisi prius decisions
of Ohio.
The Ohio Law Reporter, in volumes 21 through 40, reported
opinions of. the Courts of Appeals from 1923 to 1934. It appears
that these volumes were a continuation of the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals Reports. In its later years, the Reporter concentrated more
on the reporting of judicial decisions than on periodical articles.
The Ohio Opinions, which is discussed more fully above under
the Supreme Court, also includes cases of the Courts of Appeals.
The North Eastern Reporter from volume 151 through 200
and the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, include the Courts
of Appeals opinions.??
21 An account of these reports is included under the heading “The Circuit
Courts.”
22 A more complete statement concerning this publication is given under
the heading “The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
424 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The Ohio Bar, a publication of the Ohio State Bar Association,
covers the advance opinions of the Courts of Appeals.”
Typed copies of the Unreported Ohio Court of Appeals Opin-
ions for the Eighth Judical District have been prepared by the
Cleveland Law Library Association. To date, a total of twelve
copies of the fifty-two volumes have been typed and made avail-
able to libraries and the Bar of the state.
The Bar Briefs, a publication of the Columbus Bar Association,
and The Akron Bar Communications of the Akron Bar Association
digest but do not print opinions of the Ohio Court of Appeals for
their districts, the second and ninth, respectively.
The Common Pleas and Probate Courts
The Common Pleas Courts have remained relatively unchang-
ed throughout the entire constitutional history of Ohio.?4 Origin-
ally, these courts were composed of one presiding judge and two
or three associate judges. There were no requirements or quali-
fications attached to their offices and the practice generally was
for the president of the court to be a lawyer and the associates to
be laymen. The jurisdiction of the courts, always provided for by
law, has been modified over the years; however, they have con-
sistently been the nisi prius courts of general jurisdiction. Due to
the additional work-load given the Common Pleas Courts by in-
creasing their appellate jurisdiction, it was deemed expedient to
withdraw from these courts jurisdiction over probate and testa-
mentary matters. Accordingly, in 1851, when the new Constitution
was adopted, it created the Probate Courts of Ohio.?5 The functions
of these courts have remained relatively unchanged since that date.
The Common Pleas and Probate Courts opinions are published
in the following reports and periodicals:
Tappan’s Reports, previously discussed for its one Supreme
Court opinion, primarily reported opinions of Judge Tappan of the
Common Pleas Court of the Fifth Circuit from 1816 to 1819. This
publication is sometimes called the Ohio Decisions, Miscellaneous.
The Western Law Journal, the American Law Register, the
Weekly Law Bulletin, the Ohio Legal News, the Ohio Opinions,
and the Ohio Bar include Common Pleas and Probate Courts de-
cisions.?6
23 Ibid.
24The Common Pleas Courts in Ohio find their origin in the Northwest
Territory. On August 23, 1788, the Governor and judges of the Northwest
Territory, sitting as a legislative council, passed an act establishing “A Gen-
eral Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace and County Courts of Common
Pleas.” When Ohio became a state, the Common Pleas Courts became con-
stitutional courts pursuant to Art. 3 of the Constitution of 1802.
25 Art. 4.
26 These publications are discussed in more detail under the heading “The
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 425
The Ohio Decisions Reprint, the Cleveland Law Register, the
Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin, the Weekly Law Gazette, the West-
ern Law Monthly, the American Law Record, the Cleveland Law
Reporter, and the Ohio Law Journal report opinions of the Com-
mon Pleas and Probate Courts.?’
The Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin, in one volume, reported
cases from the Common Pleas, Probate, and Cincinnati Superior
Courts for 1857. The series was the predecessor of the Weekly Law
and Bank Bulletin which is more fully discussed under the District
Courts.
3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions, a one volume report, reported
cases from the Common Pleas and Superior Courts of Montgomery
County from 1865 to 1873. Another publication of the Laning Com-
pany, it includes many of the opinions of Judge Haynes of the
Superior Court which had been reported and preserved by O. M.
Gottschall of the Dayton bar. The volume has been referred to by
such names as the Dayton Reports and the Ohio Decisions, Dayton.
Goebel’s Probate Reports, in one-volume, reported cases in the
Hamilton County Probate Court from 1885 to 1890. These opinions
were rendered by Judge Herman P. Goebel, and were edited and
arranged by W. H. Whittaker of the Cincinnati Bar.
The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, in eight volumes, was a com-
panion set to the Jahn publication, the Ohio Circuit Court Reports.
In addition to opinions of the Common Pleas Courts, it reported
cases from the Cincinnati Superior, Hamilton County Insolvency,
and Municipal Courts from 1893 to 1901. The series was discon-
tinued in favor of the Ohio Decisions when the Jahn publications
were purchased by the Laning Company.
The Ohio Decisions, Ohio Lower Decisions edition, and Iddings’
Term Reports contain Common Pleas and Probate Courts opinions.”®
The Ohio Decisions, in thirty-one volumes, reported opinions
of the Common Pleas and the Cincinnati Superior Courts, selected
opinions from other lower Ohio courts and a few unofficially pub-
lished opinions of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Com-
mission. The set, which includes opinions from 1894 to 1920, is a
companion set to the other Laning publications. While the series
was to be unaffected by the purchase of the Jahn publications, from
that date this set was cited by various means, i.e., “12 Ohio De-
cisions,” “12 Ohio Decisions, Nisi Prius,” or “9 Ohio Nisi Prius Re-
ports.” Competition with and eventual sale to the Ohio Law Re-
porter Company lead to the discontinuance of the series.
27A fuller account of these publications is given under the heading “The
District Courts.”
28 These publications are more completely discussed under the heading
“The Circuit. Courts.”
426 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series, in thirty-two
volumes, is a companion set to the Ohio Law Reporter Company’s
Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series. It reported 1902 to 1934
opinions of the Common Pleas, Cincinnati Superior, Hamilton
County Insolvency, and Municipal Courts. The series was succeed-
ed by the Ohio Opinions.
The Ohio Law Abstract, considered more fully under the
Courts of Appeals, includes opinions of the Common Pleas and
Probate Courts.
The Ohio Supplement, in seventeen volumes, was bound with
the various volumes of the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series,
Ohio Edition, beginning with volume 30 and ending with volume
66. The Supplement reported cases from the nisi prius courts of
Ohio from 1932 to 1936.
The North Eastern Reporter, Second Series, only volumes 67
et seq., report Ohio nisi prius cases. This set from volume 67 con-
tinues the Ohio Supplement series.
The Cincinnati Superior Courts
There have been two distinct Cincinnati Superior Courts in
Ohio. The first of these was created in 183879 and continued until
abolished by the Schedule to the Constitution of 1851. This court,
as well as its successor, was given concurrent jurisdiction with the
Hamilton County Common Pleas Court in essentially all civil mat-
ters at law or in chancery. The second court was created in 1854?
and functioned until it was abolished in 1921 by an act of the Gen-
eral Assembly.*! A large number of the judges of the latter court
subsequently made outstanding contributions in the national judi-
cial and political realms.*?
The decisions of the Cincinnati Superior Courts are published
in the following publications:
The Western Law Journal, the American Law Register, and
2936 Ohio Laws 95.
3052 Ohio Laws 34.
31109 Ohio Laws 354.
32 Included among these were Alphonso Taft (1864-72), who became Sec-
retary of War, Attorney General of the United States, Minister to France,
and Minister to Russia; Joseph B. Foraker (1879-82), who became Governor
of Ohio and United States Senator; Smith Hickenlooper (1918-23), who be-
came United States District Judge and later Judge of the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals; Stanley Matthews (1862-63), who became United States
Senator and Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Judson
Harmon (1878-82), who became Governor of Ohio and Attorney General of
the United States; William H. Taft (1887-90), who became Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals, Governor of the Philippines, Secretary of War, Presi-
dent of the United States, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States; and Edward F. Noyes (1889-90), who became Governor of
Ohio and Minister to France.
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 427
the Weekly Law Bulletin include Cincinnati Superior Court cases.*’
The Ohio Decisions Reprint, the Weekly Law and Bank Bul-
letin, the Weekly Law Gazette, the Western Law Monthly, the
Cincinnati Municipal Decisions, the American Law Record, and
the Cleveland Law Reporter contain Cincinnati Superior Court
decisions.**
Handy’s Reports, in two volumes, reported the opinions of the
Cincinnati Superior Court from 1854 to 1856. The reporters of the
volumes were R. D. and J. H. Handy of the Cincinnati bar. These
opinions were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volume 12.
Disney’s Reports, in two volumes, reported opinions of the
Cincinnati Superior Court from 1854 to 1859. These opinions were
reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint, volumes 12 and 13. This
set, with but a single exception, did not duplicate the opinions found
in Handy’s Reports. The preparation of the publication was origin-
ally undertaken by Judge Stanley Matthews, who subsequently
became a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and
was continued by William Disney of the Cincinnati bar.
The Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin, the Ohio Nisi Prius Re-
ports, the Ohio Decisions, and the Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New
Series, include Cincinnati Superior Court opinions.*5
The Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter, in two volumes,
printed opinions of that court from 1870 to 1873. Volume 1 was
edited by Charles P. Taft and Bellamy Storer, Jr., sons of the con-
temporary judges. The second volume was edited by Charles P.
and Peter R. Taft. Both volumes, as were Handy’s and Disney’s
Reports, were published by Robert Clarke & Co., of Cincinnati.
These opinions were reprinted in the Ohio Decisions Reprint,
volume 13.
The Ohio Decisions, the Ohio Lower Decisions edition, also in-
cluded Cincinnati Superior Court opinions.*®
The Cincinnati Superior Court Decisions, in one volume, re-
ported opinions of the court for the period 1903 to 1907. The De-
cisions were reported by Judge Lewis M. Hosea of the Superior
Court and published by The W. H. Anderson Company. The publi-
cation is generally referred to as ‘“Hosea’s Reports.”
The Ohio Law Reporter, in some of its early volumes, printed
a number of otherwise unpublished Cincinnati Superior and other
33 These journals are discussed in greater detail under the heading “The
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
34For more complete references to these publications, see the discussion
under the heading “The District Courts.”
35 More complete discussions of these periodicals appear above under the
heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.”
36A more complete statement on this publication was given under the
heading “The Circuit Courts.”
428 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
nisi prius court opinions. Most of the opinions published in the Re-
porter, however, were included in the Ohio Nisi Prius, New Series.
The Franklin County Superior Court
Like the Cincinnati Court, the Franklin County Superior Court
generally functioned as a substitute court of common pleas. This
court was established in 185737 and functioned until it was abolish-
ed in 1865.58
The opinions of the Franklin County Superior Court were in-
cluded in the Western Law Monthly and in the reprint of those
cases in volume 2 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint.*?
The Cleveland Superior Court
This Superior Court, like that of Cincinnati, sat during two
different periods. It was first created in 1848*° and then discon-
tinued by the Schedule of the Constitution of 1851. The court, and
that of Cincinnati and the Commercial Court of Cincinnati, could
accept no new actions after February, 1852, but was permitted to
operate until February, 1853. The second Cleveland Superior
Court was established in 1873*! and was abolished two years later.*
Its decisions are contained in the Western Law Journal and
in the reprint of those cases in volume 1 of the Ohio Decisions Re-
print.*’
The Montgomery County Superior Court
This court was established in 18564 and functioned until 1885,
when it was abolished by an act of the general assembly.‘ Its
jurisdiction was the same as that of the other superior courts.
The opinions of the Montgomery County Superior Court are
included in the American Law Register and in their reprints in
volume 3 of the Ohio Decisions Reprint.*®
Three Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions also contains the Mont-
gomery County Superior Court opinions.‘’
3754 Ohio Laws 37.
38 62 Ohio Laws 58.
39 For a more detailed statement regarding these publications, see the dis-
cussion under the heading “The District Courts.”
4046 Ohio Laws 21.
4170 Ohio Laws 297.
4272 Ohio Laws 105.
43 A discussion of the Western Law Journal was given under the heading
“The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
4453 Ohio Laws 38.
45 82 Ohio Laws 85.
46The American Law Register is discussed more completely under the
heading “The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
47¥For a fuller account of this volume, see the discussion of it under the
heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.”
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 429
The Commercial Court of Cincinnati
Created in 1848** this court was given concurrent jurisdiction
with the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court over all chancery
matters and those civil actions which were based upon contract.
The court was abolished in 1853 as a result of the Schedule of the
1851 Constitution.
Its opinions were included in the Western Law Journal and
those cases were reprinted in volume 1 of the Ohio Decisions Re-
print.*?
The Hamilton County Insolvency Court
This court, created in 1894,5° was one of a pair of insolvency
courts established in Ohio which administered assignments for the
benefit of creditors, receivers for insolvent corporations, and other
commercial matters. This court was abolished in 1921,5! while the
other court, the Cuyahoga County Insolvency Court, continued to
function until 1934.
The Weekly Law Bulletin included the opinions of the Hamil-
ton County Insolvency Court.°? ;
The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, the Ohio Decisions, and the Ohio
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series, contain decisions of this court.
The Ohio Law Reporter, dealt with above in greater detail un-
der the Federal Courts, also included the Hamilton County In-
solvency Court decisions.
The Municipal and Probate Courts
No adequate historical summary of the Municipal and Police
Courts of Ohio can be given in this article, in view of its limited
scope. At best, only the more significant highlights of these courts
can be presented. The Police Courts were first established in 185254
and generally given authority similar to the Justices of the Peace
and Mayor’s Courts. No pattern can be followed as to the various
Municipal Courts either as to the dates of establishment or the
jurisdiction; however, these courts now operate in most of the ma-
jor cities in Ohio, the oldest being the Cleveland Municipal Court,
created in 1910.
The Municipal and Police Courts opinions are included in the
Weekly Law Bulletin, the North Eastern Reporter, Second Series,
48 46 Ohio Laws 17.
49 See note 43 supra.
5091 Ohio Laws 844.
51108 Ohio Laws 357.
52 The Bulletin is considered in greater detail under the heading “The
Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
53 For more detailed information regarding these publications, refer to
the discussion under the heading “The Common Pleas and Probate Courts.”
5450 Ohio Laws 223.
430 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
and the Ohio Bar, publications which are outlined above under the
Supreme Court.
The Ohio Decisions Reprint, in volume 7 through 11, reprinted
the opinions in the first thirty volumes of the Weekly Law Bulle-
tin.55
The Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, the Ohio Decisions, the Ohio Nisi
Prius Reports, New Series, and the Ohio Supplement also covered
the Municipal and Police Courts opinions.*®
The Federal Courts
The Ohio Law Reporter, more fully discussed under the Fed-
eral Courts, contains decisions of the Municipal and Police Courts.
The Ohio Law Abstract, which is treated in detail under the
Courts of Appeals, also includes Municipal and Police Court opin-
ions.
A number of reports have selected and published certain fed-
eral cases particularly applicable to Ohio law. These publications
are outlined below. The general federal reports, however, are not
included in this survey.
The Ohio Federal Decisions, in sixteen volumes, printed se-
lected opinions of Federal Courts arising out of Ohio disputes or
construing Ohio statutes. This series, another Laning Company
publication, included opinions from many sources covering the
period 1809 to 1811.
The Weekly Law Bulletin, the Ohio Legal News, and the Ohio
Opinions contain selected decisions from the Federal Courts bear-
ing on Ohio law.°*’
The Ohio Law Reporter, in forty-two volumes, included select-
ed opinions of the Federal Courts. The Reporter, a competitor of
the Weekly Law Bulletin, was an Ohio Law Reporter Company
publication. For most of its life, it functioned as a periodical, rather
than a report, printing only Federal opinions and reserving the
other decisions for’ its companion sets, the Ohio Circuit Court Re-
ports, New Series, the Ohio Court of Appeals Reports, and the Ohio
Nisi Prius Reports, New Series. The Reporter was the victor in
the struggle for publication supremacy but was voluntarily aban-
doned at a later date in favor of the Ohio Opinions. Its title was
then combined with that of the Ohio Opinions to formulate the
caption for the advance sheets to the Ohio Opinions.
55 A more complete discussion of the Reprint is given under the heading
“The District Courts.”
56 These reports are discussed further under the heading “The Common
Pleas and Probate Courts.”
57 These publications were more completely discussed under the heading
“The Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commissions.”
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 431
The Ohio Law Abstract also covers selected Federal Courts
decisions.5®
Miscellaneous Ohio Reprints
A number of reprints of the various reports of the Ohio ju-
dicial decisions has been published. These reprints, with the ex-
ception of the Ohio Decisions Reprint, were not discussed in the
preceeding sections of this article, since they are essentially dupli-
cation of the original reports and are not independently cited.
On the other hand, the Ohio Decisions Reprint was previously
treated because of its significance and frequency of citation.
Numerous reprints or republications of the Ohio Reports and
the Ohio State Reports have been issued. These reprints were
basically duplicate copies of the originals? and have not been
independently cited by distinctive names. However, there are a
few notable exceptions to this general rule. For example, in 1850,
editions of volumes 2 and 3 of the Ohio Reports were published
with notes by S. Shellabarger. Soon thereafter a new edition of
volumes 4 through 7 was printed with notes by M. E. Curwen. A
reprint of the first seven volumes of these reports, Wilcox’s Con-
densed Reports, merits special mention. This is a condensed edition
by P. B. Wilcox, a Reporter of the Ohio Reports, with the first
four official volumes in one volume and volumes 6 and 7 in another.
The Reports were condensed by omitting the arguments of counsel.
In 1833, Reporter Hammond, the predecessor of Wilcox, published
a condensed edition of the. first two volumes of the Reports in one
volume. Neither of the latter editions found lasting favor.
A reprint of Tappan’s Reports was published in 1875 and a
revision in 1899. Both editions were typographical improvements
over the original but otherwise did not alter the text.
The R. D. and J. H. Handy’s Reports of Cases in the Superior
Court of Cincinnati suspended publication while in the middle
of the second volume. Thus, it includes only 288 pages, without
title or index. In 1877, a new edition, two volumes in one, was
published with notes by Lewis E. Mills.
Wright’s Ohio Supreme Court Reports was republished in
1884 as a second edition with annotations.
Mr. Carl Jahn, while publishing the Weekly Law Bulletin
and competing with the Laning Company, issued certain reprints
583A more specific treatment of this publication is given under the head-
ing “The Court of Appeals.”
59 The original edition of volume 7 of the Ohio Reports was published in
two parts which were inadvertently paged separately. It is therefore neces-
sary to cite that edition by part as well as volume. The second edition of
1852 has a dual pagination with both original and continuous page numbers;
therefore, it and its reprints can be cited without reference to the parts.
432 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
of cases found in the old Ohio legal periodicals. This group of re-
prints, consisting of five volumes, competed with the Laning series,
the Ohio Decisions Reprint. Although the Jahn reprints are not
as comprehensive as the Ohio Decisions Reprint, they nevertheless
include cases not found in the Reprint. These originally appeared
in the Cleveland Law Register and the Cincinnati Daily Court
Bulletin. The Jahn series is without a title but can be independently
cited, since it has separate volume and page numbers. A list
of the publications thus reprinted follows:
American Law Record
Cleveland Law Record
Cleveland Law Reporter
Cleveland Law Register
Cincinnati Daily Court Bulletin
Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin
Weekly Law Gazette
American Law Register
Western Law Journal
Western Law Monthly
Table of Abbreviations of Ohio Court Reports
Uniformity is not without its faults, yet its benefits become
apparent when one examines the numerous unstandardized and
conflicting abbreviations which have been used to identify the
various Ohio court reports. While it is too late in the season of
Ohio court reporting to give consistency to the citations of the
past publications, we can partially relieve the confusion by listing
the many varying abbreviations of the publications discussed in
this article as culled from numerous sources and repositories.
Abbreviation Publication
A. L. Rec. American Law Record
A. L. Reg. (N.S.) American Law Register, New Series
A. L. Reg. (O. 5S.) American Law Register, Old Series
Abs. Ohio Law Abstract
Am. L. Rec. American Law Record
Am. L. Reg. American Law Register
Am. Law Rec. American Law Record
Am. Law Reg. American Law Register
App. Ohio Appellate Reports
B. Weekly Law Bulletin
Bull. Weekly Law Bulletin
Burgess Ohio State Reports, volumes 46-51
c.¢. Ohio Circuit Court Reports
C. C. n.s. Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series
C.D. Ohio Circuit Decisions
C. L. Rec. Cleveland Law Record
C. L. Reg. Cleveland Law Register
C. L. Rep. Cleveland Law Reporter
C.S.C.R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter
Cin. Law Bul. Weekly Law Bulletin
1950] OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS 433
Cin. Mun. Dec. Cincinnati Municipal Decisions
Cin. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter
Cin. S.C. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter
Cin. S. C. Rep. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter
Cin. Supr. Ct. R. Cincinnati Superior Court Reporter
Cincinnati Law Bull. Weekly Law Bulletin
Cir. Ct. Dec. Ohio Circuit Court Decisions
Cleve. L. Rec. Cleveland Law Record
Cleve. L. Reg. Cleveland Law Register
Cleve. L. Rep. Cleveland Law Reporter
Cleve. Law R. Cleveland Law Reporter
Cleve. Law Rec. Cleveland Law Record
Cleve. Law Reg. Cleveland Law Register
Critch. Ohio State Reports, volumes 5-21
D. Disney’s Reports
D. Ohio Decisions
D. Rep. Ohio Decisions Reprint
D. Repr. Ohio Decisions Reprint
Dayton 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions
Dayton T. R. Iddings’ Term Reports
Dayton Term Rep. Iddings’ Term Reports
Dec. Rep. Ohio Decisions Reprint
Disn. Disney’s Reports
Gaz. Weekly Law Gazette
Goebel Goebel’s Probate Reports
Gottschall 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions
Granger Ohio State Reports, volumes 22-23
Griswold Ohio State Reports, volumes 14-19
H. Handy’s Reports
Ham. Ohio Reports, volumes 1-9
Hammond Ohio Reports, volumes 1-9
Han. Handy’s Reports
Hand. Handy’s Reports
Handy Handy’s Reports
Hosea Cincinnati Superior Court Decisions
Idd. T. R. Iddings’ Term Reports
Idding Iddings’ Term Reports
Iddings T. R. D. Iddings’ Term Reports
L. & B. Bull. Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin
L. C. D. Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions)
L. R. Ohio Law Reporter
Law & Bk. Bull. Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin
Lawrence Ohio Reports, volume 20
Lower Ct. Dec. Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions)
Misc. Dec. 3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions
N. E. North Eastern Reporter
N. E. 2d North Eastern Reporter, Second Series
N. P. Ohio Nisi Prius Reports
N. P.n.s. Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series
No. East. Rep North Eastern Reporter
O. Ohio Reports
O.A. Ohio Appellate Reports
O. A. R. Ohio Appellate Reports
O. App. Ohio Appellate Reports
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Ohio Cir. Ct.
Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.)
Ohio Cir. Ct. R.
Ohio Cir. Ct. R., N.S.
Ohio Cir. Dec.
Ohio Dec.
Ohio Dec., N. P.
Ohio Dec. Repr.
Ohio F. Dec.
Ohio Fed. Dec.
Ohio L. Abs.
Ohio L. B.
Ohio L. J.
Ohio L. R.
Ohio Law Abst.
Ohio Law Bull.
Ohio Law J.
Ohio Law R.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports
Ohio Circuit Court Decisions
Ohio Circuit Court Reports
Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series
Ohio Circuit Decisions
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Circuit Decisions
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Decisions Reprint
Ohio Federal Decisions
Ohio Law Abstract
Ohio Law Abstract
Weekly Law Bulletin
Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions)
Ohio Law Journal
Ohio Law Journal
Ohio Legal News
Ohio Law Reporter
Ohio Law Reporter
Ohio Legal News
Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions)
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series
Ohio Opinions
Ohio State Reports
Ohio Supreme Court Decisions
(Unreported Cases)
Ohio Supreme Court Decisions
(Unreported Cases)
Ohio State Reports
Ohio Supplement
Ohio Reports
Ohio Reports
Ohio Appellate Reports
Ohio Courts of Appeals Reports
Ohio Circuit Court Reports
Ohio Circuit Court Decisions
Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series
Ohio Circuit Court Reports
Ohio Circuit Court Reports, New Series
Ohio Circuit Decisions
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Decisions Reprint
Ohio Federal Decisions
Ohio Federal Decisions
Ohio Law Abstract
Weekly Law Bulletin
Ohio Law Journal
Ohio Law Reporter
Ohio Law Abstract
Weekly Law Bulletin
Ohio Law Journal
Ohio Law Reporter
1950]
Ohio Leg. N.
Ohio Legal N.
Ohio Lower Dec.
Ohio Misc. Dec.
Ohio N. P.
Ohio N. P., N.S.
Ohio, N.S.
Ohio Op.
Ohio Prob.
Ohio S. & C. P. Dec.
Ohio S. U.
Ohio St.
Ohio St., N.S.
Ohio Sup. & C. P. Dec.
Ohio Supp.
Ohio Unrept. Cas.
Rand.
S. &C. P. Dec.
Stanton
Sup. & C. P. Dec.
Wkly. Law Bull.
W.L.B.
Warden & Smith
Warden’s Law and
Bk. Bull.
Week. Cin. L. B.
Week. L. Gaz.
Week. Law Bull.
Week. Law Gaz.
West. L. J.
West. L. M.
West. L. Mo.
West. Law J.
West. Law M.
Wilcox
Wright
OHIO’S REPORTED DECISIONS
Ohio Legal News
Ohio Legal News
435
Ohio Decisions (Ohio Lower Decisions)
3 Ohio Miscellaneous Decisions
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series
Ohio Reports, Annotated
Ohio Opinions
Goebel’s Probate Reports
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Supreme Court Decisions
(Unreported Cases)
Ohio State Reports
Ohio State Reports, Annotated
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Supplement
Ohio Supreme Court Decisions
(Unreported Cases)
Ohio State Reports, volume 52-71
Ohio Decisions
Ohio Reports, volumes 11-13
Ohio Decisions
Tappan’s Reports
Tappan’s Reports
Tappan’s Reports
Wright’s Reports
Weekly Law Bulletin
Weekly Law Bulletin
Weekly Law Gazette
Weekly Law Gazette
Western Law Journal
Western Law Journal
Western Law Monthly
Ohio State Reports, volumes 2, 4
Ohio State Reports, volumes 2, 4
Ohio State Reports, volume 3
Weekly Law and Bank Bulletin
Weekly Law Bulletin
Weekly Law Gazette
Weekly Law Bulletin
Weekly Law Gazette
Western Law Journal
Western Law Monthly
Western Law Monthly
Western Law Journal
Western Law Monthly
Ohio Reports, volume 10
Wright’s Reports
The Ohio Legislative Reference Bureau
And Its Place in The Legislative
Process
ArtTHuR A. SCHWARTz*
In the American way of life which is based on the theory of
representative government as the bulwark of a free people, the
legislator becomes the cornerstone upon which rests the responsi-
bility of encompassing through the vehicle of legislation the sum
total of man’s relations with his fellow man.
For generations the hackneyed phrase of mediocre legislative
accomplishment has perpetuated itself in common parlance. The
distrust of legislatures in general has in many instances resulted
in state constitutions which are nothing more than compiled statutes
with innumerable restrictions on the action of the legislator.' By
the legislative reference bureau supplying the proper technical
aid to the legislators, the legislative process can be lifted up by
its own bootstraps.
The legislator may be a newcomer to the field of legislation.
From all walks of life, from every focus of endeavor, we see the
farmer, the storekeeper, the country lawyer, the man of business,
the housewife, all grappling entirely unprepared with the prob-
lems of making laws that represent every phase of industrial,
social, economic or governmental life. Suddenly thrown from the
quiet of his native community, the legislator enters life on a new
plane; he must acclimate himself to his new surroundings, new
techniques must be acquired and new problems must be solved.
The comparatively simple problems which perplexed our fore-
fathers find no comparison when juxtaposed with the intricate
questions of our day, which include taxation, public utilities,
public finance, social security, insurance, elimination of crime
and a host of other subjects covering every field of human en-
deavor from the highly technical and professional to those of the
ordinary layman.
If the legislator is to represent properly his constituents he
must introduce bills and must in some way by providing the proper
impetus succeed in getting the bills passed. First, he must have
his bills drafted, and as he probably has had little, if any, drafting
experience and knows little of legal technique, he is greatly per-
plexed. He is confronted with a host of bills on as many different
* Director of The Legislative Reference Bureau, State of Ohio
1 An excellent example is the constitution of the state of Louisiana.
436
1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 437
questions and should be intellectually equipped to run the gamut
of a multitude of complex subjects. Even the scientific problems
that the chemist, the physicist or the other men of science find
difficult, must be met and solved.
The only answer is that if private business secures experts to
look after its business, the public should do likewise. Every im-
proved business method should be utilized in providing technical
assistance to our legislators to the end that men who pass the laws
may always have at their command knowledge worthy of being
utilized in the making of good laws.
And here the legislative reference bureau steps in as liaison
officer to bridge the gap, as it were, and make it easier for the leg-
islator to enter upon his new duties with a greater degree of pro-
ficiency. Unless the bureau enters into this relationship with the
spirit to win the legislator’s confidence and trust, unbiased and un-
influenced by partisanship, and with unflinching devotion to truth,
fact finding and scholarship, the bureau is not fulfilling its function.
ORIGIN OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE MovEMENT
The legislator groping for light, fumbling his way through the
musty archives of a university library, laid the groundwork for
a vision to a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in
1901, and out of that vision has evolved the legislative reference
concept, which from its first inception in New York? and Wiscon-
sin has grown until it now encompasses a large percentage of our
states.
With a background deeply vested in the fundamentals of eco-
nomics, history, philosophy and political science, Charles McCarthy
left the university imbued with an idea, a spirit of helpfulness
which took concrete form in a new technique devised primarily to
provide specific aid to members of a legislative body. It was Mc-
Carthy of Wisconsin who envisioned a new order of things, in
which the art of formulating legislation, aided by fundamental re-
search into the concepts of the social sciences, could rise above the
mediocre and stand out head and shoulders above the hodgepodge
draftmanship of previous decades.
Dr. Charles McCarthy lived to see a dream come true — he
saw the art of legislative draftsmanship lifted to a place worthy of
its importance.’ In 1912, he published “The Wisconsin Idea‘ in
2 While the state of New York actually started a legislative reference
bureau in 1890 as a section of the New York State Library, it was Wisconsin
that first attracted national interest in the field.
3 Dr. Charles McCarthy was chief of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference
Library from its inception in 1901 until his death in 1921.
4 McCartny, THE Wisconsin Inga, (New York, 1912).
438 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
which he outlined for posterity the objects and purposes of a leg-
islative reference bureau.‘
EVOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BuREAU IN OHIO
Ohio ranks among one of the earliest of the states in which ef-
forts were made to focus attention on the needs of calling for
technical assistance in drafting bills and in supplying legislative
members with research data to aid the legislative process. ,
As early as 1908 two bills were introduced in the Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly providing for the establishment of a legislative
reference department in the Ohio State Library.®
Reintroduced in the regular session of 1910, a bill was finally
passed on May 10, 1910, as “An Act to provide for a legislative
reference and information department in connection with the Ohio
State Library.”? Under this law there was established in connec-
tion with the state library a department to be known as the Legis-
lative and Information Department for the use and information es-
pecially of the general assembly, the officers of the several state
departments and such other persons as may desire to consult the
same.
In 1913, an act entitled, “An Act to create a legislative refer-
ence department, to provide for the maintenance and administration
of the said department, for the appointment of a chief thereof, and
to repeal sections 798-1 to 798-5 of the General Code of Ohio,” was
passed by the assembly. This newly created department was still
kept under the control of the board of library commissioners as
was the old department. The duties of the chief prescribed by this
act are the same as provided in Section 798-3, General Code.®
5For a complete biography of Charles McCarthy, see: Frrzpatricx, Mc-
CarTHy oF Wisconsin, (New York, 1944).
6 House Bill No. 709, 77th General Assembly, was introduced January 7,
1908, and was defeated in the house January 23, 1908. House Journal, Ohio
General Assembly No. 99 (1908).
House Bill No. 1043, 77th General Assembly, was introduced February 3,
1908, and died in the committee on libraries. House Journal, Ohio General
Assembly No. 99 (1908).
7 House Bill No. 384, 78th General Assembly, passed April 30, 1910 (101
Ohio Laws, 221).
8103 Ohio Laws, 8.
9“It shall be the duty of the director to collect and compare the laws
of this and other states pertaining to any subject upon which he may be
requested to report by the governor or any committee or member of the
general assembly; to collect all available information relating to any matter
which shall be the subject of proposed legislation by the general assembly;
to prepare or advise in the preparation of any bill or resolution when re-
quested to do so by the governor or by any member of the General Assem-
bly; to preserve and collate all information obtained and carefully index and
arrange the same so that it may be at all times easily accessible to the mem-
bers of the general assembly, other state officials and to the general public
1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 439
In 1933 the control of the legislative reference bureau was
transferred from the state library to a legislative reference board
composed of the governor, clerk of the Senate and clerk of the
House of Representatives, who appoint the director and the secre-
tary of the bureau.’?
FUNCTIONS OF THE BuREAU
Bill Drafting
“It shall be the duty of the director * * * to prepare or advise
in the preparation of any bill or resolution when requested to do
so by the governor or by any member of the general assembly ***”"!
The most important function of the legislative reference bu-
reau is the actual drafting of bills ready for introduction in the
general assembly. Approximately 90 per cent of all bills and
practically all resolutions introduced are prepared in the bureau.
At the 1949 regular session of the general assembly, 1091 bills and
resolutions were drafted in the bureau.
The member either orally outlines the bill he desires drafted,
or presents written notes which serve as a basis for the preparation
of the bill by the drafter. Frequently drafts of bills which have
been previously prepared outside the bureau are presented, which
must be drawn over in order to meet the specifications of correctly
drafted bills, including the standard component parts of title, en-
acting clause, body and repeal clause.”
The process by which.a bill is perfected through the facilities
of the bureau, and made ready for introduction on the floor of the
general assembly, makes an interesting story.
for reference purposes; to collect such books, pamphlets, periodicals, docu-
ments and other literature as may be of use to the general assembly or other
state officials, and to keep the same on file in the quarters of the bureau,
temporarily or permanently, according to the time for which such literature
may be needed. It shall further be the duty of the director to collect, com-
pile, classify and index the documents of the state, including Senate and
House journals, executive and legislative documents and departmental reports
of this and other states; to keep on file all bills and resolutions printed by
order of either house of the general assembiy; to accumulate data and sta-
tistics regarding the practical operation and effect of statutes of this and
other states.”
10 See: Onto Gen. Cope § 798-1.
11 Onto Gen. Cope § 798-3.
12 Sections of the Ohio General Code are either newly enacted, amended
or repealed. A newly enacted section appears by reference to number, only,
in the title and in section one of the bill, while the text of the section as
enacted appears in the body of the bill. An amended section appears by refer-
ence to number only in the title, in section one and in the repeal clause, and
the text of the section amended appears in the body of the bill. A repealed
section appears by reference to number only in the title and the repeal clause.
440 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The draftsman first makes a study of the General Code in or-
der to determine if there is any statute now in force and effect,
which covers the subject in any way, and determines whether any
law relates either directly or indirectly to the content of the pro-
posed bill. A like check is made of the session laws in order to as-
certain whether any law, previously adopted by the General As-
sembly, but not of a permanent or general nature has any bearing
on the content of the bill.’
Through a complete set of the Journals of the general assembly,
and through a like file of the final bulletins which index all bills
and resolutions introduced, access can readily be had to the bills
of any previous session of the general assembly, which may in any
manner relate to the subject matter of the bill under consideration
and which may be an important factor in determining the content
of the new bill being prepared. Likewise the pamphlet acts of
previous sessions are frequently utilized to great advantage, es-
pecially where minor changes are made in a large number of sec-
tions of previously enacted laws. (In this case, the bill is typed
directly from the slip act.)
The next step in the process is determining whether any com-
parative legislation of other states would be helpful in the formu-
lation of the content of the bill. Digests of legislation of other
states on various subjects filed in the bureau library are used. Al-
so the “State Law Index” of the Legislative Reference Service of
the Library of Congress serves as an index to legislation in other
states, citing acts which are available in the codes and session
laws of the various states on file in the Supreme Court Law
Library.
Frequently the necessity of reading decisions of the supreme
court and courts of appeals as well as Opinions of the Attorney
General, construing certain sections of the code concerning which
requests for amendments have been filed in the bureau, have im-
portant bearing on the actual wording of the amendment sought.
Then too, on numerous occasions amendments to statutes are re-
quested for the express purpose of obviating previously rendered
opinions of the attorney general and court decisions construing
said statutes.
On the face of it, the comparatively simple task of drafting
a bill on any particular subject, may have far deeper implications.
Is the bill within the encompassing sphere of constitutional limi-
tations? Does the bill fulfill a legitimate function? Is there a
philosophic background that justifies its existence?
Whenever a bill is drafted by the bureau and questions of
13 The reader should keep in mind the fact that only laws of a permanent
or general nature are included in the Ohio General Code.
1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 441
constitutionality arise in the opinion of the staff of the bureau,
a brief is presented to the author of the bill summarizing court
decisions and attorney general’s opinions on the basis of which
the bureau deems the bill constitutional or unconstitutional, as
the case may be.
But how are we to determine when the purpose of a law, which
is unaffected by any express prohibition in the constitution, is
legitimate? The answer may appear to be easy. Look first to the
purpose of the constitution itself. Thus the central thought mani-
fests itself as the very foundation upon which the whole is built.
If the purpose of the proposed law is within this all encircling
spirit then such law is legitimate, as anything fairly within that
has always been, and must necessarily always be.
Thus, far above the actual mechanics of lawmaking or law
drafting lies a far more significant, a far deeper attribute.
Another element of prime importance in legislative drafting
is the confidential relationship which must of necessity be entered
into between the legislator and the legislative reference bureau.
Legislators being human, often take pride in being the first to
initiate a brand-new idea on the floor of the legislative halls.
Their thoughts and observations and suggested solutions of legis-
lative problems must be guarded with utmost secrecy while the
bill is in the process of preparation and until he, and he alone,
cares to divulge it.
The legislative reference bureau only fulfills its mission in
prudent guidance. Never must it assert itself in matters of policy.
That is the province of the legislator. Whenever the legislator has
the slightest inkling that research or reference material has been
assembled or put forward with the slightest flavor of bias, he
will feel that the bureau is no longer serving on the high plane
on which it was established. That is where the line must be closely
drawn. The legislator must be the sole judge. Decisions must be
based on facts.
The actual bill drafting function loses its identity and merges
itself into the finished product in the various steps a bill takes in
its course through the general assembly. When the bill as finally
enacted in the end finds its place in the Ohio General Code, it
often bears no resemblance or perhaps only slight resemblance
to the bill as initially introduced. This is often due to the ironing
out of the wants and needs of conflicting interests to the best
satisfaction of all concerned.
The element of compromise enters into most successfully en-
acted legislation. Unless a spirit of give and take plays its part
in the process, very few laws would finally be enacted, and fre-
quently compromises are successfully concluded through the
442 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
intermediary relationship effected by the legislative reference bu-
reau by which antagonistic minds are brought together and con-
flicting ideas harmonized.
These compromises are brought about on numerous occasions
through the amending and reamending process in which the legis-
lative reference bureau comes to the legislators’ assistance in
the preparation of these amendments.
It often happens that after introduction and reference to com-
mittee and after committee hearings, and both sides of a question
have been throughly discussed, a bill must be rewritten in its
entirety. In that event the bureau is likely to be asked to draft
a new bill.
Usually amendments are offered to bills during their course
through both houses of the general assembly, either in committee
or on the floor of either house. Again it becomes the province of
the legislative reference bureau to prepare these amendments.
The conference table, whereat the discussion and digestion
of crosscurrents of opinion frequently contribute an important
element to the formulating of new legislation or the revamping
of former laws, likewise plays its part in the legislative process.
Here the facilities of the bureau are utilized to great advantage.
In the preliminary discussion in which forthcoming legislation is
outlined, in the threshing over and the rethreshing of ideas, the
discussion around the conference table forms an invaluable aid.
Often the draftsmen in the bureau are called to take part in
these discussions, in preparation for the drafting of a bill and the
director of the bureau frequently participates, upon request, in both
the deliberations of interim commissions, pre-session conferences
and in the multitude of instances where the counterplay of ideas
precipitates a meeting of the minds on legislative issues.
File of Bills, Resolutions and Acts
“It shall further be the duty of the director *** to keep on file
all bills and resolutions printed by order of either house of the
general assembly; ***”!4
Bills represent potential future legislation. They serve as a
clearing house for embryonic ideas that will often crystalize in
the future, but at the time of introduction they indicate matters
that are stirring in the hearts and minds of the people, but are
still without the backing of an organized public opinion.
Bills introduced at previous sessions serve as stimuli to sub-
sequent legislation. Often after repeated introductions into the
General Assembly, these bills finally find their place in the statutes
of the state.
14 Onto Gen. Cone § 798-3.
1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 443
The bureau maintains a file of bills and joint resolutions in-
troduced in the Ohio General Assembly since 1880;'5 and of acts
passed since 1913. The copies of the acts on file are in the form
of pamphlets or slip acts and are available for use of the bureau,
the members of the general assembly, and for distribution in
limited number to those parties having a special interest therein.
This file of bills, joint resolutions and acts represents the only
file kept in this state of proposed, as well as, of enacted legislation
of previous sessions.
All printed bills'® of each current session are bound into bill
books and kept on file in the bureau. These include all printings
of each bill, which may in some instances involve as many as two,
three or four printings, as originally introduced, as amended bills,
as substitute bills, and as amended substitute bills.
Likewise separate copies of all bills printed including reprints
are placed in file boxes according to bill number. These separate
copies are utilized by the bureau for subsequent bill drafting,
and copies are available to members of the general assembly as
the basis for proposed legislation at later sessions, and a very
limited number, if any, are available to the public for study by
research or other agencies having a direct interest in the subject
matter of the bill. A few copies of ail bills and acts are kept perm-
anently on file.
In some instances a bill is reported out to a standing committee
with recommendations that it be not printed; it may however be
rewritten by the standing committee which then reports the bill
out with recommendations that it be printed as a substitute bill.
Hence the bill is not available as originally introduced.
Maintaining a Reference Library
“Tt shall be the duty of the director *** to collect such books,
pamphlets, periodicals, documents and other literature as may be
of use to the general assembly or other state officials, and to keep
the same on file in the quarters of the bureau, temporarily or
permanently, according to the time for which such literature
may be needed.”!”
Another important duty of the bureau is the collection of
15 See: Onto Gen. Cope § 798-6, which directs the clerk of both houses
of the General Assembly to deliver, at the end of each session, copies of all
bills and joint resolutions to the director of the legislative reference bureau.
16 All bills are usually printed after introduction in the Senate, while in
the House of Representatives bills undergo a general screening process by
the reference committee. If the subject matter of the bill has been covered
by a previously introduced bill, or if the bill can be handled as an amend-
ment to another bill the reference committee so recommends and the bill is
never printed. Bills of a frivolous nature are likewise not printed.
17 Onto Gen. Cone § 798-3.
444 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
a wide range of material that can be utilized in the preparation
of legislation.
The catalogued pamphlet library of the bureau covers sub-
jects of legislative interest, especially in the field of the social
sciences, including reports of legislative commissions of this and
other states, and other special reports of studies and documents
in the field of state government. It must be a working library,
futuristic in intent and purpose.
The library is indexed by author and subject and is constantly
kept up to date by the addition of new material as published and
through the elimination of obsolete or redundant material.
In addition to the catalogued pamphlet library, there is also
kept on file in the bureau one of the few extant complete sets
of the journals of the Ohio Senate and the House of Representatives,
containing a complete record of the proceedings of both houses
of the general assembly since its inception in 1803. This is purely
a procedural record as no stenographic transcripts of the debates
on the floor of the general assembly or of committee hearings
are made.
The bureau also contains a complete set of the 123 volumes
of the session laws of Ohio, a complete set of the Ohio Reports,
Ohio State Reports and a set of Attorney General’s Opinions ren-
dered since 1910.
Digesting Legislation and Collecting Statistical Data
“It shall be the duty of the director to collect and compare
the laws of this and other states pertaining to any subject upon
which he may be requested to report by the governor or any com-
mittee or member of the general assembly; to collect all available
information relating to any matter which shall be the subject of
proposed legislation by the general assembly; ***’'!8
Common sense tells us that we should secure all possible
knowledge relating to a proposed statute for the use of our legis-
lators. In this way legislation cannot avoid being improved; in
this manner the best there is can be be culled from the statutes
throughout the length and breadth of our land and the dearly
bought experience in one state used for the betterment of condi-
tions in another state.
Especially during the interim beween sessions of the general
assembly, digests of the laws of all states covering subjects within
the scope of current interim commissions!’ or relating to subjects
18 Jd.
19The Ohio General Assembly is utilizing the interim commission more
and more as an adjunct to the legislative process. These commissions serve
as fact-finding agencies which make long range studies of legislative issues
during the interim, and then prepare reports, embodying recommended bills
carrying out the commissions’ recommendations.
1950] LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 445
which are likely to come up for discussion at a forthcoming session
of the general assembly, are prepared at the request of interim
commissions or of individual members of the general assembly. All
these digests are catalogued and placed on the library shelves for
reference and are continually used in the drafting of bills or the
supplying of research data for interim commissions, standing com-
mittees of both houses of the general assembly, as well as indi-
vidual members.
The process of ascertaining statistical data or other factual
information concerning any proposed legislation often involves
the gleaning of information from federal and state documents and
the necessary research work involved in checking material on
file in various government agencies of the state of Ohio and its
political subdivisions.
THe Councit oF STATE GOVERNMENTS
The Council of State Governments of Chicago, which is an
outgrowth of the American Legislators’ Association established in
1925, through the medium of its various publications, is an im-
portant adjunct to the services offered by the reference bureau.
This organization is committed to the improvement of state gov-
ernment, especially on the legislative level.
Among the numerous publications sponsored and published
by the Council of State Governments and designed primarily to
aid the legislative process and which have become leading tools
of the legislative reference bureau, we may mention the following:
“Recent Publications of Governmental Problems” (This is a
self-explanatory weekly checklist.)
“Legislative Research Checklist” (A monthly checklist based
on information sent to the council by legislative and other govern-
mental research agencies and prepared as an interstate reference
service.)
“State Government” (A monthly magazine on state affairs.)
“The Book of the States” (This book is published biennially
as an authoritative source of information on state activities, admin-
istration, legislatures, services, problems and progress, together
with current listings of state elective and administrative officials
and members of the legislatures.)
The Council of State Governments also acts in the capacity
of secretariat for a number of conferences of officials on every
level of governmental interest, national, state and local.
Of chief interest to the legislative reference bureau is the
Legislative Service Conference, organized in 1948. This confer-
ence is composed of legislators who are officers of legislative
service agencies, legislative librarians and reference officials,
446 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
statutory and code revisors and legislative drafting officials of the
states and territories. At the annual conference discussions of di-
rect interest to all legislative service agencies are promoted.
UTILizATION OF STUDENT SERVICES
In the early nineteen twenties and continuously since that
time the Ohio Legislative Reference Bureau has utilized the as-
sistance of senior law students of the College of Law of The Ohio
State University. These law students are chosen solely on the rec-
ommendation of the dean of the law school and assist in the drafting
of bills, resolutions and other requests for research work by mem-
bers of the General Assembly.
Under guidance the youth with a trained mind with its usual
zest and vigor seizes upon the opportunity to serve the legislators.
This zeal for intellectual companionship affords the senior law
student a seminar in the solution of economic, political and social
problems, which are being translated into the language of legis-
lation.
After a preliminary course in training in the principles of
bill drafting, legislative research, parliamentary and constitu-
tional law and Ohio government, during the months of November
and December, prior to the opening of the legislative session in
January, these senior law students are ready and available to
enter upon their duties with ardor and zest. This stands out as a
splendid example of how co-operation between the university and
the reference bureau can work to the distinct advantage of the
legislators.
Our social order can never become stationary. As “new oc-
casions teach new duties” we must advance and meet the problems
of each new day and hour. The legislative reference bureau must
envision the future, keep a step ahead of current events and
foresee a particular need when the call to serve arrives. To
accomplish this, the bureau must of necessity become a social
inventor projecting plans far into the future and laid upon a defi-
nite course. One must know where one is going, and we must
insist on going forward, if only a step at a time. Thus our effort
will accentuate itself in a better legislative process and a more
finely delineated product.
With courageous application to research and to the scholarly
pursuit of information, with a keen insight into human nature
and adaptability to the multitudinous demands of eight score and
more legislators at any particular session of our General Assem-
bly, the legislative reference bureau moves on with unflinching
devotion to its goal: Service.
Life History of a Bill in the Ohio Legislature
GrorcEe B. MARSHALL*
INTRODUCTION
The 99th General Assembly of Ohio will convene in regular
session on January 1, 1951. As usual a great many bills will be
introduced seeking to make some amendments in our present
laws, to repeal others, or to enact some new legislation. All acts of
the legislature affect every citizen of the state in some measure,
but, of course, individual acts affect certain interested groups
more than others. Therefore there is much interest manifested
both in favor of and against each bill which is presented and that
interest continues until the bill is lost some place along the line
or is finally enacted into law. Usually less than a third of the bills
introduced are finally enacted into law. The purpose of this paper
is to show the steps required to enact a law in our state legis-
lature. This logically will deal first with the preparation of a bill
and secondly with the steps necessary for its enactment into law.
A. PREPARATION OF BILL
Approximately 75% of all bills introduced in the general as-
sembly are drafted by the Legislative Reference Bureau which is
a bill-drafting service free to members. The balance of the bills
introduced are prepared by private attorneys, organizations, or
by the members themselves.
Task of Bill Drafter
A request by a member for the drafting of a bill may be a
simple matter or a very complex one, depending in part on the
subject-matter of the request and in part on the completeness of
the idea to be incorporated into the bill. Some bills have been
carefully worked over in advance by special groups, such as bar
associations, organizations of county auditors, professional so-
cieties, and the like. These bills ordinarily require only formal
corrections. Administration measures are usually found in this
same classification. The member introducing a bill may be pledged
by campaign promises to introduce a measure on which he is an
authority or on which he has definite and detailed ideas. It then
becomes the duty of the bill-drafter to incorporate the given
ideas into a workable bill, which sometimes requires considerable
research and often an investigation into the constitutionality of
the proposed bill. Some bills are introduced “by request” of a
* State Senator from Franklin County, Ohio.
447
448 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
member’s constituents. Oftentimes these are difficult to draft be-
cause of the vagueness of the idea and too often they do not get
the sincere enthusiastic support of their authors.
Essential Parts of a Bill
All bills, whether long or short, simple or complicated, have
certain essential parts prescribed by the constitution, by statute,
or by rule. For example, every bill must carry a number, the num-
ber of the assembly with the type of session, the name of the author
or introducer, title, enacting clause, body of bill divided into
sections, and a repealing clause if the purpose of the bill is to amend
or repeal an existing law. The space for the number is left blank
until the bill is introduced, at which time the clerk assigns it a
consecutive number, depending on the order of its introduction.
A bill introduced next year would have at the upper left-hand
corner the words “99th General Assembly, Regular Session, 1951-
1952.” Next would follow the name of the author or introducer.
The State Constitution requires that “no bill shall contain more
than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” It
is also a constitutional requirement that a bill have an enacting
clause, as follows:
“Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio.”
Example of Original Bill
When the subject matter of the bill is new, and is not already
contained in the General Code of Ohio, the title of such a bill
might read, for example, as follows:
“A bill to levy and collect taxes on the business of grey-
hound racing in the State of Ohio; and to provide a penalty
for violation thereof.”
Example of a Simple Amendment
When the purpose of the bill is to amend an existing law, al-
ready included in the general code, the title of the bill might
read thus:
“A bill to amend Section 1398 of the General Code rela-
tive to the open season on muskrat in the inland trap-
ping district.”
Example of Supplemental Bill
If the purpose of a bill is to supplement an existing law its
title might read:
“A bill to supplement Section 5609 of the General Code
by the enactment of supplemental Section 5609-1, rela-
tive to the abolishment of taxes on over-valued or as-
sessed real property.”
Example of Simple Repeal
If the bill is designed simply to repeal an existing law, its
title might be:
1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 449
“A bill to repeal Section 13421-23 of the General Code rela-
tive to the Criminal syndicalism law.”
Body of the Bill
The aforementioned requirements of a bill, while essential,
are preliminary to the real purpose and body of the bill, which is
next set forth. The body of a bill is the part which is finally
printed into the code of the state and which declares and regis-
ters the will of the assembly. A bill may be of any length provided
it conforms to the constitutional rule that it shall not contain
more than one subject. As a matter of convenience the body of
the bill is divided into logical sections of convenient length.
Who May Introduce Bills
Bills may be introduced by any of the 33 State Senators or of
the 135 members of the House of Representatives elected to the
State Legislature. Even so-called administration measures must
be introduced by a member of the assembly. This requirement
is in contrast with the practice in Congress where committees may
initiate bills.
When Bills may be Introduced
The introduction of bills is a regular order of business in
the regular session from the time it first convenes at the beginning
of each odd-numbered year until the fixed deadline which by
rule is usually the second Monday in February.
This deadline does not, however, apply to appropriation
bills. Another exception is made by the Joint Rules which per-
mit introduction of bills in either House when permission is given
by a three-fifths vote of the elected members. Such permission
is rarely asked for or given in the House but is frequently and
usually given in the Senate as an act of “Senatorial Courtesy.”
Number of Bills Introduced
Some members do not introduce any bills. Others introduce
as many as 50. The total number of bills introduced during the
past eight years averages well over 900 at each regular session.
852 bills were introduced three years ago, of which only 245 be-
came law, and 1074 bills were introduced last year at the Regular
Session, of which only 293 became law.
Numbering of Sections
If the subject-matter of a bill is new the sections are consec-
utively numbered, and if the bill is of the general nature, the
sections are later given code section numbers by the Bureau of
Code Revision, so as to fit the new law into the code at the proper
place. If the purpose is to add a supplemental section to an ex-
isting section in the code, the introducer refers to the section to
450 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
be supplemented and gives the new section a supplemental section
number. If the bill simply repeals existing sections of the code,
it mentions them specifically and these sections are eliminated
from future printings of the code. If the purpose of the bill is to
amend existing sections, all or any part of the section may be elim-
inated or new matter may be added to any part of the section
so long as the matter relates to the general subject contained
in the section.
Repealing Clause
In case an existing law is either amended or repealed the last
section of the bill is a repealing clause.
Emergency Measure
A bill which is intended to take effect immediately after its
passage and approval by the governor must contain an emergency
clause fully setting forth the reason for such emergency and the
title of such a bill must declare that the bill is to be an emergency
measure. An emergency measure requires a 2/3 majority vote
and takes effect immediately following the approval of the gov-
ernor, thereby eliminating the 90-day referendum period required
for ordinary bills.
B. ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION
I have just shown in a summary fashion how bills are pre-
pared and made ready for introduction. Let me now follow the
course of such a bill from the time it is introduced in either house
of the state legislature until it is enacted into law. While there are
slight differences in the procedure in the House and Senate, the
essential steps are the same, and I will outline the procedure in
the House of Representatives.
First Reading
The 8th order of business in the House is the introduction
of bills. The 88 counties are called in alphabetical order. If a mem-
ber from Frankliri County, for example, desires to introduce a bill
he waits until the Clerk calls the name of Franklin County then
rises to his feet and offers the bill (6 copies required by rule).
A page comes to the member and carries the bill to the desk of
the clerk where it is numbered and given its first reading, which
is by title only.
Reference of Bill
After its first reading the bill is sent to the Reference Com-
mittee for its consideration and report. The Reference Committee
must, within eight legislative days from the time it receives a bill,
report the bill back to the House and recommend the proper stand-
ing committee to consider the bill. In actual practice the House
1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 451
Reference Committee, or its chairman acting for the Committee
has been more than a sorting committee. It has scrutinized bills as
to both form and substance and on one pretext or another has on
occasion held up certain bills until the Administration is ready to
have them released. Furthermore, the committee wields great in-
fluence in being able to steer bills into standing committees which
may be known to favor or oppose the bills. The use of a Reference
Committee as we have it in Ohio is somewhat unique in parlia-
mentary practice. In the Ohio Senate the presiding officer, on
motion of the author, refers all bills to standing committees.
Second Reading
The reading of the bill by title only, together with the report
of the Reference Committee, constitutes the second reading of the
bill, which is then ordered printed. Within several days there-
after the printed bill is placed on the desk of the members and is
available to the public. The chairman of the standing committee
to which the bill is referred retains custody of the actual bill and
amendments thereto.
Hearings by Standing Committees
There are at present twenty-two standing committees in the
House of Representatives, having from five to twenty-five mem-
bers each. The Senate has nineteen standing committees, the
membership ranging from three in the Enrollment Committee to
sixteen in the Military Affairs Committee. Certain committees,
such as the Judiciary, Taxation and Finance Committees meet
regularly each week and several times each week in rooms spe-
cifically assigned for use of such committees. Other committees
meet only on call of the Chairman in whatever committee room
is available at the time.
Work of Committees
The real work of digesting and considering the bill is done in
meetings of the standing committees after public hearings and dis-
cussions on the merits of the bill. After the committee has made
what it considers a sufficient study of the bill, its chairman calls
for a vote. On a roll call a majority of the committee member-
ship must vote in favor of a motion to refer the bill out of com-
mittee with recommendation for passage. The committee might
approve a motion to continue hearings on the bill, or to refer it to
a subcommittee for further study. Another common motion is one
to postpone indefinitely further consideration of the bill and such
action must be reported to the House and entered upon its journal.
The Secretary keeps a record of all amendments and motions of-
fered and of the vote on such amendments and motions. He will
also take custody of exhibits and briefs offered to the committee.
452 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11
The rules require each committee to keep a record of committee
attendance and the names of all persons who speak before the
committee, with the names of the persons, firms, associations or
corporations in whose behalf they appear. Before any committee
reports a bill to the House, its chairman must submit it to the
Reference Committee and obtain its suggestions as to its form and
legal effect. After approval of the bill by the Reference Committee,
the Chairman of the Standing Committee makes a report on the
same from the floor of the House on the alphabetical call of the
committees, either recommending the passage of the bill as origin-
ally introduced or as amended by the committee. The bill is then
ordered engrossed and is put on the calendar for its third reading,
which is the second day following, unless otherwise ordered by a
vote of the House.
Joint Committee Meetings
It is possible and often desirable for similar committees of the
House and Senate to meet in joint committee meetings to hear ex-
perts speak for and against important measures being considered
simultaneously by both houses. This would save time for both
the members and the public, since a bill must eventually have the
approval of the committees of both houses. However, the holding
of joint committee meetings is not common practice because of the
difficulties of finding a time when substantially all the members
can attend. Both chambers usually meet each Monday evening,
Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons and Thursday morning, and
no committees may hold meetings during such times. This leaves
for regular committee meetings Tuesday morning and evening, and
Wednesday morning and evening. Sometimes hearings are set for
immediately after a session or for early Thursday morning. Thus
it can be readily seen that with the members serving on from two
to seven committees, and many of these committees meeting reg-
ularly each week, it is difficult and often impossible to work out
effective joint committee meetings.
Discharge of Standing Committees
A committee chairman has considerable discretion in the
handling of bills. Sometimes he insists on many meetings cover-
ing a long period of time, which makes other members impatient.
The house rules provide that a standing committee may be dis-
charged of a bill by a motion supported by four other members,
and adopted by a roll call vote in which a majority of all elected
members vote to support the motion. This gives control to the ma-
jority party leadership. Since committee chairmen are appointed
by the speaker and usually work in close cooperation with him and
the majority party in control of the house, it is a rare event to dis-
1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 453
charge a committee of further consideration of a bill and such
motions are seldom made.
Calendar Committee
About March ist a resolution is offered by the House leader-
ship to designate the Rules Committee to serve as the Calendar
Committee, giving it power to arrange the calendar from day to
day and to select bills on the basis of their necessity or general in-
terest. Usually the Rules Committee selects about six bills for
consideration on the date of the calendar and a similar number for
the succeeding legislative day. The Senate Rules provide that the
standing committee on rules shall have the power to prescribe the
order of business of the Senate and arrange the calendar from day
to day. The majority party in each house selects and controls the
Rules Committee and thus wields great power over the course of
legislation.
Third Reading
Bills for third reading are taken up and read and disposed of
in the order in which they appear on the calendar. The author of
a bill is always recognized first to present his bill. If the bill origi-
nated in the other house the member selected by the author to
handle the bill is recognized and given the opportunity to present
the bill. Opportunity is then given any member to speak for or
against the bill and to offer amendments. Corrective amendments
are usually accepted and adopted without extensive debate.
Amendments making substantial changes in a bill are often fully
debated before a vote is taken. The person who offers an amend-
ment always makes the first argument in support of his amend-
ment. The author, or sponsor, is then given an opportunity to de-
bate the amendment. If he gives his consent, there is usually little
further debate before the vote is taken, but if he opposes the sug-
gested amendment there is often considerable floor discussion and
debate. Oftentimes the chairman or a member of the committee
which heard and recommended the bill is recognized and asked to
comment on the amendment.
Administration Bills
There are always a certain number of bills which are called
administration measures. These are either recommended by the
Governor or introduced to carry out certain planks of the platform
of the party in control of the House. Usually the majority party
caucuses on such bills before they come up for third reading and
there is an understanding as to what, if any, amendments will be
allowed to be adopted on the floor. Surprise amendments pre-
sented by the minority members usually have a difficult time to be
adopted unless the majority leader is willing to accept the amend-
454 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
ment and gives the signal for favorable action. Because final adop-
tion is ordinarily assured in advance, the prolonged debate usually
is made for the benefit of the gallery, press, and constituents of
the various members. The members wish to make a record of the
various votes on amendments, procedural motions and the final
vote on the bill. There is also considerable maneuvering to de-
mand or avoid a record roll call by getting a motion passed or
tabled by a voice or standing vote. The minority is given the op-
portunity to get its case before the House by submitting a list of
opposition speakers to the presiding officer and he usually calls on
definite proponents and opponents alternately before recognizing
other members for general debate or amendments.
Committee of the Whole
The rules of both houses permit a bill to be referred to the
committee of the whole House or Senate, and to fix a time when it
shall be considered by the entire body acting as such committee of
the whole. The speaker or president will designate a member to
serve as Chairman, who will preside and vote as other members.
Any amendments made or passed are noted by the clerk and when
the matter is later submitted to the House or Senate for action, it
will again consider the amendments before voting on the bill as
amended. This procedure is not often used in the House but is
common practice in the Senate.
Vote on Third Reading
After the presiding officer is satisfied that no one else desires
the floor for debate or amendment, or when the previous question
is properly asked for and adopted, the question is then put, “Shall
the bill pass?” A roll call vote is taken by the clerk and if the bill
receives a constitutional majority it is declared passed as an “act.”
Necessity for passage by both Houses
After a bill has passed the originating house, the next step is
its transmission td the other house for introduction in that body.
Approximately the same procedure is followed in the second house.
If the bill is passed by the second house in exactly the same form
as in the first house, it is signed by the speaker of the house and
by the President of the Senate and sent to the Governor for his
approval or disapproval. If the second house adopts amendments
to the bill it is returned to the originating house with the amend-
ments, which if agreed to by the first house, will be sent to the
Governor for his approval.
Conference Committee
If the originating house does not see fit to concur in the amend-
ments of the second house, a conference committee consisting of 3
1950] LIFE HISTORY OF A BILL 455
members from each house is appointed to consider the various
amendments and to propose to both houses a bill which will be
satisfactory to both. Each house then votes on the conference
committee report, the members voting for or against the report.
If both agree on the report the effect is the same as passage of a
bill in identical form by the two houses and the bill is sent to the
Governor. If either house refuses to approve the conference com-
mittee report, the bill is dead unless such house requests the ap-
pointment of a second conference committee and such request is
agreed to by the other house.
Effective Date of Act
If the Governor approves a bill he signs it and has it filed with
the Secretary of State. The bill becomes effective 90 days after
such filing unless a referendum vote has been demanded by peti-
tions circulated for that purpose. Emergency measures 4nd acts pro-
viding tax levies and appropriations for the current expenses of
state government become operative immediately after passage and
approval by the Governor.
Veto Power of Governor
If the Governor does not approve a bill he returns it with his
objections noted in a veto message to the house originating the bill.
In its proper order the message of the Governor is read and the
question is put: “Shall the bill pass notwithstanding the objections
of the Governor?” If 3/5 of the members elected to that house vote
to repass the bill, it is sent with the objections of the Governor to
the other house, which may also reconsider the vote on its passage.
If 3/5 of the members elected to that house vote to repass it, it be-
comes a law notwithstanding the objections of the Governor. Of
course if the vetoed bill is not approved by both houses as just in-
dicated, it does not become a law. If a bill is not returned by the
Governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after being present-
ed to him, it becomes a law in like manner, as if he had signed it.
The Governor has the right to disapprove separate items in an ap-
propriation bill, but the assembly may repass such items in the
same manner as a vetoed bill.
Judicial Interpretatica of Constitutional Limita-
tions on Legislative Procedure in Ohio
Howarp M. Metzensaum*
Of prime importance in enacting a legislative bill into law is
the question of whether or not the bill as enacted will stand up
under judicial scrutiny when its validity is attacked in court. The
validity of a statute is generally questioned on the ground of some
constitutional defect under the federal or state constitution de-
pending on the circumstances and may either be a matter of sub-
stance or procedure. It is the purpose of this paper to examine
the problems involved from a procedural point of view as they
have arisen in the State of Ohio.!
The fundamental questions are (1) the attitude of the courts
when they are requested to look behind the enacted bill to discover
defects in its passage, and (2) in any event, if defects are alleged
to exist, whether such defects will be considered by the court in
determining the validity of the measure.
By way of introduction into the first above mentioned question
it may be stated that the conflict is between the enrolled bill itself
as precluding any further search of the records and the journal
kept by the legislative body of its activities as the controlling in-
strument. The words “enrolled bill” have accumulated many shades
of meaning but in general they refer to a bill which has been passed
by both houses of a legislature and signed by the presiding officers
thereof. Such may also include the signature of the governor and
the filing of the bill with the secretary of state.2 As to the journal
in Ohio, it is a constitutional requirement and must be published.’
Throughout this country, the courts have adopted various
theories in approaching the question of the validity of a statute.‘
One such view is that the enrolled bill is conclusive and no evidence
will be admitted to show that required procedure was not followed
in its passage or that the contents of the enrolled bill differ from
the contents of the bill as passed by the legislative body. A second
view holds that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only
when the legislative journal affirmatively shows an omission of a
* State Senator from The Twenty-Fifth District in Ohio.
1The problems under discussion here are not peculiar to Ohio. For in-
formative matter as to other jurisdictions see the following secondary sources:
46 Mic. L. Rev. 989 (1948); 32 Iowa L. Rev. 147 (1946); [1941] Wisc. L. Rev.
439, 15 Nes. L. But. 233 (1937); 21 Iowa L. Rev. 538 (1936); 3 Rocky Moun-
TAIN L. Rev. 38 (1936).
2 SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STaTuToRY ConstrucTION, § 1401 (3rd 1943).
3 Onto Const. Art. II § 9.
4Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N.E. 591 (1915); SurHeranp,
supra § 1402.
456
1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 457
constitutionally-required procedural step will the enrolled bill be
invalidated. Still another theory holds the enrolled bill is prima
facie correct but evidence from the journal or from any other re-
liable source may be offered to show that the requisite procedure
was not followed or that the enrolled bill differs in content from
the bill as passed. A fourth and last view holds that the bill is
valid only if the requisite steps are shown by the journal to have
taken place.
In Ohio, the leading case of Ritzman v. Campbell’ established
the enrolled bill theory as to the contents of a measure and handed
down a dictum that went almost that far as to procedural require-
ments. In this case the court said®:
Meanwhile an enrolled bill bearing the solemn attestation
that it was signed by the presiding officers of each house
while the same was in session and capable of doing busi-
ness, and which thereafter was presented to and signed by
the Governor and by him filed with the Secretary of State,
must, if the legislative journal shows it to have received
the necessary constitutional majority be considered to be
what it purports to be, and not under any circumstances
subject to impeachment as to its contents or the mode of
its passage.
It will be noted that the court provided an exception as to
procedure, indicating that the journal must show the bill received
the constitutional majority. Authority for this approach developed
out of the earlier case of Fordyce v. Goodman’, which held that
when the question of whether a bill has been passed by the requisite
number of legislators is raised, the journals are proper evidence to
determine the answer. While this represents an apparent deviation
into another theory mentioned earlier, the court offered a very
practical justification, pointing out that to hold otherwise would
open the door for presiding officers to enact a bill without the
proper vote. Further, until the journal itself is produced to show
that the requisite number of votes was not received, the enrolled
bill will be presumed to have received the required constitutional
majority.’
Occasionally a question arises as to the authoritativeness of
the certified copies of the enrolled bills published in the volumes
of Ohio Laws under the authority of the secretary of state. Such
copies are prima facie evidence of the law and may be controverted
by reference to the enrolled bills!® but not to the journals of the
5 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
6 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, at 263.
7 Fordyce v. Goodman, 20 Ohio St. 1 (1870).
8 Hilton v. State ex rel. Bell, 108 Ohio St. 233, 140 N.E. 681 (1923); Steam-
boat Northern Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 384 (1857).
9 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, 8 Ohio C.C. 25, 4 Ohio C.D. 296 (1893).
10 State v. Groves, 8 Ohio St. 351, 88 N.E. 1096 (1909).
458 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
legislature.!!
Turning now to the second question involved in this discussion,
namely, what limitations the court will consider in testing the
validity of a bill, the law of Ohio seems clear. The Constitution of
the State of Ohio provides for the reading of a bill fully and dis-
tinctly on three different days, unless this provision is properly
waived.'?. As to this provision, the court will not travel behind
the enacted bill to see if compliance therewith has been had, holding
this provision to be merely directory in its nature and not manda-
tory upon the legislature.'’ This last statement was made con-
crete in the later case of Tim v. Nicholson'* which dealt with the
constitutional provision that no bill shall contain more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.!5. This limini-
tation was held to be intended only as a permanent rule for pro-
ceedings in the legislature and therefore directory. The court said
it would not be considered in determining the validity of the bill.
The safeguard suggested by the court was the legislators’ regard
for and their oath to support the constitution of the State.
However, as to other provisions they have been labeled as
mandatory,'® which in effect is saying that non-compliance will
result in invalidating the bill.
The Ohio Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
in either house without the concurrence of a majority of each
House’s members.'’ This is clearly a mandatory limitation on the
legislature.'8
Presentment of a bill to the governor for his approval and the
subsequent filing of a bill which is subject to referendum with the
secretary of state are of a similar import.!°
In the case of State v. Kiesewetter?® the court held section 17
of Article II of the Constitution of Ohio was mandatory and there-
11 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, note 4. Contrary expressions in early low-
er court cases are, of course, without authority. See State ex rel. Rogers v.
Price, supra, Burke v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Dec. 542 (1900).
12 Onto Const. Art. II § 16.
13 Miller and Gibson v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854). But see Bloom v.
Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461 (1877).
14 Tim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176 (1856); Ohio ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cov-
ington et al., 29 Ohio St. 102 (1876); Seeley v. Thomas, 31 Ohio St. 301 (1877);
Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Jones v. County Commis-
sioners et al., 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 14, 15 Ohio C. D. 510 (1903).
15 Onto Const. Art. II § 16.
16 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
17 Onto Const. Art. II § 9.
18 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra; Fordyce v. Goodman, supra.
19 Werde v. Richardson, 77 Ohio St. 182, 82 N.E. 1072 (1907) (As to presen-
tation to governor).
20 State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254, 12 N.E. 807 (1887).
1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 459
fore the presiding officers of each house must sign the bill publicly
in the presence of the house and while it is in session and capable
of doing business, or the bill is invalid and open to attack. As a
practical matter, due to time limitations on the printing of bills,
each House of the General Assembly oftentimes meets in skeleton
session in order that this requirement may be met, without keep-
ing the entire membership present for such purpose. Inasmuch as
no roll call is taken on these days, the journal affirmatively fails
to reflect the absence of a quorum, and it is problematical as to
whether any court would question the procedure.
Directly related to this problem and necessary to a more com-
plete understanding is the theory of the court concerning impeach-
ment of the journal, or what evidence the court will admit in order
to establish the facts as they differ from those reported in the
journal.
In the interesting case of Wrede v. Richardson?', the court al-
lowed reference to be made to (a) the “Minute Book” kept in the
governor’s office, (b) to receipts given by the governor’s clerk,
and (c) to a statement written on the enrolled bill itself to show
that the bill in question has been presented to the governor and
had become a law without his signature. The court, in this case,
refused to admit the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the
governor had not been presented with the bill and that he had
been ill and had not been at his office at the time the bill was al-
legedly presented to him. The court was of the opinion that the
Minute Book was admissible because it was kept, like the legis-
lative journal, in accordance with law. The protection of the
governor’s daily record here is in line with the general rule apply-
ing to the journal; namely, that it cannot in cases of legislative
procedure be impeached.”?
Outside the realm of legislative procedure, the journal has
been the subject of two important cases. The first case, State ex rel.
Loomis v. Moffitt?, decided in 1832, came up on a writ of quo
warranto to test the authority by which one Moffitt undertook the
duties of a judgeship. A direct attack was made on the legislative
journal, and the court held that the journal could not be contra-
dicted by the parol evidence of one individual member, the journal
being the action of the whole body and not of a single member.
The doctrine of the Moffitt case was departed from in Harbage v.
Tracy**, decided in 1937. In this case, the journal indicated that
21 Werde v. Richardson, supra.
22 State ex rel. Rogers v. Price, supra; State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44
Ohio St. 348, 7 N.E. 447 (1886).
23 State ex rel. Loomis v. Moffitt, 5 Ohio 358 (1832).
24 Harbage v. Tracy, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 553 (1937), aff'd. 64 Ohio App. 151
(1939), app. diss’d. 136 Ohio St. 534 (1939). For a complete discussion of this
case, see 5 Onto Sr. L. J. 213 (1939); 25 Minn. L. Rev. 528 (1941).
460 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11
the legislature had been in session during a particular period, when
in fact it had not. The court permitted the journal to be impeached
by extrinsic evidence saying,”’:
. .. we are of the opinion that such a manifest mis-
statement of facts cannot be shielded from scrutiny which
would develop the truth by the claim that the journals
of the two houses may not be impeached.
In the light of these decisions, it would seem to be a fair con-
clusion that the general rule of not permitting the legislative
journal to be impeached still exists, but an exception will be
made if manifest fraud is made known to the court.
SUMMARY
One may well inquire as to the grounds upon which the Ohio
Courts have accepted the enrolled bill theory in preference to the
others. The court, in the Ritzman case*® stated that practical con-
siderations made this the only wise rule. At the end of every legis-
lative term literally hundreds of bills are passed and presented to
the enrolling clerks who are compelled to work under exhausting
pressure. Under these circumstances there are bound to be some
discrepancies between the bills which are passed and the bills as
they are actually enrolled. To look behind the enrolled bill would
result in the invalidating of a great many statutes and it is doubt-
ful if any useful public purpose would be served.
As to the second view, holding the journal conclusive if it
affirmatively shows the omission of a step, it appears to be an un-
workable solution. The journal will seldom if ever affirmatively
indicate an omission.?”
The third approach permitting evidence from the journal and
any other reliable source to impeach the enrolled bill, is the most
liberal view and while not the law in Ohio, it is gaining favor.’*.
To hold the journal conclusive, and the bill valid only if the
requisite steps are shown to have been taken on its face is the
most unworkable of all the theories. This fact was recognized by
the court in the Miller case,?? in which the court said:
If a strict, literal compliance with every constitutional
requirement, however, minute, is necessary to the validity
of a law, and the courts are bound to hold that nothing
was done but what appears in the legislative journal, it is
easy to demonstrate that not a single statute enacted since
the constitution took effect can be upheld.
25 Harbage v. Tracy, supra, at 162.
26 Ritzman v. Campbell, supra.
27 Ohio cases supra, will for the most part bear this out, except as to the
requirement that the statute must have received the majority of votes set forth
yxy the constitution.
28 SUTHERLAND, supra, § 1402.
29 Miller v. State, supra, at 481.
1950] CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 461
On final analysis, it seems that the Ohio courts have accepted
the most workable solution available, admitting that human beings
do err, and have made the theory flexible enough to permit ex-
ceptions when sound reason demands.
In dividing the constitutional limitations into directory and
mandatory classifications, the courts have done so on their own
authority, there being nothing in the constitution to indicate any
difference. It appears that the courts have made directory those
limitations which are not inherently essential to the validity of a
bill, and have at the same time maintained the dignity of the con-
stitution, by putting the legislators on their honor. To those who
would argue that the constitution ought to be followed to the
letter, it might be said that the realistic approach of the courts
gives the words of the constitution a workable interpretation and
is therefore preferable.
Over all, the law of Ohio concerning these problems generally
is comparatively clear and definite. The decisions have created
a workable framework which permit legislator and practitioner
alike to understand and cope with legislative procedure in Ohio.
General Versus Special Statutes in Ohio
W. T. Matuison, Jr.*
Introduction
Before the Civil War there was widespread recognition that
the state legislatures were abusing their power to enact special and
local legislation.! There was no doubt at all that power to enact
statutes of this character existed under the accepted American
theory that the power of state legislatures is plenary except as
specifically restricted. It was equally certain that there were
proper occasions for the use of a special statute. A law for the re-
lief of a particular person under circumstances thought to create
a moral obligation on the part of the state but where no remedy
was otherwise provided is an example. However, the state leg-
islatures, Ohio’s included,? abused special statutes by passing
them in numbers out of all proportion to need and without any
serious attempt by the whole memberships of the legislatures to
examine the merits of proposed bills. Those members whose con-
stituents were immediately affected usually sponsored the legis-
lation and log-rolling tactics customarily resulted in its adoption.
The abuse of special legislation became the normal state of affairs.
Municipalities became the particular victims of irresponsible legis-
lative majorities. There is no evidence to support the view that
special statutes were used because they were considered more
effective in the circumstances as a matter of policy. Rather, the
view was that the legislature could more effectively maintain its
own overriding control by the use of specialism.
Constitutional provisions were supplied in order to prevent
special legislation in those situations where general legislation
could do the job more effectively or in situations where special
legislation was believed to have been abused.‘ At the present time
* Sterling Fellow, Yale Law School; Teaching and Research Assistant, the
College of Law, The Ohio State University, 1949-1950.
The writer desires to express his appreciation to Dean Jefferson B. Ford-
ham for the use of notes prepared for the course in legislation in the College
of Law of The Ohio State University.
1 For a discussion of the background of legislative abuse of special laws,
see Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 355-358
(1936).
2 For a discussion of legislative abuse of special laws in Ohio, see Walker,
Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 Onto State L. J. 1 (1948).
3 Many state constitutions now contain express prohibitions against spe-
cial legislation regulating municipalities as well as a general provision against
special legislation. See, e.g., Munn. Const. Art. IV, § 33.
4 See 2 SuTHERLAND, STaTuToRY ConsTRUCTION § 2101 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
462
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 463
there are several types of such state constitutional provisions. Mis-
souri, for example, prohibits local and special laws in twenty-nine
enumerated instances and in any instances where a general law
can be made to apply.’ It is expressly provided that the problem
of the applicability of a general law is a judicial question. A num-
ber of states simply have the general provision that no special law
can be enacted where a general law can be made applicable.’ Where
the state constitutions do not speak to the point there is a division
of opinion among the courts as to the ‘judiciality” of the provi-
sion.’ A third group of states prohibit special laws when there is
already a general law on the subject.’ This small group, in effect,
permits legislative determination of generality or specialty but
does not allow both general and special legislation to co-exist on
the same subject. Ohio belongs to still another group. All of the
states which prohibit or restrict special legislation stand in con-
spicuous contrast to the federal government which has no such
limitation in its basic law.'!° Some of the states have no constitu-
tional provisions dealing with the subject.
The most important of the various Ohio constitutional pro-
visions concerned with special and general legislation is Article II,
Section 26, which provides, in part, “All laws, of a general nature,
shall have a uniform operation throughout the State. . .” A def-
inition of “laws, of a general nature” is not provided. Perhaps the
provision of a guide to the meaning of the phrase was regarded as
superfluous by the members of the Constitutional Convention of
1851 who were probably quite sure that the clause was aimed at
the then plethora of special and local legislation and required no
explanation beyond the facts which brought it into existence. In
any event, a substantial body of case law has been applied to its
interpretation.
Article II, Section 26,'! is written in general language and has
been held to apply to all subjects except those explicitly and ex-
5 Mo. Constr. Art. III, § 40. Many of the enumerated items are applicable
to local government units.
6 Mo. Const. Art. III, § 40, sub. 30.
7 See, e.g., Mtcn. Const. Art. 5, § 30.
8 See 2 SuTHERLAND, Statutory Construction § 2103 (3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
9 See, e.g,. Pa. Const. Art. III, § 7.
10 The equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution is, however, relevant to the problem of classifica-
tion. “Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited
in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all per-
sons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.” Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
11 The Ohio constitutional provisions will be frequently referred to only
by article and section numbers.
464 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
clusively provided for by other sections of the constitution. Article
IV, Section 1, for example, empowers the legislature “from time
to time” to establish courts inferior to the courts of appeal and the
general laws provision of the constitution is considered inappli-
cable.!? In the same way, Article II, Section 30, requires special
legislation for establishing new counties, changing county lines, or
removing county seats.'3 The requirement is implicit but clear
because general legislation would be inconsistent with the pro-
cedure established in the constitutional provision.
Section 32 of Article II expressly provides that the legislature
“shall grant no divorce”, so it is unnecessary to consider what effect
Article II, Section 26, standing alone, would have as to legislative
divorces. Another express prohibition on special legislation is
found in Article XIII, Section 1, which declares quite simply, “[t]he
General Assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate
powers.” This provision applies to municipal as well as private
corporations. !*
Complementary to the provision just quoted is Section 2 of
Article XIII which requires general laws for the creation and
regulation of private corporations. Section 6 of the same article
requires the legislature to “provide for the organization of cities
and incorporated villages, by general laws.” Both municipal and
private corporations were justly regarded as important and partic-
ularly dangerous subjects of special legislation, hence their specific
prohibition in addition to the general one found in Article II, Sec-
tion 26.
In short, Article II, Section 26 (frequently referred to in this
article as the general laws provision) is of general applicability
except as limited by other parts of the constitution.'5 The common
sense rule of constitutional interpretation that the particular pro-
vision most closely related to the subject matter in question will
be held applicable has been adhered to in Ohio. Curative statutes,
not covered in Arti¢le II, Section 26, are permitted with certain
restrictions in Section 28 of the same article.
12 Neither the offocial syllabus nor the opinion in State ex rel. Fox v.
Yeatman, 89 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913), wherein a special statute concern-
ing a municipal court was upheld, mentioned Article II, Section 26.
13 Article X, Section 1, requires general laws for the organization and
government of counties.
14 State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902); Cin-
cinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital, 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902).
15In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that Article II,
Section 26 was mandatory rather than merely directory.
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 465
General Laws — Classification
A. MunIcrpaL CoRPORATIONS
As has been indicated already, the problem of specialism has
been particularly acute in the field of municipal corporations.'® It
is, therefore, the plan of this article to consider first the require-
ments of generality as applied to municipal corporations both be-
cause of the intrinsic importance of the subject and because it is
believed that an analysis of the requirements as to municipalities
will provide considerable informational background for the subjects
to be considered at a later juncture.
1. Historical development prior to 1851.
It should be mentioned at once that the historical background
of municipal government in Ohio has been carefully and fully
analyzed in the pages of this Journal in an article by Professor
Harvey Walker.'’? The treatment here will be confined to a brief
survey of the use of special and general legislation in relation to
municipalities prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851.
In territorial times the small number of municipal units were
incorporated by occasional special legislation. There is no reason
to believe that the method was not adequate to the situation pre-
sented. Even if the use of general laws would have been preferable,
the small amount of special legislation relating to municipalities
did not burden the legislature.
Under the first Ohio Constitution'® the legislature was left
free to deal with municipalities as it saw fit. There was not even
the possibility of gubernatorial veto to act as a brake. Beginning
with Chillicothe’? in 1804, a series of special acts was passed. In
1817 the first general law for the incorporation of municipalities
was passed by the legislature.?° The incorporation procedure uti-
lized is interesting today principally because of the use of the court
of common pleas as a fact-finding agency.
Following the passage of the general incorporation law of
1817 there was, for a few years, a substantial lessening in the num-
ber of special charters granted. Particular amendments to previ-
ously-granted special charters continued in undiminished volume.
The general act of 1817, however, appeared for a while to have
substantially reduced the total amount of special legislation even
though it only briefly stopped special chartering. By 1834 the
situation had so deteriorated that the Thirty-third General Assem-
bly passed fifty-eight pages of general laws in contrast to four
16 See note 3 supra.
17 Walker, supra note 2.
18 Constitution of 1802 which became effective in 1803.
19 Act of Feb. 18, 1804.
20 Act of Jan. 7, 1817.
466 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
hundred sixty-five pages of special and local laws. In 1838 the
legislature came to its own rescue by passing another general in-
corporation law.?! For a few years the special acts passed referred
to the general law for provisions as to organization or powers, but
by 1844 this practice was reversed and the tendency to do every-
thing in the special statute reappeared. The Forty-eighth General
Assembly demonstrated how well the old system was re-established
by passing seven hundred sixty-seven pages of special and local
laws and only one hundred twenty-nine pages of general ones. In
May, 1850, when the Second Constitutional Convention of Ohio
met, there was apparently widespread belief that something should
be done to relieve the legislature of the crushing burden of special
legislation and the municipalities themselves of the evils of legis-
lative log-rolling.
2. The Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851
Delegate James W. Taylor of Erie County stated his view of
the existing situation in the course of the debate on the floor of
the convention which framed the Constitution of 1851: “[i]t has
been frequently said that three-fourths of the laws of Ohio are
special and local in their nature; and I believe that an effort will
be made to confine the Legislature to general regulations exclu-
sively.”?? The effort was made and succeeded even though the
Convention appeared to spend more time, insofar as the debates
are indicative, on the problem of general incorporation laws for
private corporations. There is no record of debate on any of the
provisions of Article XIII which was accepted by the Convention
on March 10, 1851.75 The significant section, as far as municipalities
were concerned, was the sixth which provides, in part: “The Gen-
eral Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and
incorporated villages, by general laws. . .” Probably no member
of the Convention of 1850-1851 had any idea of the vagaries of
judicial interpretation to which this section would be subjected.
The first section, which also has importance for municipalities,
provides: “The General Assembly shall pass no special act con-
ferring corporate powers.”
Two basic sections were placed in Article II, the portion of the
constitution dealing with the legislature, which were to have far-
reaching general influence. Section 26, the provision requiring
general laws to have uniform operation, has already been men-
tioned. Section 28 provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall
have no power to pass retroactive laws, .. . but may, by general
laws, authorize courts to carry into effect upon such terms as shall
21 Act of Feb. 16, 1838.
221 Ohio Convention Debates 285 (1851).
232 Ohio Convention Debates 851 (1851).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 467
be just and equitable, the manifest intention of parties, and officers,
by curing omissions, defects and errors, in instruments and pro-
ceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of
this State.” It is apparent at a glance that both of these sections are
applicable to statutes dealing with local government in general as
well as to municipal corporations. The language in Section 26 re-
quiring “uniform operation” apparently calls for judicial interpre-
tation, whereas the wording of Section 28 requiring curative stat-
utes to be general ones seems to be more precise and meaningful
standing alone.
In Case v. Dillon** the court considered the validity of an act
passed on March 24, 1851 (prior to the effective date of the Con-
stitution of 1851) which authorized Muskingum County to subscribe
to the capital stock of a specified railway corporation. Article VIII,
Section 6, of the new constitution provided that the “General As-
sembly shall never authorize any county, town, or township” to
become a stockholder in any corporation. By a three-to-two vote
the court upheld the statute, primarily on the ground that the new
constitutional provision was only prospective in operation. The case
is significant for our purposes because the court first undertook
to interpret Article II, Section 26, in it. Judge Thurman, writing
for the majority, appeared to assume at once that the statute was
not of a general nature. He wrote, “[i]t is no more of a general na-
ture than would be an act to authorize the construction of a bridge
or the erection of a poorhouse.”’5 The corollary found by the court
was that the act was necessarily, by its nature, a local one and so
the constitutional provision dealing with laws of a general nature
was inapplicable. There was no indication that the court considered
the possibility that legislation authorizing local government invest-
ment in private corporations might be a proper subject for a
general law. By uncritically seizing upon the idea that certair
subjects were local in nature, the court opened the door to wide-
spread evasion of the constitutional mandate of uniformity of oper-
ation. The vigorous dissent of Judge Ranney did not discuss Article
II, Section 26.76
3. The Period 1851-1912
In 1852 it would have appeared to a careful observer that the
new constitution had achieved its aims insofar as general legislation
was concerned. Proof would have been found in that the special
laws of 1852 comprised forty-seven pages while the general ones
filled three hundred forty-eight pages. On May 3, 1852, existing
laws relating to the organization and government of municipal
242 Ohio St. 607 (1853).
25 Id. at 617.
26 Id. at 624-647 (dissenting opinion).
ee eee
468 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
corporations were repealed and, by the same general statute, means
were provided for the organization of “cities and incorporated vil-
lages”. Municipal corporations were divided into three broad
classes: cities of the first class were all those of over 20,000 pop-
ulation; cities of the second class were units below that figure with
a population of at least 5,000; villages were of less than 5,000 pop-
ulation. By an amendment of March 25, 1854, a local option pro-
vision was inserted in the general law: a municipal corporation
would not advance to the next higher population grouping without
the approval of its council. The symmetry of the classification
scheme could, thus, be impaired at the will of a municipal council.
During the fifty-year period from 1852 to 1902 the legislature
departed radically from the three-class arrangement it had followed
immediately after the adoption of the new constitution. By 1880
generality in form had become a cloak for specialty in fact.
In one term of court, in just a few months, the entire classi-
fication structure so painstakingly built up over a period of years
was brought crashing down to earth.?”7 When the January, 1902
Term of the Ohio Supreme Court commenced there was a plethora
of classifications. Each of the eleven largest cities of the state was
placed in a different grade of the hierarchy. Special legislation
under the guise of classification had become sanctified by the pass-
age of time and implicit judicial approval. The members of the
legislative department had little reason to suspect that the judicial
department would say nay to what had been done.
In 1900 the legislature had passed a “general” law empowering
Toledo to construct or repair a bridge across the Maumee River in
which Toledo was described as “any city of the third grade of the
first class” having a “navigable river or rivers, passing into or
through any such city.”’8 In Platt v. Craig?® a taxpayer asked that
defendant officials of the city be restrained from proceeding under
the statute. At about the same time another taxpayer asked man-
damus to compel the mayor of Toledo to submit to the voters the
question of acting, under the permissive statute.*° The decision
resolved both disputes. Judge Davis, speaking for a unamimous
court, immediately stated that constitutional questions were pre-
sented and disclaimed any intention to reconcile the previous
decisions in the area, after pointing out that some of them were
based on expediency. He then stated that the constitution, having
emanated from the people, “must be construed as the people must
have understood it’! and, with the aid of a dictionary, determined
27 The January, 1902 Term.
28 Act of April 14, 1900.
2966 Ohio St. 75, 63 N.E. 594 (1902).
30 Jones, Mayor of Toledo v. State ex rel. Walbridge, supra, note 29.
3166 Ohio St. 75, 77, 63 N.E. 594, 595 (1902).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 469
that the words “general” and “special” were antonyms. The court
concluded that the classification was “exceedingly artificial and a
sham”>? and that the statute was unconstitutional as violative
of Article XIII, Section 1, and, in the alternative, Article II, Section
26. The reasoning as to the former was that the statute was special
in that it applied only to Toledo and that it was a forbidden attempt
to confer corporate powers. The latter section was violated be-
cause, even if it was a law of a general nature, it was limited to
one particular city. There was a dictum to the effect that Article
II, Section 26, did not prohibit all special legislation and that an
emergency could legalize some special legislations’ Judge Burket
did not concur in this portion of the opinion or syllabus. The
Platt case revealed the weakness of the structure of classification
but its practical effect was limited to a vitiation of the one statute
before the court.
The Platt case was decided on March 18, 1902. On the following
April 29th the legislature passed a special statute expressly appli-
cable only to the Cincinnati Hospital which purported to confer
certain additional powers on the trustees of the hospital. The
hospital was a municipal institution and, at the request of a tax-
payer, the corporation counsel sued to enjoin the issuance of bonds
and the expenditure of money under the statute. The case came
before the court in Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital’
and the defendants pleaded a local and temporary emergency in
Cincinnati in reliance on the emergency language in the Platt case.
The court about-faced and said, “[a] sufficient answer to this con-
tention is that such doctrine is not decided in nor encouraged by
the case cited.’”°5 It would have been more candid to admit what
was said in Platt, including the statement of the emergency doc-
trine in the official syllabus, and to reach the result in the Cin-
cinnati Hospital case on the basis of new-found wisdom. Instead
the court said that the second paragraph of the syllabus and the
opinion related only to Article II, Section 26.5 While this state-
ment was entirely accurate, it should not have been allowed to
obscure the identity of the fact patterns in the two cases. Both
were cases in which a municipal corporation was to receive cor-
porate power from an abortive statute. The court went on to
say that “[i]t was obvious not only to the member of the court
who wrote the opinion in that case [the Platt case], but to all
32 Jd. at 81, 63 N.E. at 596.
33 See id. at 78, 63 N.E. at 596.
34 66 Ohio St. 440, 64 N.E. 420 (1902).
35 Id. at 447, 64 NE. at 422.
36 The court did not think that the syllabus related to Article XIII, Sec-
tion 1.
A x ra
470 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
of us, that the unconditional terms of the inhibition against spe-
cial acts conferring corporate power would not admit of any ex-
ception.”3? The syllabus of the Cincinnati Hospital case made no
mention of Article II, Section 26, and the opinion does not decide
whether it was violated. The decision was based on violation of
Article XIII, Section 1, by the statute which purported to confer
corporate powers on the hospital trustees.
In State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones,3* decided two days after the
Cincinnati Hospital case, an act of April 27, 1902, was held un-
constitutional. The action was an original one in mandamus brought
in the supreme court by the unfortunate petitioners, newly ap-
pointed police commissioners of Toledo under the act of April 27,
1902, to compel the defendants, incumbent commissioners, to sur-
render commission property. The act provided for “the appoint-
ment, regulation, and government of a police force in cities of the
third grade of the first class.” That it affected no municipality but
Toledo was admitted. The attorney general, for the petitioners,
relied on the long line of decisions sustaining classification and
pointed out that there was no law on the subject except the one
under which petitioners claimed as it had expressly repealed all
other laws on the subject. The defense relied on Article XIII, Sec-
tion 1, which had been such a bulwark in the Cincinnati Hospital
case. The unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by Judge
Shauck, who brushed aside relators’ contention that there was no
other law on the subject by pointing out that the repealing section
of the act under attack would fall unless the rest were valid. Judge
Shauck then proceeded to make a twofold argument: first, that
the statute attempting to reorganize the board of police commis-
sioners of Toledo was a special act granting corporate powers con-
trary to the prohibition of Article XIII, Section 1; and, secondly,
that the classification of cities of the third grade of the first class
was a sham as it only included Toledo. The second branch of the
argument received detailed consideration. The history of the classi-
fication of municipalities was reviewed and it was pointed out that
the existing absurd number of classifications was similar to the sit-
uation existing prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1851.
The court found further evidence of legislative intent to use classi-
fication as a cloak for special legislation in Section 1546 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Ohio which provided that “[c]ities of the second
class which hereafter become cities of the first class, shall constitute
the fourth grade of the latter class.” There were no cities of the
fourth grade of the first class; it was just insurance against second
class cities moving into the classification with Toledo. It was point-
3766 Ohio St. 440, 447, 64 N.E. 420, 422 (1902).
3866 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424 (1902).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 471
ed out that the population differences between the various grad-
ations of municipalities were too narrow to be significant. The
court concluded that those considerations which tended to take the
statute out of Article XIII, Section 1, tended to place it within the
prohibition of Article II, Section 26. In the Knisely case, in short,
the court indicated that it would no longer sanction legislative
evasion of the constitution and that the pretence that the classi-
fications were meaningful would no longer be kept up.
Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Beacom*® was the last case in
the series and it demolished the structure on the same day that
the Knisely case was decided. Petitioners brought an action in quo
warranto against the defendants, certain key municipal officers of
Cleveland, and alleged that the act of March 16, 1891 under which
defendants claimed office was invalid. The act in question oper-
ated on cities “of the second grade of the first class.” Cleveland
was the only Ohio city in that class. Judge Shauck, again speaking
for a unanimous court, invalidated the statute on the authority
of the Knisely case. In answer to the argument that the de facto
government of the city should not be disturbed after the passage
of years during which legislation of this character had not been
disapproved, the court replied that, “i]t is admitted that no limi-
tation bars inquiry into the title of the defendants.’*° Judgment
of ouster was granted and, because of the practical considerations
of the maintainence of municipal government in Cleveland, exe-
cution of the judgment was suspended until October 2, 1902.
The governor called a special session of the General Assembly
which met on August 25, 1902, and prepared a new municipal
code.*! The Municipal Code of 19024? swung to the opposite pole
from isolation of municipalities into separate classes under the
guise of classification: all municipal units in the state were placed
in two classes. Those municipalities with a population of 5,000 or
more were made cities and all below 5,000 were designated villages.
Each of the groups was furnished with one uniform governmental
scheme. This was no hardship for the villages but it created a sit-
uation for the cities which was as bad as, or worse than, that exist-
ing before the judical ax fell. It was unworkable for a city such as
Cleveland to have the same governmental structure and powers as
a municipality of 5,500 or 6,000 population. The use of only two
classes resulted in over-simplification of the problems of the most
populous cities. However, it had one advantage. It placed the larg-
er cities in such an impossible situation that their citizens became
3966 Ohio St. 491, 64 N.E. 427 (1902).
40 Id. at 507, 64 N.E. at 428 (1902).
41 See Fairlie, The Municipal Crisis in Ohio, 1 Micu. L. Rev. 352 (1905).
42 Act of Oct. 22, 1902.
472 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
leaders in the municipal home rule movement. The results achieved
by the Constitutional Convention of 1912 were in no small measure
due to the felt necessities of the larger urban areas.
The Municipal Code of 1902 was upheld as a general act, hav-
ing a uniform operation throughout the state in Zumstein v. Mul-
len.*s The attack was fundamentally based on the claim that the
provision for a different number of councilmen in different cities
in reality constituted special legislation in the form of isolated
classes according to the old scheme. The different provision for
councilmen was based on a sliding scale closely keyed to population
and the court found no difficulty in upholding it. Chief Justice
Burket’s opinion for the still unanimous court was notable for its
analytical discussion and resolution of the claimed ambiguity in
the method of computing the number of councilmen under the
statute.
4. The Present Constitutional Classification of Cities.
(a) An exclusive population classification.
The adoption of Article XVIII, the “home rule amendment”,
transferred the dual classification of the Municipal Code of 1902
into the organic law. Section 1 provided for classification of muni-
cipalities as follows:
Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities
and villages. All such corporations having a population of
five thousand or over shall be cities; all others shall be
villages. The method of transition from one class to the
other shall be regulated by law.
Section 2 of Article XVIII provided, in part, that, “[g]eneral
laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and govern-
ment of cities and villages.” The two provisions just quoted did
not result in placing the larger municipalities in the kind of a
strait-jacket that they existed in from 1902 to 1912. Substantive
home rule powers were granted directly to municipalities by other
sections of Article XVIII and were not contingent upon the adop-
tion of a home rule charter. Thus, all municipalities were grant-
ed power under Section 3 to adopt and enforce “such local police,
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws.”
It should be emphasized that Article XVIII, Section 1, pro-
vides an exclusive classification of municipalities as to population.
There is nothing in the section which would or should exclude
further classification on the basis of relevant factors unconnected
with population.
(b) Classification as charter and non-charter.
43 67 Ohio St. 382, 66 N.E. 140 (1902).
44See Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 Onto Sr. L. J. 18 (1948).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 473
In Dillon v. Cleveland*S the court examined Ohio General
Code Section 4227-12 which provided that certain foregoing sec-
tions of the General Code relating to the initiative and referendum
should be inapplicable to any municipality operating under a home
rule charter containing provisions for the initiative and referendum.
It was claimed that the classification of municipalities into charter
and non-charter units was prohibited by Article II, Section 26. The
ready answer to this objection, as the court indicated, is that the
very classification in question is recognized by the constitution.
(c) Geographical classification.
Geographical classification was upheld in Board of Health v.
Greenville.*® Section 1249 et seq., General Code, authorized the
state board of health to take certain action in connection with
sewage, including requiring the construction and operation of sew-
age purification plants. It was further provided that no city or
village which is discharging sewage*’ into any river which separates
Ohio from another state (the court judically noticed that this applied
only to the Ohio River) would be required to install sewage puri-
fication plants as long as unpurified sewage of cities and villages
of any other state is discharged into the river above the Ohio city
or village.
The geographical classification affected by this proviso was
the basis of an asserted violation of Article II, Section 26. The court
upheld the classification. It would have been quite futile to have
compelled those located upon the Ohio side of the Ohio river to re-
frain from pollution of the stream when it was being polluted by
those on the other bank who were quite beyond the reach of the
Ohio legislature. The sound basis for the decision was that the
statute did operate as uniformly as the nature of the subject mat-
ter permitted. The court also pointed out that the class was an
open one.
There is further authority to support the view that geographical
classification is permissible in Ohio. In State ex rel. Squire v.
Cleveland** the court had before it a statute relating to “[aJll
municipal corporations within the corporate limits of which there is
or may hereafter be included part of the shore of the waters of
Lake Erie.’”*° Another section of the statute excepted Cleveland
from the operation of its general provisions. The trial court be-
45117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927).
4686 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
47 The Onto Gen. Cone provision read “is discharging sewage” whereas the
Act of April 7, 1908 read “is now discharging sewage.”
48150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948).
49 Onto Gen. Cove § 3699-1.
50 Onto Gen. Cope § 3699-8.
474 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
lieved that the excepting provision invalidated the entire act on
the ground that this particular section could not be dropped and
the act extended to cover Cleveland because the legislature did
not intend to include Cleveland and the court had no power to do
so. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court
and held that the statute, aside from the excepting provision, was
valid. This was determined on the basis that the provision ap-
plicable only to Cleveland was merely a limitation on the territorial
operation of the act and was, therefore, separable under the separ-
ability clause. Judge Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the su-
preme court, thought that the whole act was invalid under Article
II, Section 26. Since, however, more than one of the members of
the supreme court agreed on the theory propounded by the court
of appeals that view prevailed.5°* The element of “naturalness” in-
herent in a geographical classification is a strong basis for uphold-
ing it. It is also readily apparent that a statute such as the one
considered in the Squire case would have no applicability to other
than littoral lands no matter how generally it was drafted.
The court’s treatment of the provision excepting Cleveland
from the operation of the statute is particularly interesting. It
could have said that the excepting provision was invalid but to dis-
regard it would result in applying the statute where the legislature
had forbidden so the whole enactment must fall. Instead, the op-
posite result was achieved with an appropriate show of deference
to the legislature.
In Greenville v. Board of Health,5' and in other cases, the court
has been asked, in the event that an exception to a general statute
shall be found to be unconstitutional, to disregard the exception
and to apply the statute uniformly throughout the state. The court
has consistently refused to accede on the ground that such action
would invade the province of the general assembly in extending
the operation of the statute in a manner expressly forbidden by
the general assembly. The result of this view has been that where
the exception is held invalid the whole statute falls with it. There
is no disposition to underestimate the drastic effect of a holding of
unconstitutionality. There must be, however, certain self-imposed
judical restraints when a statute is subjected to review and the
one which refuses to extend a statute where the legislature has for-
bidden is based upon the most sound considerations of deference
due a coordinate branch of the government.
B. Counties
In Andrews v. State ex rel. Henry** a statute providing for
58a Onto Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2.
5186 Ohio St. 1, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912).
52104 Ohio St. 384, 135 N.E. 655 (1922).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 475
bonds in criminal cases, in fact limited only to Cuyahoga County,
was invalidated under Article II, Section 26. Judge Wanamaker,
speaking for a unanimous court, strongly intimated that a classi-
fication of Cuyahoga County along with the other larger counties
would be a reasonable one. It appears to the writer that there are
no sound reasons which require county population classification
to be more suspect than similar classification applied to munici-
palities. The fire prevention problem, for example, of counties con-
taining organized areas would be roughly similar to one another
and substantially different from predominantly rural counties.
County libraries are the subject of general legislation in Ohio.
A statute concerning the establishment of libraries in general terms
but actually applicable only to Hamilton County has been in-
validated as contrary to Article II, Section 26.55 The court thought
that it was obvious that libraries could only be the proper subjects
of general laws because knowledge was not more necessary or de-
sirable in one part of the state than in another.
The problems arising under the general laws provision of the
constitution have been far less acute in relation to counties than
to municipalities. The Ohio Supreme Court has not treated counties
in a significantly different manner from cities. Of course, there is
no constitutional classification of counties.
C. ScHoots
By Article I, Section 7, of the constitution the legislature is
exhorted to encourage schools. The cases reveal that the encour-
agement must be by general laws.
In Minshall v. State ex rel. Merritt’* the court examined that
provision of Ohio General Code Section 7749-1 which required a
district board of education to furnish transportation for high school
students when the county board of education so determined. There
was no difficulty in upholding the statute in view of the express
exception in Article II, Section 26, which allows statutes relating
to the public schools to take effect upon the approval of an au-
thority other than the General Assembly.
On April 2, 1902 the legislature passed an act establishing a
special school district in parts of two counties. Quo warranto was
brought to test its validity and, in State ex rel. v. Spellmire,*> the
court discussed the relevant cases in the course of holding the act
invalid under Article II, Section 26. The court overruled the
Shearer case,5° which had stated the rule that special legislation
53 Brown v. State ex rel. Merland, 120 Ohio St. 297, 166 N.E. 214 (1929).
54124 Ohio St. 61, 176 N.E. 888 (1931).
5567 Ohio St. 77, 65 N.E. 619 (1902).
5646 Ohio St. 275, 21 N.E. 354 (1889). This resulted in reinstating State
v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 (1882) which had previously been overruled by the
Shearer case.
476 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
was not prohibited as applied to subject matter local in nature such
as schools. It was the view of Chief Justice Burket, speaking for
a unanimous court, that there was no constitutional justification
for the Shearer doctrine “of carving a special or local subject-mat-
ter out of one of a general nature.’’? The reversal was based on the
purely logical grounds that no exception is expressed in Section
26. It had been argued for the defendants that an adverse decision
might well jeopardize other school districts. Judgment of ouster
was granted and the court emphasized that the judgment could be
drawn so as to “protect the public interests.”5*
In Cline v. Martin’® the court upheld the validity of a statute
which conferred authority on county boards of education to change
school district lines in order to facilitate accessibility for all stu-
dents served by the school. The charge of specialism deserved no
more from the court than the statement that this was “undoubted-
ly” a law of a general nature which operated uniformly through-
out the state.
D. TAaxaTION
In the taxation field we find, as we have in other areas, that
the law as to the requirements of generality was well-established
and then, after the lapse of years, the earlier decisions were re-
jected. It was once settled that a tax collector could be appointed
for certain designated counties. The rationale was that tax col-
lection was clearly a matter of a local nature. The present rule is
that the subject is of a general nature and that statutes concerning
it must be of uniform operation throughout the state.®!
In Davis v. Wiemeyer® the court was confronted with the prob-
lem of the constitutionality of a statute which authorized, as to
some property owners only, the assessment of real estate accord-
ing to benefit received in the construction of a state highway.®? The
legislature attempted to authorize the county commissioners of
counties having a tax duplicate of at least a certain amount to
assess part of the cost against specially-benefited property owners.
No such authorization was made as to those counties having a
lesser tax duplicate. Judge Robinson, speaking for a unanimous
court, said that the law was of a general nature and, therefore, was
required to operate uniformly throughout the state. The court then
proceeded to determine that the classification of property owners
57 67 Ohio St. 77, 89, 65 N.E. 619, 623 (1902).
58 Id. at 90, 65 N.E. at 623.
5994 Ohio St. 420, 115 N.E. 37 (1916).
60 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Crites, 48 Ohio St. 142, 26 N.E. 1052 (1891);
State ex rel. Ogelvee v. Capeller, 39 Ohio St 207 (1883).
61 State ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 74 Ohio St. 403, 78 N.E. 523 (1906).
62 124 Ohio St. 103, 177 N.E. 37 (1931).
63 Onto Gen. Core § 1193.
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 477
for purposes of assessment was unreasonable because the value of
the tax duplicate of a county has no necessary relation to special
benefit to a property owner. The opinion did not indicate that a
classification of counties as to the value of tax duplicate would be
banned by Article II, Section 26, for other purposes. The writer
suggests that the court is to be commended for frankly examining
the relationship between the classification utilized and the benefit
conferred by the construction of the highway. In many instances
the validity of the classification can be properly appraised only by
examining its relation to the rest of the statute.
Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides that
the legislature “shall make,” by taxation or otherwise, provision
which “will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state.” Section 7575, General Code, pur-
suant to the mandate, provided for a property tax levy equally
throughout the state and for distribution of the proceeds to school
districts according to need. In Miller v. Korns® the statute was at-
tacked as contrary to both Article II, Seciion 26, and Article XII,
Section 2, which provides for ad valorem taxation by uniform rule.
The court said that the latter requirement was met by the tax be-
ing imposed equally on all property throughout the state and that
unequal distribution of the proceeds was necessary to meet the
constitutional requirement of an efficient school system. Of course,
the argument of violation of Article II, Section 26, received short
shrift in view of the provision relating to the establishment of an
efficient school system throughout the state. There is no doubt that
the court reached the correct result.
In State ex rel. Brunenkant v. Wallace,®5 Ohio General Code
Sections 6290, and 6291, were attacked on the ground that uni-
formity was lacking because trackless trolleys were excluded
from the definition of motor vehicle for the purposes of the annual
license tax on motor vehicles. The court held that Article II, Sec-
tion 26, was not violated by this statute as it operated uniformly on
a territorial basis and applied equally to all persons and property
intended to be brought within its operation. It appears to the writ-
er that a different decision would have resulted in depriving the
legislature of its discretion and policy-making power in the field of
taxation. This would be an improper result in view of the well-
settled power of the legislature to select the subjects and persons,
within broad limits, to which a given tax will be made to apply.
The statute under consideration amounted merely to a legislative
determination that trackless trolleys would not be classified with
motor vehicles in general for purposes of taxation.
64107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923).
65137 Ohio St. 379, 30 N.E. 2d 696 (1940).
478 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
There is reason to believe that classification in taxation statutes
will be upheld so long as fundamental tenets of fair play are not
violated. In other words, where there is only a difference of op-
inion as to the propriety of the classification under consideration
the court is not likely to invalidate the statute. This is but another
example of the due regard which most courts have today for the
exigencies of a sound tax-gathering system. The flow of revenue
will not be hampered except when there are clear violations of
constitutional mandates.
E. Pusiic Works
The judicial treatment of the requirement of generality in
statutes concerning public works has been variant. The initial
Ohio view was set forth in a case where mandamus was asked to
compel the commissioners of a particular county to act under a
statute directing them to improve a particular road within the
county.” The writ was allowed and the court brushed aside the
argument that the statute violated the general laws provision by
saying, “this provision does not affect the power of the legislature
to pass local laws where the acts are in their nature local.”®* The
other possible mode of treating the problem, that is, denominating
roads a subject of general legislation and so one requiring uniform
treatment throughout the state, did not initially win the court’s
support.
In Hixson v. Burson’ the court had before it a statute which
authorized any county having a population between 35,190 and
35,200 to construct roads within the county under certain con-
ditions. The act applied actually only to Athens County. The court
said that the statute was clearly a local one and the problem pre-
sented was whether the subject of roads was general in nature.
After an elaborate discussion the court concluded that, “[i]t seems
so clear that the subject of roads is of a general nature, that we
would be doing violence to our oaths to hold otherwise’’”® and pro-
ceeded to overrule the inconsistent holding in the earlier case.
The rule as to highways enunciated by Hixson v. Burson was
soon extended to bridges.’”! In the face of a general law concerning
66 This view was recently demonstrated in Angell v. City of Toledo, 153
Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 (1950) where the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
the invalidation of the Toledo municipal income tax on constitutional grounds.
The court was not impressed by dicta in an earlier case which supported
plaintiff's position.
67 State ex rel. Hibbs v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 35 Ohio St.
458 (1880).
68 Id. at 467.
6954 Ohio St. 470, 43 N.E. 1000 (1896).
70 Id. at 485, 43 NE. at 1003.
71 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Davis, 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1895).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 479
the construction of bridges the legislature passed an abortive spe-
cial statute dealing with bridges in Mahoning County. The ex-
istence of the general statute on bridges appeared to be a sub-
stantial factor in the holding that bridges were only appropriate
subjects for general legislation. Where there is an operative gen-
eral statute dealing with a subject, it should certainly receive
judical consideration in the determination of the generality of the
subject matter.
In Thorniley v. State ex rel. Dickey,’? the court approved and
followed the Hixson case and State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Davis” in the course of holding Section 4903 of the Revised Statutes
unconstitutional. The statute was deemed to be repugnant to the
generality requirement of the constitution in that it was an es-
sential part of a statute making different provision for the manage-
ment of highways in different counties of the state. No rational
basis was discovered for the differentiation in treatment and it was
noted that the counties to which the special legislation applied were
the most, as well as the least, populous in the state. The invalidated
section itself only related to the compensation of county commis-
sioners for services rendered as highway directors and the same
result could have been reached by holding that it was repealed by
a later inconsistent statute which specified the salaries of county
commissioners and limited their salaries to such amount.”
The Hixson case substantially represents the Ohio rule today.
It appears that the rule is sound in two important respects: (1) It
closes a loophole in the constitutional requirement of general leg-
islation. The loophole amounted to saying that a bridge or a road
was localized in a particular area of the state and could, therefore,
be dealt with by special or local legislation. It is believed that
this was nothing more than a play on words. (2) As a practical
matter it has been shown that general laws are most efficacious in
the public works field. It would be difficult to show any defects
of the present system comparable to the log-rolling which was pre-
valent under the old system of special legislation.
It appears that logic alone has not proven an unerring guide
in this area. The modern Ohio law has come into existence after
the court has had full opportunity to appraise the working results
of both special and general legislation in the field. The courts’
resolution of the problem purports to have discovered the key to
what the constitution really means. The writer suggests, however,
that what the court has really done is to resolve a question of leg-
islative policy in much the same manner that the legislature would
7281 Ohio St. 108, 90 N.E. 144 (1909).
7355 Ohio St. 15, 44 N.E. 511 (1896).
74 Act of April 21, 1904.
480 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
do if it had the power. The court has decided that general statutes
are probably better in the public works area. In other words, the
court originally determined that the legislative decision to use
special laws was reasonable and now only general laws on this
subject are so held.
F. ELEcTIONS.
Statutes providing for and regulating primary elections have
been unsuccessfully attacked as contrary to the general laws pro-
vision.’?5 The permissive primary election applied only to those
parties which cast at least ten per centum of the vote at the last
general election but this was not held to be an unreasonable classi-
fication. In the same case it was determined that the existence of
special primary election statutes in three counties of the state did
not prevent the general statute from operating uniformly through-
out the state as no geographical restrictions were imposed upon it.’®
In State ex rel. Wilmot v. Buckley’’ the court passed on a
statute concerning election boards which specifically exempted
Mansfield and cities of the fourth grade of the first class from its
operation. There was no difficulty in finding that the act was vio-
lative of the uniformity requirement of Article II, Seection 26. In
answer to the argument that the exceptions should be disregarded
and the legislation applied uniformly, the court replied that there
was a difference between an exception and a limitation and that
this was an exception and the court had no power to extend the act
where the legislature had forbidden. The case is also noteworthy
for an interesting dictum to the effect that the old election statute
contained a valid classification as far as cities went but that there
was no authority to classify counties as to elections.”? There was
little indication as to why counties should be treated differently in
this respect.
In Gentsch v. State ex rel. McGorray”? the court upheld Re-
vised Statutes Section 29260 which provided that in all cities of a
population of 300,000 or more or which later attained such a popu-
lation the polls should be open on election day from five-thirty
o’clock in the morning until four o’clock in the afternoon. Section
2926a provided that the polls should close at 5:30 in the afternoon
in all other cities where registration was required. Only Cincinnati
and Cleveland would be required to close their polls at four o’clock
at the time of the decision but the court was impressed by the
open-end character of the classification. The reasonableness of the
75 State ex rel. Webber v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85 (1908).
76 Id. at 579, 84 N.E. at 90.
7760 Ohio St. 273, 54 N.E. 272 (1899).
78 Id. at 297, 54 NE. at 276.
7971 Ohio St. 151, 72 N.E. 900 (1904).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 481
classification was approved on the ground that fraud was more
likely to occur in large cities under cover of darkness. The court
concluded that the statute was general and operated uniformly
within the requirements of Article II, Section 26. There appears
to be no doubt but that the classification was as wide as the evil
to be corrected and this should be enough.
State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller®® upheld an act passed by
the legislature to provide for the election of judges by separate
non-partisan ballot. The decision was by a three-to-two vote and
was characterized by sharp dissenting opinions based on the stated
improper treatment of illiterate voters. Judge Donahue, writing
for the majority gave only brief attention to the claim of invalidity
under Article II, Section 26, and disposed of it on the grounds that
the legislature had power to treat elections for different types of
offices differently. The result was buttressed by an extended dis-
cussion of the requirements for judicial office in contrast to those
for legislative and executive positions. The majority opinion also
pointed out that separate ballots were not previously unknown in
Ohio. At this writing there is nothing surprising about the de-
cision because of the contemporary widespread use of the separate
non-political judical ballot.®!
G. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Crime
Laws defining crimes and prescribing punishment therefor
must comply with the general laws provision.**
2. Jury Trial
A statute imposing certain restrictions on the right to trial by
jury in “all counties which now contain, or which may contain a
city of the second grade of the first class” was invalidated in Silber-
man v. Hay*® as contrary to the general laws provision. The “classi-
fication” was applicable only to Cuyahoga County and the court
stated that no subject was more clearly of a general nature than
the basic right to trial by jury. Judge Minshall carefully dis-
tinguished the facts under consideration from those in an earlier
80 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N.E. 1078 (1912).
81 It is noteworthy that at the time of the decision in the Miller case the
provision of Article IV, Section 2 requiring more than a majority vote in the
supreme court to hold a law unconstitutional had been adopted but was not
yet effective. Judge Donahue said, “The fact that it has been adopted shows
that the people of this state are of the opinion that courts have been too ready
to find constitutional objection to legislation.” Id. at 30, 99 NE. at 1080.
82In Ex Parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638 (1885) it was held that a statute
purporting to make it a crime to be found in or near a certain city with
burglar’s tools was invalid as contrary to the general laws provision.
83 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 NE. 258 (1899).
482 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
case which upheld a mode of selecting jurors in Cuyahoga County
differently from the provision made under the general law.** It is
doubtful whether such a statute would be upheld today.
3. Personal Property.
Statutes which classified beer bottles and similar containers
separately from other personal property have been held to be gen-
eral statutes with the requisite uniform operation throughout the
state.25 In reaching this result the court was careful to point out
that containers of the type under consideration were different from
other personal property in that their normal use required them to
be temporarily in the possession of the purchaser of their contents.
The owner of the container customarily had his trade name or
mark blown into the bottle.
4. Relief
In State ex rel. De Woody v. Bixler®® the court examined a
statute which permitted county commissioners, by a two-thirds
vote, to establish a poor relief distributing fund and which re-
quired them to take such action when requested by resolution of
a taxing authority administering relief within the county.8’7 The
statute was upheld against an attack under that provision of Article
II, Section 26, which declares that no act, except those relating to
public schools, shall be passed “to take effect upon the approval of
any other authority than the General Assembly .. .” Judge
Williams, writing for a unanimous court, said that the county com-
missioners were, at most, required to make a factual determination.
The decision is in accord with the modern view that the legislature
may delegate the power to make determinations of fact.
5. Trust Companies
Legislation purporting to authorize probate courts in some
counties only to appoint trust companies to act as administrators
of decedents’ estates has been invalidated as contrary to the gen-
eral laws provision.** It is not believed that the decision would
preclude general legislation in the field.
H. EvaLuaTIon
The crucial test of the workability of population classifications
is usually found in their application to municipalities. As has al-
ready been indicated, the Ohio pattern of two population groupings
for all municipalities would result in severe hardship were it not
84 McGill v State, 34 Ohio St. 228 (1878).
85 Renner Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 NE. 118 (1917).
86136 Ohio St. 263, 25 N.E. 2d 341 (1940).
87 Onto Gen. Conve § 6309-2.
88 Schumacher v. McCallip, 69 Ohio St. 500, 69 N.E. 986 (1904).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 483
for the existence of substantive home rule powers for municipal-
ities.®°
Classification of municipalities into broad and substantial
population groups is widely upheld even though there may be
many more groups than are permitted under the Ohio Constitution.
Such classification finds ready judical acceptance even though
there may be wide factual divergences within cities of the same
general size.°° The reason for the popularity of population group-
ings is probably that such classification involves general similarity
within the class in respect to population which, in turn, is thought
to have at least some relevance to the character and scope of many
municipal problems. It is true that large metropolitan areas have
serious problems in connection with crime prevention, for example,
which are not found in rural areas. It is very doubtful, however,
that there is as complete similarity as might be expected in regard
to particular types of municipal activities, such as the need for
fire or police protection, within cities of the same population
group.”! It is thought that these considerations do not tend to de-
stroy the validity of population classification. After all, the pur-
pose of the constitutional provisions is to prevent the abuses of spe-
cial legislation for each municipality. Even though population
groupings are rather rough and ready, they are sufficiently remov-
ed from specialism to justify validation. Of course, the judiciary
should not approve merely sham classification.
While population groupings provide only a general guide to
municipal similarities, practical considerations are strongly in their
favor. It would be well-nigh an impossible task to draft a statute
with base classifications which take account of almost every point
of difference and which, at the same time, do not constitute spe-
cialism in fact under the guise of classification.
Germaneness of the population classification to the purpose of
the law should be a factor which receives careful judical consider-
ation. The population classification should have some real bearing
on the problem at hand.®? An established population classification
should be used where appropriate, but it should not be utilized to
prevent geographical classification, for example, when only such
89 See note 44 supra.
90 See the cases cited in 2 SuTHERLAND, Statutory CoNsTRUCTION § 2109
(3rd ed., Horack, 1943).
91For a study of the lack of relation between population and area and
various other factors see Horack and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another
Twilight Zone, 12 Inn. L. J. 109, 183, 184-186 (1936).
92 See, e.g., State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807,
184 S.W. 2d 593 (1945) which upheld a population classification related to fire
protection purposes even though St. Louis County was the only one in the
c
484 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
classification can give coherence to a law. It is believed that the
Ohio court has been wise to uphold geographical classification as
in accord with realities even though it finds no express sanction in
the constitution.
The courts frequently test population classification by de-
termining whether it is “open-end” so that the subjects of the law
can move from one class to another as populations change. Stated
negatively, frozen population classifications (which are frequently
limited to a particular census) are invalid. This writer believes
that it is entirely proper to require classifications to be fluid. Other-
wise, the degree of artificiality present in the classification is likely
to increase proportionately to the time the classes have been frozen.
It should at least be required of population classes that they
accurately reflect population as of the present time.
The Ohio cases have generally stated uniformity of operation
to be a separate requirement. Frequently the subject matter of the
statute will be determined to be of a general nature and then the
statute will be invalidated on the ground that it fails to have a
uniform operation throughout the state. It is believed that this
is merely a roundabout method of saying that the statute is special
and the constitution requires it to be general, so it must fall. If a
statute particularizes within a possible and practical general class-
ification it is special law. A statute is a general one if it applies
equally to all those within the classification it establishes. If the
classification is unreasonable the statute can either be invalidated
on due process grounds or because the classification is not suf-
ficiently related to the subject matter of the legislation. The Ohio
court’s frequent reference to “uniform operation throughout the
State” is understandable because, after all, the language does
appear in the constitution. It is far, however, from constituting
a solving concept.%
Curative Statutes
The problem of generality as opposed to specialism also arises
in connection with’ curative and retroactive legislation. The partic-
93 Some cases illustrate a realistic use of the uniformity provision:
In State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E. 2d 219 (1941)
the court upheld the validity of a statute requiring city fire departments to
meet certain minimum standards. The opinion briefly considered the claim
that the statute lacked uniform operation in that it applied only to cities and
dismissed it on the grounds that the constitution recognized reasonable classi-
fications including the classifications of cities and villages.
In State ex rel. Outcalt v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St. 457, 17 N.E. 2d 743
(1938), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Whittemore Acts which,
in the period of the depression, remitted penalties and interest on taxes as
an inducement to payment. The court specifically stated that the uniformity
provision of Article II, Section 26 was not violated as the questioned statutes
operated equally upon persons and property similarly situated.
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 485
ular problems raised under the Ohio constitutional provision are,
however, sufficiently different from the problems thus far covered
in this paper to justify separate treatment. It may be helpful at
the outset to suggest definitions of the kind of legislation under
consideration. A curative (or validating) statute, most simply
viewed, is one designed to cure legal defects in either prior acts
or prior legislation or in both. Such a statute is usually a retro-
active one. A retroactive (or retrospective) statute is one which
affects acts or legal relations existing before the statute came into
operation.
In addition to the provision forbidding the impairment of
contracts, which is beyond the scope of this article, Article II,
Section 28, of the Ohio Constitution contains both a flat prohibition
and a limited authorization. The first clause in the section states
that “[t]he General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro-
active laws.” This has been held to constitute a flat prohibition
of such laws. The third portion of the section, the significant one
for purposes of this discussion, provides that the legislature may,
“by general laws” authorize courts to effectuate on equitable terms
“the manifest intention of parties, and officers, by curing omissions,
defects and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of
their want of conformity with the laws of this State.”
Curative statutes are usually plainly retroactive in effect, so
the provision just quoted may be treated as an exception to the
broad prohibition against retroactive laws found in the same article
of the constitution. Is there anything which requires curative legis-
lation to be only retroactive in operation? The constitutional pro-
vision itself, of course, contemplates the effectuation of prior acts.
However, this is not to specify the method by which such acts
are to be effectuated. A careful reading of the provision fails to
reveal an express interdiction of prospective or open-end curative
statutes. There is no reason why a statute drafted to effectuate
acts, insufficient or defective in themselves, occuring in the future
would not meet the literal language of the constitution. The re-
quirement that the effectuation be by means of general laws seems
to add considerable strength to the conclusion that “open-end”
legislation is desirable. Indeed, as we have already seen, there
is much authority which indicates that such prospective character
is essential to the validity of a general law.
What arguments can be mustered to oppose general and pros-
pective curative legislation? Such a question requires analysis of
the practical and common-sense reasons behind a constitutional
94 Safford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 Ohio St. 332, 164 N.E. 351
(1928). The prohibition against retroactive laws does not include those of
a procedural or remedial nature. State ex rel. Slaughter v. Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio, 132 Ohio St. 537, 9 N.E. 2d 505 (1937).
486 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
authorization of curative legislation. One substantial policy basis
is the recognition that a substantial portion of state and local bus-
iness is conducted by laymen unfamiliar with legal intricacies.
It is believed that the logic behind the constitutional provision is
that where there are policy reasons to effectuate otherwise legally
unmeaningful acts that the legislature should have specific au-
thorization in the constitution to carry such acts into effect. The
legislature will determine whether the conditions which exist and
the acts which have been done are entitled to validation. Whether
the legislature bases its policy determination on the good faith
and substantial compliance with the law by the parties or officials
or on the necessity of avoiding undesirable consequences or un-
certainty where the legally inadequate action has been relied upon
is unimportant so long as the legislative effectuation is on such
terms, according to the constitutional wording, “as shall be just
and equitable.”
Would the fundamental policy enunciated be undermined by
a general law operating prospectively which undertook to validate
future deficient acts which were based upon a prescribed degree
of compliance with other existing law or upon the presence of good
faith on the part of some or all of the parties? This question would
be almost instantly met by the objection that such a law would
encourage disregard of the law generally on the assumption that
all, or at least many, defects would be automatically cured by
the suggested general and prospective curative statute. To state
such an objection is to acknowledge its merit. Such a course of
conduct would perhaps be unwise for a legislature to follow. Even
so, it is doubtful whether unwisdom alone would answer the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of such a measure. As a matter of law
such a statute would amount to nothing more than a legislative
declaration that the law shall not be so strict in reference to those
matters capable of validation under the prospective curative statute.
It should not be forgotten that we are interpreting a constitutional
requirement that cuirative laws be general ones. Whatever might be
a court’s view as to the wisdom of an “open-end” curative statute,
it is submitted that there would be no proper occasion for the use
of the drastic step of a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality.
It has not been the purpose of the foregoing discussion to
suggest that “closed” curative statutes are invalid. The purpose
has been, rather, to explore fully the considerations relevent to
“open-end” curative statutes. In view of the plain requirement
that curative laws must be general laws, a fundamental question
in connection with the validity of “closed” curative statutes is
whether such a statute with a “frozen” classification can qualify
as a general law. As applied to municipalities such classification
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 487
based on population would clearly be invalid under Article XVIII,
Section 1, which requires “transition” from the one class to the
other. Different considerations, however, may be relevant when a
“closed” basis of operation is employed in curative legislation. The
problem here is whether past acts can constitute a reasonable basis
for the operation of curative legislation. Suppose, for example,
that a statute passed in 1949 ordains that all persons who were the
victims of torts committed by the state between 1943 and 1947
should be awarded damages in a prescribed manner. Is the stated
period of time a reasonable basis for the operation of the legis-
lation? Stated differently, is the basis so unreasonable as to warrant
invalidation? Probably the statute is inadequate if there is no
other provision made for those similarly situated who were vic-
timized before 1943 and after 1947. But this is a far cry from
deeming it unreasonable. Standards of reasonableness lack precision
and in this situation, where the time period is assumed to have
some relation to the injuries suffered, it seems proper to uphold
the legislative determination. Further support for this view can be
found in the legislature’s acknowledged policy power in respect
to curative statutes. The legislature determines initially whether
a particular subject matter can be appropriately dealt with by a
curative statute and, within certain broad limits, it should have
the power to prescribe the operative time, including the beginning
and terminal dates, of curative legislation enacted. As a practical
matter in Ohio there should be no question as to the validity of
“frozen” curative legislation because the Ohio Supreme Court
has actually gone so far as to uphold special curative legislation
which is applicable only to a past event and to one named indi-
vidual.®5
In Spitzig v. State ex rel. Hile®’ a special statute based on a
personal injury fact background was presented to the court. One
Spitzig was summoned as a juror and while so acting and in the
absence of negligence on his part was injured due to the falling
of a courthouse elevator. The legislature passed a special statute
authorizing the county commissioners of Cuyahoga to pay the
victim a sum not exceeding $15,000. A taxpayer sued to enjoin the
payment of $12,500, which sum had been set pursuant to the
terms of the statute. The court emphasized that it had only the
constitutional question to decide.
Judge Kinkade, who wrote for the unanimous court which
upheld the validity of the statute, appeared to reason in the follow-
ing manner: (1) The facts were undisputed. (2) The legislature
found that the injury to Spitzig imposed a moral obligation on the
95 See note 96 infra.
96119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928).
ee EN
2
MAS
488 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
state. (3) The payment of $12,500 was only compensation and was
in no sense a gratuity extended by the county to Spitzig.”” (4)
The special statute did not violate the state constitution because
where the state acknowledges a moral obligation the prohibition
of retroactive laws found in Article II, Section 28, is inapplicable.
(5) Although the moral obligation does not amount to a legal
one, it is “unthinkable” that the state be powerless to act in the
premises. ’
Implicit in the holding that Article II, Section 26, also was in-
applicable was the determination that the statute in question was a
law of a special nature. Aside from the implication just mentioned,
the court repeatedly referred to the statute as a special one. How
then did it overcome the obstacle presented by the general law re-
quirement of Article II, Section 28? The writer is unable to answer
this question other than to say it appears that the court simply
ignored the requirement. The conclusion that the payment to Spit-
zig was compensation rather than gratuity may be questionable in
view of the legislative finding of only a moral obligation resting
upon the state. In any event, the legislature did formulate the
policy that Spitzig should be paid. It is quite clear that the court’s
view that the statute was special was correct because it applied
only to Spitzig. Certainly it was retroactive in operation and basing
it upon a moral obligation, without more, does not render the
general law requirement inapplicable. It is submitted that there
is no sound reason for the court’s validation of special legislation,
once the legislature has found a moral obligation, in the face of
the contrary unequivocal constitutional mandate. It will not do to
rationalize the result in terms of some inarticulate judicial feeling
that general legislation would not be applicable to the fact situ-
ation; such an argument does not apply to the Ohio Constitution.
Even though one rebels against the conception of public irrespon-
sibility present in the concept of sovereign immunity from tort
liability, it is well to recognize that the constitution provides a means
to accomplish the laudable objective which the legislature had in
providing for Spitzig’s relief. A general statute passed for the relief
of all those now or later situated similarly to Spitzig would comply
with the requirements of Article II, Section 28.
It is frequently said that a legislature cannot do by a validating
act that which was originally beyond its power. The Ohio general
assembly once attempted to provide that special school districts
previously invalidated would become valid special school districts
under the provisions of a validating act.9® The court struck down
the supposed validating act without hesitation and said that the
97 Id. at 120, 162 N.E. at 395.
%8 Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. 54, 75 N.E. 939 (1905).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 489
legislature’s power “to validate any void or ineffectual act is lim-
ited to such acts as it might have originally performed or author-
ized.
It is essential that the curative statute be worded sufficiently
broadly to remedy the defect which the legislature intends to
reach. In one case failure to advertise for bids pursuant to the
requirement of an existing statute was not validated by a later
statute which purported to cure the defect because the later statute
was carelessly drawn too narrowly.!©
In Kumler v. Silsbee! the court had before it a statute which
provided that where any municipal corporation previously had
granted by ordinance the right to lay pipes and drains below the
surface of its streets that such ordinance should be held valid and
binding as if the municipality had had express authority so to
grant. The claims were made that the statute was unconstitutional
because it was retroactive and so violated Article II, Section 28,
and because it was a special grant of corporate power and so vio-
lated Article 13, Section 1. The court held that the act, as a curative
one, was within that exception to the prohibition against retroactive
laws. Without extended discussion the court held the statute to
be general. It is implicit in the opinion that curative acts must
be general.
Curative acts are a valuable legislative tool to help smooth
the administration of government and to prevent wrongs from going
without effective legal remedies. The requirement of the Ohio
Constitution that such acts must be general is entirely workable
and the courts should see that purported curative legislation meets
the constitutional test.
Express Prohibitions on Special Legislation
Article II, Section 32, put an end to legislative divorces in
Ohio.!°
The leading case for our purposes on Article XIII, Section 1,
which as we have seen forbids special acts conferring corporate
power, is the Cincinnati Hospital case which was discussed earlier
in this article.'!°° In this case the court held void a statute which
attempted to confer corporate power on a named muunicipally-
owned hospital. The case shows that even though this constitutional
provision is frequently thought of in connection with private cor-
99 Id. at 57, 75 N.E. at 940.
100 Cowen v. State ex rel. Donovan, 101 Ohio St. 387, 129 N.E. 719 (1920).
101 38 Ohio St. 445 (1882).
102 For the background of legislative divorces in Ohio see Woodbridge,
A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law,
13 U. or Crnn. L.R. 191, 251-255 (1939).
103 See note 34 supra.
490 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
porations, it can also apply to municipal corporations.'*
Requirements or Authorizations of Special Legislation
The implicit requirement of specialism for the creation of new
counties and for certain other purposes has already been men-
tioned. !95
Article IV, Section 1, of the Ohio Constitution provides that
the judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts
of appeals, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such
other courts inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to
time be established by law.
In Kelley v. State!’ the court considered a statute of April 9,
1856 which conferred certain criminal jurisdiction on some of the
common pleas courts of the state and not on others. By a three-
to-two decision the court determined that the courts of common
pleas in Ohio were an organization of a general nature and that
the laws dealing with them must, therefore, be of a general nature.
It was also stated that these laws “are imperatively required to
have a uniform operation throughout the state.”!°’ The reasoning
of the court was mechanical but the decision effectively prevented
special legislation applicable to the lower courts.
In Wallace v. Leiter’ a statute which provided that there
should be an appeal in certain counties from the probate court to
the circuit court in specified cases was invalidated as a general
law not having uniform operation. In a brief opinion the court
stated its reliance on the well settled rule of the Kelley case.
In two interesting cases the court examined legislation dealing
with probate courts. In the first case, Squire, Superintendent of
Banks, v. Bates,'!©? the court invalidated Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 10501-62, which provided for divergent methods of appeal
from probate courts. The statutory method provided that in in-
stances where the probate judge had the qualifications prescribed
by law for common pleas judges, appeal was taken directiy to the
court of appeals. In other instances the appeal was to the common
pleas court. Judge Zimmerman, speaking for a unanimous court,
stressed that the result of the method was to make appeals de-
pendent upon the qualifications of the particular probate judge.
The opinion stated that because the statute concerned the appellate
104In a leading case the trial court thought that if the questioned statutes
were not invalid as contrary to the general laws provision that they should
fall under Article XIII, Section 1. State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio
St. 303, 82 N.E. 2d 709 (1948).
105 See page 464 supra.
1066 Ohio St. 269 (1856).
107 Id. at 272.
108 76 Ohio St. 185, 81 N.E. 187 (1907).
109 132 Ohio St. 161, 5 N.E. 2d 690 (1936).
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 491
jurisdiction of two constitutional courts that it was a law of a
general nature and failed to have the requisite uniform operation.
In re Estate of Bates'!© presented a situation readily distin-
guishable from the foregoing one. Section 10501-56, General Code,
provided that when a record was not made at the hearing of a
matter before the probate court, an appeal on law and fact may
be taken to the common pleas court. Judge Matthias, writing for
the unanimous court, emphasized that the legislation merely
provided an optional method of procedure. The argument that
the statute was invalid as not having uniform operation was based
on the fact that some probate courts were combined with common
pleas courts and that therefore the statute only applied to probate
courts as such. The court readily conceded that this was the situ-
ation but apparently thought that the classification of probate
courts which were not combined with common pleas courts was
a reasonable one. The statute applied only to appeal proceedings
and applied uniformly to separate probate courts throughout the
state. It is clear that so long as some probate courts are combined
with common pleas courts and are known as “common pleas courts”
and the others are separate and are known as “probate courts” that
it is entirely proper to treat the latter as a separate class for such
purposes as appeal to the common pleas courts. It would, of course,
be ridiculous to allow such an appeal for the former class as it
would result in an appeal taken from a court to the same court.
The reader will have noted that all the cases dealing with
courts which have been -discussed thus far have been concerned
with the constitutional courts enumerated in Article IV, Section 1.
This provision of the constitution also refers to “such other courts
inferior to the courts of appeals as may from time to time be es-
tablished by law.” This is interpreted to refer to laws passed by
the legislature; the power to establish courts is held to be beyond
the home rule powers of municipalities.!'' The uniformity re-
quirement of Article II, Section 26, is regarded as inapplicable to
the creation of inferior courts and the general assembly has com-
monly created particular municipal courts by special laws.'!? In an
important case where the problem could have been raised, the
requirement of the general laws provision was not even men-
tioned.'!3 It is believed fair to assert that Ohio has, in this area
done violence to the policy favoring general legislation. It would
seem that this area would be an ideal one in which to use general
110142 Ohio St. 622, 53 N.E. 2d 787 (1944).
111 State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 NE.
647 (1925).
112 Onto Gen. Cope § 1558-1 et. seq.
113 State ex rel. Fox v. Yeatman, 98 Ohio St. 44, 105 N.E. 74 (1913).
492 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
legislation which varied the number of judges in relation to the
population of the communities served. The judiciary has the power
to determine the meaning of the constitutional requirement of
general laws in this field. The constitution is not crystal clear on
the point and the judges, therefore, should not be adverse to con-
sidering factors of policy and practicality. In many instances the
feasibility of a general statute is a policy determination rather
than an inevitable decision deduced from fixed principles.
Express Requirements of General Legislation
Article XIII, Section 6, which requires general laws for the
organization of municipalities may be regarded as a specific im-
plementation of Article II, Section 26, which, of course, applies
to municipalities also. Where a special statute attempts to regulate
municipal organization the court could point to either Article XIII,
Section 6, or to the general laws provision. In the same way,
Article X, Section 1, which requires general laws for the organi-
zation and government of counties, could be used as an alterna-
tive to the general laws provision.
Section 2 of Article XIII requires general incorporation acts
for private corporations. It has been held that this provision grants
wide authority to form new corporations and to effect changes in
existing ones so long as general laws are utilized.''*
Some Policy Factors
The plethora of interpretive problems arising under the con-
stitutional provisions examined in this article could lead one to
the conclusion that judicial determination of requirements of gen-
erality in legislation has not been altogether successful. Very few
subjects of legislation, however, are “naturally” the subject for
either a general or a special law. The very simplicity of the language
“Ta]ll laws, of a general nature” may tend to lull one into a sense of
complacency as to the character of interpretive problems. Ex-
perience has shown that the problems under the general laws
provision are as formidable as those arising under the equally
simple phrase “all powers of local self-government” found in the
home rule amendment. Therefore, there must be one authoritative
interpreter.
Would the situation be improved by making the legislature
the sole judge of the applicability of a general law? There are
several arguments which can be mustered on the negative side.
Prior to the Beacom''5 case the legislature pretty much had the
final say and the record was one of evasion and disregard of the
constitutional mandate. An important argument is that legislative
114 Belden v. Union Central Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E. 2d 629 (1944).
115 See note 39 supra.
1950] GENERAL AND SPECIAL STATUTES 493
solutions frequently must be based on compromise and expediency.
The legislative process does not lend itself to that detached con-
sideration which is necessary for constitutional interpretation.
Another objection would be that legislative interpretation would
probably result in a patchwork of particular solutions rather than
an integrated pattern. Finally, it would be out of harmony with
the existing method of constitutional interpretation to entrust
this part of the constitution to the legislature.
On the other side of the argument is that a purely logical
analysis of the constitutional requirements is not enough. The judi-
cial process, so the argument would run, is not well fitted to make a
broad gauged inquiry into the considerations dictating the use of
a particular type of statute. The legislature could acquire the fac-
tual information on which a sound policy decision could be based.
If the legislative solution were deemed inappropriate, the law
could be repealed and a more workable one enacted. Other pro-
visions of the constitution could be relied upon to prevent legislative
abuse in this area. “The question, ‘could a general law be made
applicable?’ does not really call for interpretation and application
of existing law but requires a policy determination as to whether
the subject is one which could be effectually dealt with by general
law.”116
We are committed to judicial review and it is at least doubtful
as to whether the Ohio Supreme Court should be displaced as the
arbiter of general as opposed to special legislation. Would it not
be more profitable to press for an affirmative vote on the question
of a constitutional convention at the general election in November,
1952 so that the whole question of the present constitutional re-
quirements of general and special laws could be opened? If this
were done, the court could be presented with a much more coherent
pattern than now obtains. It is incongruous to permit special laws
for the creation of inferior courts when there is no reason to be-
lieve that the subject is not readily susceptible to general legislation.
By the same reasoning, the special laws subject to local referendum
authorized in Article II, Section 30, are undesirable.!”’
It cannot be overemphasized that the court’s function in passing
on an initial legislative determination of the type of statute to
be employed is one calling for the exercise of judicial talents of
the highest order. The judges must steer a middle course between
credulity where only form supports the legislative determination
and over-zealousness for precision where the legislative determi-
nation appears rough but is nonetheless supportable. They should
116 ForpHaM, Loca, GOVERNMENT Law 60 (1949).
117See Fordham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23
Onto Bar 181, 186 (1950).
494 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
recognize, for example, that in some circumstances a general law
may operate on a very limited number of persons and still be valid.
In the words of Judge Cardozo, “Time with its tides brings new
conditions which must be cared for by new laws, Sometimes the
new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the new conditions affect
one only or a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow
as the mischief.”!!8
118 Williams v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 46 (1933).
The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio
JEFFERSON B. ForpHAM* AND J. Russet, LEAcH**
This paper is designed as an expository treatment of the process
of popular legislation at the state level in Ohio. The primary con-
cern is with the “how” of the subject without critical re-exami-
nation of the “why.” The policy aspects are intriguing; they chal-
lenge separate discussion in relation to possible constitutional re-
vision in Ohio.!
The initiative is a device by which any person or group of per-
sons may draft a statute and, by securing to a petition the signatures
of a minimum number of qualified voters, require the appropriate
state officials (with or without action upon it by the legislature)
to submit the measure to the electorate at a general or special elec-
tion.? If an initiated measure is approved by the required major-
ity, it becomes a law. In some states the device may be employed
to amend the constitution. The true initiative has two forms. The
direct initiative gets a measure to the voters without the necessity
for first submitting it to the legislature in order to permit consider-
ation there before referral to the voters may be required.’
The referendum is a device whereby a measure, already
adopted by a representative legislative body or constitutional con-
vention, is held in suspense until it shall have been submitted to
the voters at a general or special election, there to be ratified or
rejected by majority vote. There are compulsory, voluntary and
optional types of referenda. In the case of the compulsory refer-
* Dean of the College of Law, The Ohio State University.
** Reference Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 At the general election in November 1952 the voters of Ohio are sched-
uled to vote, under Section 3 of Article XVI of the constitution, on the ques-
tion “Shall there be a convention to revise, alter or amend the constitution?”
For a general discussion of this subject, see Fordham, Some Aspects of Con-
stitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 Onto Bar 181 (1950).
21 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18,
p. 183. Mr. Luce would confine “initiative” literally to initiating the making
of law: “. . . taking the terms as we find them, we shall approach clear think-
ing if we try to restrict ‘initiative’ to that independent process whereby an
electorate begins the making of a law; ‘referendum’ to that process whereby
an electorate completes or prevents the making of a law; and ‘direct legis-
lation’ to that process of law-making wherein a representative body plays
either a subordinate part or no part at all.” Luce, LecisLaTive PRINCIPLES 565
(1930).
31 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts 1917-18,
p. 183.
4 Ibid.
495
496 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
endum a measure must go to the electors and receive a majority
vote before it may become operative. This type is used to a great
extent in the amending of state constitutions. The voluntary type
is referral to the voters by the legislature at its own instance.
Under the optional form a referendum is had responsive to a
petition of a percentage of the electors. It is the optional type
which is usually embraced in the combination of the initiative
and referendum.
Although these devices did not gain a foothold in the United
States, as applied to ordinary legislation, until the end of the
nineteenth century, popular legislation is a governmental process
of great antiquity.’ The initiative, in its modern form, was born
in Switzerland about about a century ago.°
It was in 1898 that popular legislation secured constitutional
recognition in American state government. In that year South
Dakota amended her constitution to permit the use of the initia-
tive and referendum at the statutory level.’ In the years from
1900 to 1909 six states followed the example of South Dakota.*
Four of these states extended the initiative provisions to amend-
ments to their state constitutions.’ In the so-called “progressive
era,” 1910 to 1915, twelve states adopted provisions permitting
both the initiative and the referendum.'° Ten of those states, includ-
ing Ohio, made the initiative available as to constitutional amend-
ments.!!' New Mexico and Maryland have provided for the
referendum alone.'? There has been scant development since 1915;
only Massachusetts has been added to the list of initiative and
5 Losincier, THE Peopte’s Law 1 (1909).
6 Rappard, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Switzerland, 63 Tue
ANNALS 110, 131 (1912).
7S. Dax. Const. Art. III, § 1.
8 The states, with dates of original adoption noted, are: Utah, Art. VI,
§ 1(2) (1900); Oregon, Art. IV, §§ 1, la, Art. IX, §§ 1, la, Art. XI, § 10, Art.
XVII, § 1 (1902); Montana, Art. V, § 1 (1906); Oklahoma, Art. V, §§ 1-4, 6-8,
Art. XVIII, § 4(a) to 4(e) (1907); Maine, Art. IV, Pt. I, § 1, Art. XXXI (1908);
Missouri, Art. III, §§ 49-53, Art. XII, § 2B (1908).
9 Utah, Oregon, Oklahoma and Missouri.
10 The states with dates of original adoption noted, are: Arkansas, Art. V,
§ 1 (1910); Colorado, Art. V, § 1 (1910); Arizona, Art. IV, § 1, Art. XXI, § 1,
Art. XXII, § 14 (1911); California, Art. IV, §§ 1, 1b (1911); Nebraska, Art. III,
§§ 1-4 (1912); Washington, Art. II, § 1, Art. XI, §§ 2, 4, 10 (1912); Idaho, Art.
III, § 1 (1912); Ohio, Art. II, §§ 1-1g (1912); Nevada, Art. XIX, §§ 1-3 (1912);
Michigan, Art. V, §§ 1, 30, 38, Art. XVII, §§ 1-3 (1913); North Dakota, Art.
II, § 25, Art. XV, § 202; Mississippi (1914 — held invalid in Power v. Robert-
son, 130 Miss. 188, 93 So. 769 (1918) ).
11 The exceptions were in Idaho and Washington.
12 The states, with dates of original adoption noted are: New Mexico, Art.
IV, § 1 (1911) and Maryland, Art. XVI (1915).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 497
referendum states.'’ On the other hand, no state has abandoned
the initiative and referendum, once provision has been made for
them in its constitutional scheme.
There is no federal bar to state use of direct legislation. An
effort was once made to persuade the United States Supreme
Court that the device violated the republican form of government
clause of the Constitution, but the court categorized the contention
as a political question not for judicial determination.’
Ohio adopted the initiative and referendum in 1912. Popular
legislation was one of the liveliest topics of discussion to engage
the attention of the constitutional convention of that year. Among
those who spoke in favor of the innovation was Theodore Roose-
velt, who appeared by invitation. It is of interest, as an historical
aside, that the Colonel even spoke out for the recall of judicial
decisions.'5 One of the objections which seemed to cause the
most concern was the suggestion that the then still active move-
ment for the single tax would stand a better chance of success in
Ohio through direct legislation than through action of the general
assembly. An accommodation was achieved by so amending the
proposal as to ban resort to direct legislation to embrace Henry
George’s darling.
The record of direct legislation in Ohio discloses the interest-
ing fact that the device has been employed more freely at the con-
stitutional than the statutory level. Between 1912 and 1950 twenty-
nine constitutional amendments were proposed by the initiative.
Nine were ratified. During the same period fifteen of twenty-nine
amendments proposed by the general assembly were approved.
Seventeen legislative measures have been proposed by the initiative.
Of these, three were enacted by the general assembly. Three of
those not so enacted were carried to the voters by supplemental
petition; one was adopted. As for the referendum, we find that ten
measures have been referred and, of them, all save one were dis-
approved at the polls.'¢
13 Mass. Const. Art. of AmMenp. LXXIV (1918).
14 Pacific State Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 US.
118 (1911).
151 Onto CoNsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1912, ProceEpINGs AND DepatTes 378.
Also of interest is Art. IV, § 7 of the constitution as amended in 1912. The
movement for popular legislation led to this amendment whereby through
a petition and an election, the voters of smaller counties could cause a uni-
fication of the probate and common pleas courts.
16 Legislative Reference Division, Ohio State Library, Operation of the
Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 1931; Onto Execrion Sraristics.
498 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
INITIATIVE
1. Matters or Areas to which the Initiative Applies
a. Constitutional Amendments
Sections 1 and 1a of Article II of the Ohio Constitution reserve
to the “people” the power, through the initiative, to amend the
constitution. There are no express substantive limitations upon
that power. It has been suggested, however, that there is an im-
plied limitation which precludes amendment, in this wise, of the
initiative or referendum sections of the constitution. Were this
not so, it is said, all the procedural protections insisted upon by the
conservative element in the 1912 Convention could be eliminated.
To eliminate “dangers” of this nature; Mr. James P. Richardson
introduced two resolutions in the Massachusetts Convention of
1918, which were designed to place their provisions beyond the
reach of the initiative.'? In Ohio there have been two unsuccess-
ful attempts to amend the initiative and referendum provisions.'*
We are unable to find a rational basis for the asserted limitations.
If certain provisions are considered so important that they should
not be subject to change in this way an express limitation is called
for. Thus, Arizona has provided by an initiated constitutional
amendment that the legislature may not repeal or amend initiated
or referred measures approved by the people.'® and this provision
has been given effect by the courts.”° While the limitation related
to measures of statutory, and not constitutional dignity, the point
is the same.
172 DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Massachusetts 639, 950.
The resolutions read: “No part of the Constitution which provides for the
establishment of the initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an
initiative petition.” These amendments were rejected by votes of 106 to 129
and 137 to 140. This gentleman, with others, was successful, however, in
adding the following clause to a provision relating to excluded matter: “No
part of the constitution specifically excluding any matter from the operation
of the popular initiative and referendum shall be the subject of an initiative
petition; nor shall this section be the subject of such a petition.” (Italics ours).
18 The first attempt was in 1915 when the people defeated a proposed
amendment to limit elections on twice defeated constitutional proposals and
to prevent the abuse of the initiative. The second attempt, while being ap-
proved at the polls, was short-lived; this was the amendment to Article II,
Section 1, which reserved to the people the legislative power of the referen-
dum on the action of the assembly ratifying a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution. This amendment was declared unconstitutional in Hawke
v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), on the basis of the Federal Constitution. No-
where in the opinions there or in the Supreme Court of Ohio, is found any
argument that the section was invalid as not dealing with a proper subject
of amendment by the initiative.
19 Artz. Const. Art. IV, pt. 1, § 6.
20 State ex rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69, 131 P. 2d 983 (1942);
Williard v. Hubbs, 30 Ariz. 417, 248 Pac. 32 (1926).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 499
b. Legislation
Certain limitations are imposed on the people’s power to adopt
initiated laws. Some of these are expressly written into the con-
stitution while others have been worked out in the process of
judicial decision. Article II, Section le, prohibits the use of the
initiative process to enact “a law authorizing any classification of
property for the purpose of levying different rates of taxation
thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single tax on land or
land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule
than is or may be applied to improvements thereon or to person-
al property.” While, as we have seen, the single tax movement
was still vigorous in 1912, at this day the fear of the ghost of
Henry George seems very unreal. In view of the relative ease
of amending the constitution, this limitation is pretty weak, in
any event.
The constitutional limitations on the power of the general as-
sembly to enact laws are made applicable in broad terms to popular
legislation. This is generally taken to refer only to substantive
limitations. Constitutional limitations on legislative procedure are
not appropriate to the processes of popular or direct legislation.
The question whether constitutional provisions as to form and
style of bills and laws apply to initiated measures is more trouble-
some. Are they limitations on legislative power? It should be
noted at once that Section 1g of Article II prescribes a form of
enacting clause for initiated measures. That section also refers to
the title of such a measuré but is silent as to form and content of
both title and body. It will be remembered that Section 16 of
Article II requires that a bill originating in the general assembly
be confined to a single subject clearly expressed in its title. The
supreme court considers these requirements merely directory,”'
but the legislature, to its lasting credit, conscientiously abides by
them anyway. Even if they were, by interpretation, carried over to
the initiative it is not evident that they would harden into some-
thing of a mandatory character. On the same footing is the second
part of the companion requirement that an amendatory law con-
tains the entire section or sections amended and repeal the section
or sections amended (as they theretofore stood).?* The first part,
21 Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.E. 643 (1889); Pim v. Nicholson, 6
Ohio St. 176 (1856).
22 This is shown by the approval of the Ohio courts of the doctrine of
repeal by implication. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Bower, 147 Ohio St. 66, 68 N.E. 2d
217 (1947); Goff v. Gates, 87 Ohio St. 142, 100 N.E. 329 (1912); State v. Board
of Commissioners of Wyandot County, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 90 (1897), affirmed
Board of Commissioners v. State ex rel. Cuneo, 57 Ohio St. 661, 50 N.E. 1127
(1897).
500 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
as to setting the amended sections out at length, is, however, deem-
ed mandatory.” In the absence of an authoritative ruling on the
question, the sensible course is to adhere to the rule in drafting
an initiated measure of an amendatory character.
The courts have recognized an implicit limitation on the
municipal initiative. The initiative and referendum are reserved to
the “people” of a municipality as to any subject of municipal leg-
islative action.“ It appeared in State ex rel. Smith v. City of Fre-
mont,2® that the state health authorities had ordered the city to
change its water supply source or install purification facilities. The
day before a water filtration plant bond ordinance of the city was
adopted by council on third reading an inconsistent measure, which
called for a change from a river to deep wells as the source of sup-
ply, was put forward by initiative petition. At the next general
election the initiated measure was approved by the voters.
Mandamus to compel action under the initiated ordinance was de-
nied by the supreme court in a brief per curiam opinion on the
theory that the initiative may not be used as a substitute for the
referendum. Council’s ordinance was adopted as an emergency
measure and as such was not subject to referendum. Since the
Ohio courts refrain from reviewing legislative declarations of
emergency,”* the effect of the decision is to enable a municipal
governing body to put its measures beyond the reach of either the
initiative or the referendum. This is made the more clear by the
critical statement in the opinion that the initiated measure was an
attempt to repeal legislative action. The attorney general has so
construed the court’s language in ruling that the initiative could
not be used to repeal a non-emergency ordinance on which the
ninety-day referendum period had run.”? The municipal initiative
and referendum may be regulated by the exercise of home rule
charter-making power.”* On this basis the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County has decided that a charter provision permitting
repeal of an ordinance by an initiated measure is valid.”®
We are not aware of any instance in which this implicit limi-
tation has been invoked at the state level. Nor have we, on the
other hand, found any logical basis for denying its application to
statutes. It is true that under the general statute an initiated ordi-
23 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917).
24 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1f.
25116 Ohio St. 469, 157 N.E. 318 (1927).
26 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937).
27 1948 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4252.
28 Onto Gen. Cope § 4227-12. Applied in: State ex rel. Daniels v. Council
of City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E. 2d 913 (1939); Dillon v City
of Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 806 (1927).
29 Ferguson v. Wiegand, 34 Ohio Law Rep. 257 (1931).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 501
nance is not channeled through council, whereas an initiated statute
must be subjected to consideration by the general assembly. This
provides some procedural basis for a distinction but it is not com-
pelling because, even under the state pattern, the last word is with
the electors. The difficulty is with the proposition per se. As indi-
cated by the dissenters in the Fremont case, the design of the con-
stitutional reservation of powers to the electors was to enable them
to enact legislation as a part of the legislative power of the state on
at least an equal footing with the representative legislative body,
but the decision of the court left them far short of that.°° The leg-
islative body can repeal popular legislation®*®* and it can, as we
have seen, by an emergency clause, put a measure beyond reach
of the referendum. Yet, we are told, the electors cannot, by initi-
ative, repeal a legislative enactment.
Initiative and referendum provisions have, in other states, been
declared inapplicable to municipal legislation administrative in
character.*! Considerable confusion has resulted from this rule
due to the difficulty of determining just what action is legislative.
Most of the few Ohio cases involving this problem relate to the
referendum and will be discussed under that head.3? In Goodman
v. Hamilton,** the court held that an initiated ordinance, authoriz-
ing and directing a city official to enter into a contract with a public
utility company to obtain artificial gas for the city, was legislative
in nature and a valid act. Whatever may be the position taken as
to municipal measures, there is no sound basis that one can readily
perceive for engrafting an exception onto the state initiative and
referendum with respect to measures deemed administrative. Apart
from express limitations, the power reserved to the electors is as
broad as that vested in the general assembly. As a practical matter,
moreover, a local governing body is likely to deal much more di-
rectly with administrative matters than is a state legislature.
Particular note may be made of the fact that the initiative may
be used to levy a state tax or make an appropriation of state funds.
Theoretically, this could have absurd effects upon the state budget.
In practice, the power has not been so employed. The most the
voters have done is repeal the tax on colored oleomargarine by
initiative in 1949.
2. Preliminary Steps
Section 1g of Article II, ordains that the provisions of that sec-
tion (presumably Section 1 and all its subsections) shall be self-
30116 Ohio St. 469, 472, 157 N.E. 318 (1927).
30a State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935).
31 Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P. 2d 480 (1939); Note: 122 A.L.R. 769.
32 Page 523, infra.
33 21 Ohio App. 465, 153 N.E. 217 (1926).
502 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
executing, except as otherwise provided, and that laws may be
passed to facilitate their operation, “but in no way limiting or re-
stricting either such provisions or the powers herein reserved.”
The legislature has enacted implementing sections,** among which
is one requiring proponents to give notice of their intention to
circulate petitions.** This is done by filing a petition, signed by
one hundred qualified electors, and a summary of the proposal
with the attorney general for examination.** If the summary is, in
the opinion of that officer, a fair and truthful statement, he must
so certify.*7 A verified copy of the proposal, together with the sum-
mary and the certificate, is then filed with the secretary of state
whose duty it is, in turn, to designate the size, color and weight of
the paper to be used and the general arrangement of the petition.
There are other provisions governing printing, control, and disposal
of blank petitions by the secretary of state, and payment to that of-
ficer by the petitioning committee for the costs of printing.**
The question whether these are all true implementing pro-
visions or constitute restrictions on the powers reserved to the
voters by the constitution has not been adjudicated. It is hardly
cause for serious concern. The requirement of one hundred sig-
natures is not onerous; those signers would be but a tiny fraction
of the immensely larger total needed to get a measure to the legis-
lature and they would serve as some indication to the attorney gen-
eral that the petition was being put forward on a serious basis. It is
required that the summary be reproduced on the printed petition.
The apparent purpose is to help the persons, whose signatures are
sought, to get with facility an understanding of what the proposal
is about. The attorney general doubtless could be required by
mandamus to certify an adequate summary but the supreme court
has denied the writ in an instance where the “summary” was longer
than the text. That, observed the Chief Justice, simply was not a
summary.*®
3. Form of Petition
The constitution expressly permits the presentation of petitions
in separate parts, but each part must contain all the elements of a
34 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175 to 4785-183.
35 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175.
36 The attorney general will not certify unless the summary is accom-
panied by a petition of one hundred signatures. 1930 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio)
No. 1854.
37 Under a former statute calling for a fair and impartial synopsis the
attorney general ruled that arguments may not be included in a synopsis.
1930 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1854. It is doubted that the statutory change
to “fair and truthful” would affect this ruling.
38 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175, 4785-176a, 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
39 State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 27, 176 N.E. 664 (1931).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 503
complete petition.*’ This is a practical necessity. The constitution
requires that a petition bear “across the top” a prescribed caption*’
and that there be set out in the petition the full text of the proposed
law or proposed constitutional amendment with the prescribed
enacting clause or resolving clause, as the case might be.
The implementing statute’? goes much further; it not only
prescribes the form of petition but requires that there be elements
not exacted by the constitution. The statute requires that the words
“initiative petition” be placed at the top of the petition. This is to
be followed by a place for numbering each part of the petition.
Next there is a place for inserting the name of the solicitor to whom
the part is issued. Below this is a place for inserting the date of is-
suance. After these items comes the caption required by the con-
stitution. It may be doubted that this departure from the literal
language of the constitution is serious, since the matters set ahead
of the caption are simply useful mechanics for administrative pur-
poses.
The statute requires that, following the constitutional caption,
there be set forth the summary and then the certification of the at-
torney general as to the summary, under proper date. Then must
follow the names and addresses of a committee of from three to
five members to represent the petitioners in all matters relating to
the petition or its circulation.** The next item is a notice, printed
in red, that one who signs more than once or signs a name other
than his own or signs when not a qualified voter is subject to
prosecution. Then follows-a place for a statement of the amount
the solicitor has received or expects to receive for his services and
from whom. The address of the person paying for the services must
be given. (The solicitor must fill in his part before any elector
signs. Of course, he can fill in “nothing,” if he is not working for
pay.) The next item is the following legend before the signatures:
“Sign with ink or indelible pencil. Your name, residence, and date
of signing must be given.” The text of the proposal must be set out
immediately following the place for signatures and it must begin
with the prescribed resolving or enacting clause, as the case may
40 On10 Const. Art. II, § lg.
41 For constitutional proposals, the caption reads: “Amendment to the Con-
stitution Proposed by Initiative Petition to be Submitted Directly to the Elec-
tors.” Art. II, § la. For legislative changes the caption reads: “Law Proposed
by Initiative Petition First to be Submitted to the General Assembly.” The
capitalization of both captions is slightly changed in Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-
176.
42 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176.
43 The requirement of a committee is ordained by Oun1to Gen. Cope § 4785-
180. This requirement of a committee of not less than three purports to deny
to the “lone wolf” the rights of the initiative or referendum processes.
504 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
be. The final item is an affidavit of the solicitor. The precise form
is fixed by the statute.
It should be observed that the statute in requiring a fixed form
of petition uses the qualifying word “substantially”, which is de-
signed to obviate any questions based on minor deviations.**
4. Obtaining Copies of Petition for Circulation
As already mentioned, the secretary of state orders the print-
ing of all petitions and retains their possession until certain formal-
ities are complied with. In order for the committee of petitioners
to obtain blank part-petitions, they must file a list of the names
and addresses of the circulators and the number of part-petitions
to be issued to each.*® The secretary of state then places the circu-
lator’s name on the particular part-petition and keeps a record of
the serial number and date of issuance of each such petition issued.
Petitions circulated by anyone other than the listed solicitor will
not be accepted by the secretary of state.
5. Signatures to Petitions
The constitution requires that petitions proposing constitutional
amendments bear the signatures of ten per centum of the electors*®
and those proposing legislation, three per centum.*7 Upon these
petitions as well as supplementary initiative petitions, it is neces-
sary that there be the signatures of not less than one-half of the
designated percentage of electors for each of one-half of the counties
of the state.4® The basis upon which the required number of pe-
titioners in any case is determined is the total number of votes cast
for the office of governor at the last preceding election therefor.*®
The clause “last preceding election” has been taken to refer to
that election next preceding the filing of the petition despite the
fact that the petition filed lacked sufficient signatures and a guber-
natorial election occurred before the additional signatures were
filed.° The effect of this ruling has been limited by a legislative
directive that the secretary of state shall not accept for filing a
petition which does not purport to contain at least the minimum
number of signatures required.™!
Each signer of a petition must be “an elector of the state.”*?
The constitution elsewhere provides that every citizen of the Unit-
44 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175.
45 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-176a.
46 Onto Const. Art. II, § la.
47 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
48 Onto.Const. Art. II, § lg.
49 Ibid;.Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-182.
50 State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171, 187 N.E. 301 (1933).
51 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-177d.
52 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 505
ed States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a
resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of
the county, township, or ward, in which he resides, such time as
may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector,
and be entitled to vote at all elections.** Voting privileges may,
however, be limited by registration statutes so long as they are
reasonable in their requirements.®* In enacting legislation to im-
plement the initiative and referendum provisions, the general as-
sembly saw fit to employ the registration device and required that
each signer be a qualified elector of the county, and a registered
voter, if he resided in a registration city or precinct."> Although a
person may be a qualified elector when he signs a petition his name
will not be counted if he is not a voter at the time the petition is
examined by the county board of elections.5® A change of residence
within a precinct or a correct entry on the petition of the street
address coupled with a mistaken entry of the ward and precinct
will not invalidate a signature.*’
The constitution prescribes that the names of all signers to a
petition shall be written in ink, each signer for himself, and that
each signer shall place on the petition, after his name, the date of
signing and his place of residence.*® Residents of municipalities
must note their municipality, street and number (if any), ward
and precinct. Any other signer must state the township and coun-
ty in which he resides. The implementing legislation requires, in
addition, that the rural route or other post office address of non-
municipal residents be shown."
In one particular, legislation lessens the strictness of the proc-
ess; the constitution specifies signing in ink, the statute calls for
ink or indelible pencil. This has passed muster in the courts on
the theory of substantial compliance.* But it has been held that
the requirements as to the date of signing, the residence of the
signer and his ward or precinct are mandatory and failure to place
53 On10 Const. Art. V, § 1; Sections 5 and 6 of this article deny residency
to the military under certain conditions, and deny the privileges of electors
to idiots and insane persons.
54 State ex rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 101 Ohio St. 370, 130 N.E. 29 (1920);
Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N.E. 538 (1885).
55 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-34 (1945) and 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
56 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-178.
57 In the Matter of Initiative Petitions, 3 Ohio Supp. 260 (C.P. 1939).
58 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g.
59 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
60 Om10 Gen. Cone § 4785-176.
61 Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N-E. 532 (1922), In re Referendum
Petition, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 140 (1915). A ruling by the attorney general,
however, holds that signatures in black or colored pencil are invalid. 1939
Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
506 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
that material on the petition is fatal to the validity of the signa-
ture.** This information may, however, be written on the petition
by another, at the direction and with the authority of the elector,
since the mandate as to signing, “each signer for himself,” is deem-
ed to refer to the signature alone.*
One further limitation relating to signers of petitions is pre-
scribed by statute. Each part-petition which is filed must contain
signatures of electors of only one county. The attorney general
has ruled that this provision tends to facilitate the operation of the
initiative and referendum and that any part-petition which bears
signatures of electors of two or more counties is invalid.“* This
holding could be exploited to advantage by opponents of a petition
by getting signatures of out-of-county electors on the petition; ap-
parently there would be no criminal liability although the elector
signed only to defeat the petition.
May one who has signed, later withdraw his signature from
the petition?®’ Without the benefit of statute the supreme court
held signers to have this privilege on referendum petitions if the
withdrawal was made before official action was taken on the pe-
tition.** Any doubt was resolved by the enactment of a provision
which now permits an elector to withdraw his name at any time
prior to the time the part-petition bearing his signature is returned
by the county board of elections to the secretary of state.** This
must be done by written request to the board of elections. Further
complications might be caused should an elector first withdraw
his signature, then change his mind and seek to reinstate it. In a
somewhat similar situation dealing with remonstrances to school
district changes, the attorney general ruled that this could be
done.
6. Circulation and Verification of Petitions
Solicitors must retain possession of incomplete petitions or
part-petitions and may not leave them at any place for signing out
62 In re Referendum Petition, 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 140 (1915); 1932 Ops.
Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 4272.
63 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933).
64 Onto Gren. Cone § 4785-177 (Supp. 1949).
651949 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 783; Informal Opinion of the Attorney
General (Ohio) No. 464, January 4, 1949.
66 Note: 85 A.L.R. 1373 (1933).
67 State ex rel. Kahle v. Rupert, 99 Ohio St. 17, 122 N.E. 39 (1918); but
see State ex rel. v. Lemon, 26 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 151 (1925).
68 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177a (Supp. 1949).
6° 1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 984. This opinion can, however, be
distinguished as the attorney general ruled that signatures could be added
on remonstrances until the final possible filing date, even if actually filed
earlier.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 507
of their presence.” It is required that any petition or part-petition
left in violation of this provision be seized on behalf of the county
board of elections and forwarded, with an affidavit explaining the
seizure, to the secretary of state. Notice and hearing must be given
the solicitor and each member of the committee for the petitioners.
The statute puts the burden of proof on the solicitor and if he does
not sustain it the secretary of state must destroy the petitions or
part-petitions in question.”
The constitution requires that each part-petition must be veri-
fied by affidavit of the solicitor, which shall set forth (1) the “num-
ber of signers” of the part-petition; (2) that each signature was
attached to the part-petition in the presence of the affiant; (3) that
the signatures were attached with knowledge of the contents of
the petition; (4) that each signature was entered on the date placed
after it; (5) that “to the best of his knowledge and belief” each
signature is genuine; and that “he believes” the signers to be
electors.’2 This section also prescribes that “no other affidavit
thereto shall be required.” The form of affidavit prescribed by
statute demands more of the affiant. It requires the circulator to
swear positively that the signers were electors and that the signa-
tures are of the persons whose names they purport to be.™* This
places a burden on the solicitor to determine as a fact the identity
of a signer and his qualifications as an elector.
Defects in the affidavit will invalidate a part-petition even
though all of the signatures are genuine signatures of electors. By
statute a part-petition is not properly verified if the statutory form
of affidavit is not properly filled out and signed; is altered by erasure
or interlineation; or is false in any respect.74 There is a like pro-
vision as to the case of a person signing more than once. This is
rather harsh. Accidents do happen in circulating petitions and,
should the circulator have two petitions on separate subjects and
a signer inadvertently signed one twice, it would seem folly to in-
validate the whole petition; especially if the circulator caught the
error and in his affidavit reported the signatures as but one.
The courts, likewise, seem very strict in cases concerning the
verification of petitions. They deem the provisions mandatory and
hesitate to rely upon the doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus,
in a case relating to a municipal referendum, it was held that the
omission to state that the electors signed with knowledge of the
contents was fatal to the validity of the petition.7*> And, in the days
70 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176b.
71 Ibid.
72 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g.
73 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176.
74 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-176c.
75The Ohio Valley Electric Railway Co. v. Hagerty, 14 Ohio App. 398
(1921); motion to certify overruled, 19 Ohio Law Rep. 172.
508 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
when the secretary of state, rather than boards of elections, ruled
upon petitions, the supreme court sustained his action in rejecting
the whole document when the affidavit was false or not in part
sworn to.”* The attorney general has ruled that the secretary of
state should reject the entire part-petition when the affidavit is un-
signed by the circulator or notary.77 He did not, however, consider
an incorrect date on the affidavit as an invalidating irregularity.”
7. Filing of Petitions; Review; Protest; Additional Signatures
All initiative and referendum petitions are filed in the office
of the secretary of state.”® Part-petitions must be filed at one time
and all outstanding part-petitions must be invalidated and may not
thereafter be accepted for filing.8° A part-petition becomes void
unless filed within eighteen months after the date of its issuance.*’
The secretary of state may not accept for filing any petition which
does not purport to contain at least the minimum number of sig-
natures required.®?
In the case of a proposed constitutional amendment the secre-
tary of state must make the submission to the voters at the next
succeeding regular or general election “in any year occurring
subsequent to ninety days after the filing” of the petition.** To
calculate the ninety-day period referred to, the day of filing is in-
cluded and the election day excluded.™ It will be observed that
this is the reverse of the rule followed in determining whether an
act has been done within a period limited by law. In that situation
the first day is excluded and the last counted.** The limitation is
mandatory; the decision of the secretary of state is not conclusive,
but subject to review by the courts.8* While the constitutional sec-
tion undoubtedly precludes the secretary of state from submitting
an amendment at an election unless ninety days have elapsed since
the filing, the attorney general has ruled that the section requires
that the petition be submitted in the same year as the election
and, thus, that the secretary of state may not hold the petition un-
76 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914).
771939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203. In a case dealing with municipal
matters, it has been held that an affidavit is not defective because the notary
was the attorney for the affiant and did not stamp, type or print his name
under his signature. City of Gallipolis v. State ex rel. Houck, 36 Ohio App.
258, 173 N.E. 36 (1930).
78 1939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
79 Onto Const. Art. II, §§ 1a, 1b.
80 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
81 Om1o Gen. Cope §4785-177b.
82 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-1774.
83 Onto Const. Art. II, § la.
% Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532 (1922).
85 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933).
86 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 509
til the next year’s general election.*7 He thought this interpretation
necessary to give effect to the words “in any year”. There was,
however, another choice. The words “occurring subsequent”, and
so on, would, according to ordinary rules of grammar, be taken to
refer to the words which immediately precede them in the sentence.
The next preceding words are “in any year”. Thus, we might say
that the indicated election is the first regular or general election
in a year which shall have begun over ninety days after the petition
shall have been filed. Under this construction the process is ad-
mittedly slow but the petitioners are assured that their proposal
will eventually get to the voters. The attorney general’s view, on
the other hand, puts the quietus on a petition if filed too late in a
given year.*®*
An initiated legislative proposal filed not less than ten days
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly,
must be submitted to the assembly when it convenes.®® It seems
clear enough that the secretary of state must hold over this type
of petition, if submitted less than ten days before a session, in
order to submit it to the succeeding assembly.”
Once a petition has been filed, the secretary of state must
separate the part-petitions by counties and transmit them to the
county boards of elections of the respective counties to determine
their sufficiency.®! It has been determined that this requirement
is not restrictive of the constitutional scheme.®? In the event that
part-petitions are defective, a question arises as to who shall be
judge of their sufficiency. In a case involving a now-repealed sec-
tion of the General Code, it was held that the secretary of state
should judge the sufficiency and his decision was final so long as
he did not act fraudulently or abuse his discretion.°* The next
assembly changed this to vest the authority in the county boards
of elections, including the power “to scrutinize for the omission
of any of the formal or other requirements set forth in the con-
871949 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 753.
88 This difficulty may be overcome by the proponents of a petition by
withholding the petition from filing until the first of the following year. Sig-
natures for petitions seeking constitutional amendments may be obtained in
the year proceding the year in which the petition is filed. 1913 Ops. Att’y
Gen. (Ohio) No. 83. It must be noted, however, that the life span of each
part-petition is only eighteen months from the date of issuance to the date
of filing. Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177b.
89 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
90 Art. II, § 1b reads in part: “When at any time, not less than ten days
prior to the commencement of any session of the general assembly, . . .”
(Italics ours).
91 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-178.
92 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939).
93 State ex rel. Gongwer v. Graves, 90 Ohio St. 311, 107 N.E. 1018 (1914).
510 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
stitution.°* Under this state of facts the supreme court held that
the secretary of state was under a duty to transmit immediately
the part-petitions to the county boards and would be precluded
by a writ of prohibition from proceeding to hear and determine
the sufficiency of petitions on file.°5 This has since given way to
a provision that the boards shall determine “the omission of any
necessary details provided by law.”°* The changes in the statutes
were enough to cause a modification in but not the overthrow of
the previous ruling. Thus, in late 1939, the supreme court held that
the secretary of state could reject petitions not verified as directed
by the constitution. If the signatures lost from this means de-
creased the total so as to be under the number required the
secretary then need not transmit them to the local boards.®’ This
decision was effective in overruling an opinion of the attorney
general, given a few days earlier, which ruled that the secretary
of state could invalidate all part-petitions or signatures void on
their face.°*
Should the secretary of state refuse to proceed after invali-
dating petitions ineffectively verified, the petitioners would ap-
parently have to start over. While the constitution grants ten
additional days to file “additional signatures” to petitions verified
as provided for but proved to be not in all respects sufficient, the
doctrine of the last cited case®® would limit this grant to cases
where the petitions were properly verified but the petition or cer-
tain signatures were voided for other reasons.
Should the part-petitions contain sufficient signatures even
after the secretary has refused those on unverified part-petitions,
the secretary must transmit them to the county boards. The boards
then proceed to determine the validity of the part-petitions and
signatures. The boards must ascertain whether each part-petition
is properly verified.‘ Undoubtedly this includes the power to
reject part-petitions outright, if they are, on their face, unverified
because of the omission of the signature of the notary or circula-
tor.'°! But the power to reject part-petitions goes further than this.
94113 Ohio Laws 307.
°S State ex rel. McCrehen v. Brown, 108 Ohio St. 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
96 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-178.
97 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939);
but see Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-7 (Supp. 1949) which says it shall be the duty
of the secretary of state “to determine the sufficiency of all initiative and
referendum petitions on state questions . . . as hereafter provided.”
981939 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1203.
99 State ex rel. Herbert v. Mitchell, 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939).
100 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-178.
101 This would be occasioned only if the petition slipped through the sec-
retary of state as he also has such authority by reason of the Mitchell Case.
See note 95, supra.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 511
The boards may reject them for falsified affidavits, signatures of
electors from more than one county, or omissions of any necessary
details required by law. The boards have authority to administer
oaths, issue subpoenas, summon witnesses and compel the pro-
duction of documents in conducting investigations. '°? A board
likewise may reject certain signatures on otherwise valid part-
petitions if those signatures are not of persons on the registration
lists of a registration city, or on the polling lists of the county,
or eligible to vote in the county or are not electors at the time of
the board’s examination.'°3 It may further reject illegal signatures;
signatures written other than in ink or indelible pencil; and sig-
natures followed by no date or an incorrect date. It must determine
any repetition or duplication of signatures.
After investigating a board must make notes opposite each
rejected signature and make a report to the secretary of state in-
dicating the sufficiency or insufficiency of the signatures and
indicating whether or not each part-petition is properly verified.'!
Any circulator of a particular part-petition, any signature on
which or the verification of which has been declared insufficient
or which is held to be not verified by a county board, may protest
the board’s findings.'!°° The protest may be filed by the interested
committee or any elector, as well. There is no expressed grant of
the right of protest against action invalidating petitions or parts
thereof for other causes. Should such a protest as is permitted be
filed, the board must proceed to test its findings by bringing an
action in the common pleas court of the county within three days
after the filing of the protest. A judge of the court hears the action
and certifies his decision to the board. The latter returns only the
verified signatures and part-petitions to the secretary of state,
including therewith the report of the board. These materials must
be returned not less than fifty days before the election except that
for petitions initiating legislation, the board shall “promptly check
and return” the petitions and report.
The chronology relating to protests seems somewhat confused.
The constitution provides that petitions and signatures upon such
petitions, verified as provided in the constitution, shall be presumed
to be in all respects sufficient, unless not later than forty days
before the election, they shall be otherwise proved, and in such
an event, ten additional days shall be allowed for the filing of ad-
ditional signatures.'!°° The framers, however, failed to some extent
102 Oxuto Gen. Cove § 4785-179b (Supp. 1949).
103 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-178.
104 Ibid.
105 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
106 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. This forty-day provision was applied in
State ex rel. Vail v. Fulton, 97 Ohio St. 325, 120 N.E. 140 (1917).
512 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
in making these provisions self-executing by not providing a method
whereby the petitions or signatures could be proved insufficient.
This section would, however, stop an opponent of a petition from
protesting a signature immediately before an election and thus
throwing a monkey wrench into the whole proceedings. It relates
simply to proving matters insufficient and it could not, therefore,
preclude a protest by a circulator objecting to a board’s ruling a
signature insufficient. Moreover, under the definition of “so veri-
fied” used in the Mitchell case,!°’ it would not even stop an out-
sider protesting the day before the election on the ground that the
part-petitions were improperly verified.
The statutes set no express time limits within which protests
must be filed. One may, however, be implied from the general
arrangement of the section dealing with protests. This section!
provides, in the following order, for (1) the right of protest, (2) a
court action, (3) submission to the secretary of state and his an-
nouncement of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the whole petition,
and (4) an extension of ten days in which to file valid signatures.
It could be implied therefrom that all rights of protest cease upon
the notification by the secretary of state.
On the other hand, the statutes calls for no notice to the com-
mittee, circulator, or general public until the notification men-
tioned above is given. Without notification of the board’s findings,
how may we properly expect anyone to be able to take advantage
of the right to protest?
One further possible interpretation, with respect to consti-
tutional amendment, supplemental, or referendum petitions lies
in the fact that the “properly verified part-petition” (certified so
by the court) shall be returned to the secretary of state not less
than fifty days before the election. This might be construed to de-
feat any protest submitted later than the aggregate period needed
for the board to commence an action in the court, and for the
court’s decision and, certification plus a span of fifty days.
If the petition should be found insufficient because of an in-
sufficient number of valid signatures, the committee must be
notified and is allowed ten additional days after notification for
the filing of additional signatures.!°? This ten-day provision does
not relate to petitions which on their face do not purport to contain
107 136 Ohio St. 1, 22 N.E. 2d 907 (1939). See note 95, supra.
108 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
109 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949).
This provision does not apply when a defect in a part-petition operates to
reduce the number of counties represented on the petition to a number less
than that required by Section 1g of Art. II. 1950 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No.
1419.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 513
sufficient signatures, for these are not even accepted for filing.!!°
Apparently in such a case the committee would not be limited,
except indirectly, in obtaining additional signatures. Where, how-
ever, a petition purports to contain sufficient signatures, but does
not because of rejections by the county boards of elections, or
the courts, the ten-day extension provision applies.
The requirements as to the filing of additional signatures fol-
low the pattern of the original petition. The secretary of state,
upon request of the committee, issues new part-petitions for the
obtaining of new signatures.'!! No signature on a “supplemental
part-petition,”!!? which is the same as a signature on an original
part-petition, may be counted. The properly-verified original part-
petitions and the new supplemental petitions which appear to the
secretary of state to be properly verified are forwarded to the
county boards of elections for determination of the validity and
sufficiency of the new part-petitions. These must be returned to
the secretary of state within five days. No provision authorizes
review of the board’s findings either by the secretary of state or
the courts. Upon receipt of the county board’s reports, the secre-
tary of state must determine the total number of signatures to the
petition which he shall record and announce. Should they be
sufficient, then such amendment, proposed law, or law, shall be
placed on the ballot as required by law.'!3 Should the petition
be found insufficient, the committee must be so notified and their
only apparent recourse would be to start all over again.
8. Submission to the General Assembly
As mentioned earlier, initiated legislation in Ohio must first
be submitted to the general assembly. The direct initiative does
apply at the constitutional level; proposed amendments are placed
directly on the ballot.
If a sufficient petition is filed with the secretary of state not
less than ten days prior to the commencement of any session of
the general assembly, the secretary of state must transmit it to
110 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177d.
111 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-177c (Supp. 1949).
112 So called in Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949), but this should
not be confused with petitions to submit laws to the people after the general
assembly has refused to enact an initiated proposal. As to this limitation, a
question might arise should an elector sign the original petition and then the
“supplemental” petition after his original signature was rejected for lack of
proper verification, for example.
113 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-179 (Supp. 1949). The failure of the section
to mention submission of a proposed law to the general assembly was appar-
ently an inadvertence.
514 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
the general assembly as soon as it convenes.''* The initiated mea-
sure is certified as being sufficient to the assembly and is there
formally introduced by one of the members; usually by the speaker
as a house bill. Neither the constitution nor statutes deal speci-
fically with legislative procedure on initiated proposals, but the
assembly generally treats them as if introduced by an individual
member. Once the bill is submitted, the committee favoring the
adoption of the proposal loses its semi-official status and has no
more right to lobby for the bill or explain its merits than does
any ordinary citizen.
Should the bill receive favorable attention of the assembly
and pass either as petitioned for or in amended form, it is subject
to veto by the governor''5 and to independent referendum by the
electors.!!6
If the bill is not passed, or if no action is taken thereon within
four months from the time of receipt by the general assembly, or
if passed in amended form, the original proposal may be placed
on the ballot if sufficient supplemental petitions are properly
filed.'17 But the attorney general has ruled that the assembly is
not precluded from considering an initiated bill because more
than four months have elapsed since it was received.''8
In order to demand the submission of the proposal to the
voters supplementary petitions verified as were the original part-
petitions and signed by not less than three per centum of the elec--
tors, in addition to those signing the original petition, must be filed
with the secretary of state.'"9 The supplementary petition may
propose the law either as first petitioned for or with any amend-
ment or amendments which may have been added by either or
both branches of the general assembly.!?° There seems to be no
114 Om1o Const. Art. II, § 1b. The use of the word “any” would seem to
support the holding over of such petitions from one session until the next.
One serious limitation on the word “any” might exist with respect to special
sessions. OHIO Const. Art. Ill, § 8 provides that special sessions shall be
called by the governor and no business shall be transacted at such session
except that named in the governor’s proclamation or subsequent proclama-
tion or message or provision for the expenses of the session or other matters
incidental thereto.
115 Omro Const. Art. II, § 16 provides in part: “Every bill passed by the
general assembly shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the governor
for his approval.” In the initiative sense a bill vetoed by the governor would
hardly have been finally passed.
116Qxnto Const. Art. II, § 1b. This provision, as distinguished from a
carry-through election on an initiated measure, would, no doubt, be defeated
should the assembly amend the proposal by adding an emergency clause.
117 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
118 1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 903.
119 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
120 Ibid.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 515
provision limiting the supplementary petition procedure to the
original sponsors. Should they decide to step out any other group
could, apparently, carry on from that point. However, should the
second group succeed in its task, controversy might arise as to
which group would be entitled to prepare the arguments in sup-
port of the measure.!?!
If the assembly should pass the proposal in amended form,
the filing of a supplementary petition would prevent the enacted
bill from becoming effective until the version proposed in the
supplementary petition was rejected at the polls.'?? In that situ-
ation, the supplementary petition would have the features both of
the initiative and of the referendum. Should the bill as enacted
in amended form contain an emergency clause, it is doubtful that
it would be subject to the referendum as such,'”3 but the same
would hardly be true as to the referendum features of a supple-
mentary petition, else the basic design of ultimate electoral action
on an initiated measure could be defeated.
Most of the formalities and procedures relating to an original
petition govern supplementary petitions. In some respects, how-
ever, such procedures are not fitted to the supplementary petition,
and in others, express contrary provisions govern. It might be
questioned whether those invoking the supplementary petition
procedure need always file with the attorney general a synopsis
and one-hundred signature petition. The section requiring those
relates only to “initiative” or “referendum” petitions.'*4 It is doubt-
ful if these words are to be strictly construed, however, since
most of the sections!?5 use this language, or the even looser word,
“petition.” In one situation, however, such a requirement seems
superfluous; that is, where the measure to be submitted is the
same as proposed to the general assembly and the committee wishes
to use a synopsis, already certified as fair and truthful by the
attorney general. In an opinion concerned with a similar statute
the attorney general ruled that a previously-certified synopsis
might be used on a supplementary petition without a new certifi-
cation when the supplementary petition proposed the same, and
not an amended measure.!*6 In other instances this requirement
has as much merit as when applied to the original petitions; for
121 See page 517, infra.
122 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
123 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d.
124 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-175.
125 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 4785-175 through 4785-182.
1261927 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 235. The statute then provided that
petitioners “may submit” to the attorney general a synopsis of a proposed
law.
516 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
example, when the proposal to be submitted is an amended version
of the original.
The requirements as to printing, forms, circulators, signatures
and circulation and determination of sufficiency are generally the
same as with the original petitions. The form is varied to a slight
extent by inserting the word “supplementary” before the word
“initiative” in the title of the petition or part-petition.!2”7 Once
again ten days are given to file additional signatures should a
supplementary petition be found insufficient because of rejections
of signatures or part-petitions.!78
The times of filing prescribed for supplementary petitions
are, of course, different from those for the original petition. To be
effective a supplementary petition must be filed with the sec-
retary of state within ninety days after the proposed law shall
have been rejected by the general assembly or after the expiration
of a term of four months during which no action was taken on
the proposal or after the law as passed by the assembly has been
filed with the secretary of state by the governor.!9 It has been held
that a motion to postpone a bill indefinitely amounts to action on
and a rejection of a bill for present purposes.'5° Where the assembly
has adjourned without taking definite action on a bill the ad-
journment will be treated as a rejection and the ninety-day period
will commence at that date.'3! The secretary of state initially de-
cides if a petition was timely filed, but the ninety-day time limit
is mandatory, of course, and an error in computation is subject
to judicial correction.'*?
9. Information to the Electors
The constitution comtemplates that the electors be “briefed”,
as it were, on initiated proposals which are to appear on the ballot.
The information to be distributed consists of a true copy of a
proposed law or proposed amendment to the constitution and argu-
ments or explanations, or both, for and against the proposal.'%’
127 On10 Gen. Cope § 4785-176.
128 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-179. In such an instance, the legislative termi-
nology becomes confusing since the section calls the additional signatures
petition a supplemental petition. Thus one can file a supplemental petition
to a supplemental petition.
129 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
130 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925); 1925 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio)
p. 134; see also Rule 100, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General
Assembly of Ohio (1949).
131 Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913).
132 Spahr v. Brown, 19 Ohio App. 107 (1925).
133 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. This provision was held to be self-executing.
State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant, 93 Ohio St. 1, 112 N.E. 138 (1915). Presum-
ably, this does not require the secretary of state to issue copies of the law
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 517
The committee named in an initiative petition may prepare the
arguments or explanations, or both, in favor of the measure pro-
posed. The person or persons to prepare the statements against
the proposal must be named by the general assembly, if in session;
otherwise, by the governor.'34 The arguments or explanations, or
both, must not exceed three hundred words for each side, and
they must be filed at least sixty days before the date of the elec-
tion.'55 There is no requirement that the accuracy of the state-
ments be certified by any public officer. Unlike the expository
statements required by statute for the benefit of prospective petition
signers, this matter is argumentative. Should a statement contain
slanderous remarks, it is doubtful that its authors would be
liable.'36
When the secretary of state receives any proposed law or
constitutional amendment which would levy any tax or necessi-
tate any expenditure of state funds, he must request of the tax
commissioner an estimate of any prospective annual expenditure
of public funds and the annual yield of any proposed tax.'3’? The
tax commissioner must then prepare the estimate. The original
is filed with the secretary of state. From it copies are made to be
distributed with the publicity pamphlet discussed below.
The constitution requires the secretary of state to cause the
proposed law or amendment and the statements to be printed
and to mail or otherwise distribute these materials to each of the
electors of the state, as far as may be reasonably possible.'** Im-
plementing legislation provides that the secretary of state shall,
at least thirty days before the election, cause these materials and
a form of the official ballot, which is to be used, to be printed in
or provision to be amended, but rather to issue copies of the proposed amend-
ment. See 1940 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 2275.
134 The general wording of Art. II, § 1g is broad enough to require that
arguments be prepared against proposed constitutional amendments but the
section makes no provision for their preparation. Under a former statute
the attorney general ruled that there was no authorization for the prepara-
tion of such arguments. 1915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 867. While this
statute has been amended, it is doubted that it affects this ruling. See Ouro
Gen. Cope § 4785-180a.
135 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180a.
136 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 NE. 2d 584 (1941). Bett-
man, J., observed, obiter, that the governor, secretary of state and the official
authors are absolutely privileged if the remarks objected to are pertinent to
the occasion. The holding of the court was that if there be such a privilege,
it does not extend to an outsider alleged to have conspired with the official
appointees to defame the plaintiff.
137 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175a.
138 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g. It has been ruled that this duty is manda-
tory though the secretary is not instructed as to the details of the operation.
1927 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1073.
air bone what.
+e
mt ee
no Dee Steg eo
518 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
pamphlet form and must, at least twenty days before the election,
mail or otherwise distribute the pamphlets, charges fully paid.'%°
All costs of printing and distributing these pamphlets are paid
by the state from its general revenue fund.!*°
10. Submission to the Electors — Ballot
When a sufficient initiative or supplementary petition has
been properly filed the secretary of state must submit the pro-
posal to the electors.'*! The secretary of state will not be enjoined
from submitting a proposal because it might be inconsistent with
the federal or state constitutions,'4? and should he attempt to
withhold a proposal from the people, mandamus will lie to compel
him to submit the measure.'*3 He is plainly not concerned with
substance in the policy sense. It seems equally clear that he is not
concerned with the question whether the proposal is inconsistent
with any general limitation on legislative power such as consti-
tutional guaranties of civil liberties. That is the province of the
judiciary in proper cases instituted after the positive enactment.
What, however, of limitations addressed specifically to the initia-
tive, such as the ban on the single tax? May not the secretary
of state properly maintain that he is under no duty to submit
a proposal as to a subject which the constitution places beyond
reach of the initiative? Or is his function simply the ministerial
business of submitting any proposal which measures up in terms
of procedure, technical form and signatures?
The amendment or law proposed by the petition must be
submitted in its original form unless, in the case of a proposed
law, the supplementary petition proposes the law with one or
more of the amendments made by either house of the general
assembly. The only proposal which the constitution requires to
be submitted is that which appears on the petition and the consti-
tution permits no other to be submitted.'*
The secretary of state has the duty of preparing the ballots.'*5
While, as stated above, an initiated petition may propose two or
139 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180b.
140 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-180c.
141 Onto Const. Art. II, §§ la and 1b.
142 City of Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556 (1921);
Weiland v. Fulton. 99 Ohio St. 10, 121 N.E. 816 (1918); Pfiefer v. Graves, 88
Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913).
143 State ex rel. Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 138 N.E. 881 (1922).
144 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 187, 124 N.E. 172
(1919).
145 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g provides in part: “Unless otherwise provided
by law, the secretary of state shall .. .” The general assembly has not seen
fit to change this, but rather implements the provision by Section 4785-181
of the General Code.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 519
more unrelated constitutional amendments or statutory sections,
it is less clear whether such proposals may be combined on the
ballot. Article II, Section 1g, provides that the secretary of state
shall “cause the ballots so to be printed as to permit an affirmative
or negative vote upon each law, section of law, or item in a law
appropriating money, or proposed law, or proposed amendment
to the constitution.” It has been held that a revised municipal
home rule charter may be submitted as a whole with the voter
having but one vote either for or against it.'4° Certainly two or
more sections may be amended by unitary submission if there
is but one fundamental change and the amending of the two or
more sections relates to but a single plan.'*?7 However, the supreme
court has said that two unrelated amendments must be so ar-
ranged on the ballot as to permit the individual voter to voice
his approval of each section separately.'*® This compromise seems
logical, but the real problem is who is to say amendments are
unrelated, or are parts of a single plan? It would appear that the
initial decision is up to the secretary of state. Whether or not the
courts would review such a decision is problematical; we are in-
clined to the view that they would.
Initiated proposals appear on a separate ballot, designated “Of-
ficial Questions and Issues Ballot”, and state and local questions
are grouped and arranged so that state questions appear at the
top, county next, municipal next, township next and school district
at the foot.'*9 Within this pattern the secretary of state decides
the order of listing of state questions.'®°
On the “Official Questions and Issues Ballot” the printed
matter relating to each issue must be enclosed at the top and bot-
tom by a heavy horizontal line. Below each top line must appear
a brief title descriptive of the issue, such as “Proposed Consti-
tutional Amendment,” or “Proposed Increase in Tax Rate.” Fol-
lowing the title must be a brief statement of the percentage of
affirmative votes necessary for the passage of the measure. Next
in order comes the “text describing the question or issue.”!5! The
statute provides that the “ballot title” of an initiated proposal
shall be determined by the secretary of state but the person or
committee sponsoring the measure may suggest a title which is
146 Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
147 Resort has been made to this system quite often in the past. See, e.g.,
Ohio Election Statistics for General Election Held on the Second Day of
November 1948, page 433 (Two sections of two articles in the constitution were
amended by single vote).
148 State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 176 N.E. 664 (1931).
149 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
150 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-181.
151 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
RS ee AEE ST OS
estar eae
520 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL {Vol. 11
to be given full consideration.'? The secretary of state is instructed
to prepare a true and impartial title, which would be unlikely
to create prejudice for or against the proposal.
Much controversy has arisen over the meaning of the phrase
“text describing the question or issue” and its statutory prede-
cessor, “in language sufficient to clearly designate it.” In the case
of State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, it was declared that a
submission of a proposed amendment to the constitution without
substantial compliance with the provisions of the initiative and
referendum sections of the constitution was invalid. It was not
this innocuous statement that has created confusion, but rather
the lack of a clear majority rationalization. The case has been
cited as standing for the proposition that in the submission of a
state initiative proposal to the voters the exact language of the pro-
posal must be printed on the ballot.'%* Actually, the supreme
court has limited this theory to initiative and referendum meas-
ures on state constitutional questions.'55 In both instances, however,
it was dealing with local matters and, as yet, has not definitely
held that the proposition does not apply to initiated legislation.
Short of printing the complete text of a proposal, it seems clear
that all the essential elements or changes must be described on
the ballot.'5
This text must be placed on the right side of the ballot, be-
neath the short title, and on the left there must be four enclosed
rectangular spaces.'5? Each space is arranged in the general shape
of a square or rectangle. In the space at the top right must ap-
pear the word “yes”, while the word “no” is to appear in the space
just below. The two spaces at the extreme left are provided for
the marking of the ballot. The size of the spaces for affirmative
votes and those for negative votes must be the same.
The submitting of these issues to the voters generally follows
the ordinary election procedures with but a few variations. A
committee which advocates or opposes a measure may appoint
a challenger and a ‘witness to the count in each precinct.'58 This
procedure is handled on a county basis although the committee
need not be a local committee. In order to obtain this privilege,
the committee, acting in good faith, must file a petition with the
county board of elections not later than five days prior to the
election. Should more than one committee file, the board must
152: Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-181.
15399 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
184 Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 132, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
155 Ibid; Prosen v. Duffy, 152 Ohio St. 139, 87 N.E. 2d 342 (1949).
156 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
157 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-103 (Supp. 1949).
158 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-120.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 521
decide and announce its decision by registered mail to each com-
mittee not less than three days preceding the election. This de-
cision is not final; the aggrieved party may institute mandamus
in the common pleas court of the county to compel the board to
accept the appointees of such party. If more than three questions
are submitted, the various committees may agree upon the appoint-
ees so that not more than six challengers and six witnesses will
represent each side of all issues. If the committees cannot so agree,
the judges of elections must make the appointment so that in no
case will there be more than six challengers and six witnesses
appointed for any one election in any one precinct.
The general election laws provide the usual methods for
protests of elections on issues, for announcements of results, proc-
lamations, and certificates.
The constitution expressly validates a proposed amendment
or law which has_ been submitted to the electors and received
an affirmative majority notwithstanding any insufficiency of the
petitions by which the submission was procured.'? It is to be
noted that this applies simply to defects in petitions; it does not
purport to obviate failure to comply with other constitutional pro-
visions, such as those pertaining to the submission of initiated
proposals.!
11. Effective Date
Any proposed law or amendment to the constitution submitted
to the electors, if approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon, takes effect thirty days after the election at which it
was approved.'*! While there is no apparent method of changing
the technical effective date, the practical effective date could,
no doubt, be delayed by inserting a clause in the proposed meas-
ure which specified a later date for its provisions to become oper-
ative. Thus, a tax measure might provide for the levy to become
applicable the first day of the succeeding calendar year.
As mentioned above, when the general assembly has enacted
a proposal in amended form the effective date is suspended by
the filing of a supplementary petition. Only the law as proposed
in the supplementary petition goes on the ballot for approval or
rejection. Should that measure be rejected, the law as enacted
would go into effect immediately.'*? If, however, a majority
of those voting on the submitted proposal should approve the
measure, the legislative act would become a nullity, and the sub-
159 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g. See also Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-182.
160 See, e.g., State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N_E.
172 (1919).
161 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b.
162 Ibid.
ree, nani
522 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
mitted measure would become effective as the law thirty days
after the election.
12. Conflicting Proposals
The constitution provides that should two conflicting pro-
posed laws or amendments be submitted at any one election, the
one receiving the highest number of affirmative votes shall be
the law or amendment adopted.'®’ Apparently, no one has standing
to keep a measure from being submitted to the people because it
duplicates or conflicts with another measure to be submitted.
The reference to laws and amendments rather than conflicting
portions thereof, could conceivably kill off a complete law by
force of a conflict between one of its sections and a section of an
almost entirely unrelated law or amendment.
Another difficulty would be encountered should two proposals
be made to amend one constitutional or statutory section. Article
II, Section 16, of the constitution provides: “No law shall be re-
vived, or amended unless the new act contains the entire act
revived, or the section or sections amended.” While this section
applies only to statutory material, it was indirectly used to support
the theory that in Ohio when the whole revised text of a consti-
tutional provision is approved the old unchanged portions are
also passed upon by the assembly or, in case of an election, the
voters.'% This theory was extended by ruling, in effect, that where
two amendments to one constitutional section were proposed, even
if the changes were consistent with each other, if one or both of
the amendments were drafted so as to contain the entire section
revived the proposals would be inconsistent and one must fail.
Perhaps this result could be avoided as to constitutional amend-
ments, by petitioning only for the changes rather than a revised
section. It may be doubted, however, that this could be done as
to initiated bills, as it might be held that the pertinent clause of
Article II, Section 16, applies to them in view of the provision
that the limitations on the power of the general assembly to enact
laws shall be deemed limitations on the power of the people to
enact laws.'®
This inconsistency provision has also been said to apply to
conflicts between amendments proposed by the initiative and the
general assembly.'%
While it would be incongruous to permit the governor to veto
any direct action of the people, the constitution singles out in-
163 Ibid.
164 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
165 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1.
166 State ex rel. Greenlund v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172 (1919).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 523
itiated laws and expressly provides that they shall not be subject
to such veto.!9
13. Amendment and Repeal of Popular Legislation
May an initiated measure enacted by the electors later be
amended or repealed by the general assembly?!** Strong policy
arguments can be made on either side of this question. While there
is no authoritative ruling on it at the state level, cases which
arose in the municipal sphere are suggestive. In non-charter mu-
nicipalities the initiative and referendum are governed by general
statute. This has been interpreted to leave the local governing
body with power to repeal an amended ordinance.'® While the
statutes providing for the initiative on a local basis differ con-
siderably from the provisions for the statewide initiative, neither
deals specifically with our problem, and it seems safe to assume
that the general assembly may repeal or amend initiated laws. A
municipality is free to regulate the subject by home rule charter!”°
and in this way could assure the voters the last word on a particu-
lar measure.'”! The question does not exist as to initiated amend-
ments since all constitutional amendments, whether proposed by
convention, initiative or the general assembly, must clear through
the people. In Ohio, only two laws have been enacted by means
of a supplemental initiative petition. The first of these related
to aid to the aged.'”? Apparently the assembly never doubted its
authority to change this act for it has since added sections and
amended or repealed original sections.
"REFERENDUM
In framing referendum provisions, the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1912 chose the optional-type referendum.'’3 In one
area — that relating to the power of the general assembly to au-
thorize associations with banking powers — compulsory referendum
had been exacted by the Constitution of 1851.'4 Similarly, consti-
167 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1b. Apparently this is done to overcome any
doubt in the particular area, since legislative acts are the only ones expressly
made subject to the veto. See Onto Const. Arr. II, § 16.
168 See Note 97 A.L.R. 1046 (1935).
169 State ex rel. Singer v. Cartledge, 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N.E. 237 (1935);
1933 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 19.
170 State ex rel. Daniels v. City of Portsmouth, 136 Ohio St. 15, 22 N.E
2d 913 (1939).
171 See, e.g., Section 48 of the Charter of the City of Columbus, Ohio,
which provides that the city council may not amend or repeal an ordinance
adopted by the voters for a period of two years after its passage.
172 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 1359-1 et seq., as adopted by initiative November 7,
1933.
173 Onto Const. Art. II.
174 Onto Const. Art. XII, § 7.
gee mere
524 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
tutional amendments proposed by the assembly or constitutional
conventions must be submitted to the voters.'75 The provision
relating to associations with banking powers is obsolete; “banking
powers” has been interpreted to apply only to powers employed
in making or issuing paper money or, at most, to the powers ex-
ercised by banks of issue.!7© In our present national system of
banking and currency, there is no place for state bank notes serv-
ing as a circulating medium.
No express provision of the constitution authorizes the volun-
tary referendum, whereby the legislature voluntarily submits an
act to the people. It has been held that except for the provisions
relating to the initiative and referendum, all legislative authority
must be exercised by the general assembly alone.'”? The general
assembly may not delegate to any other body or to the public di-
rectly the power to pass laws.'78 Local option laws are a well-
rooted exception to this general principle.!”9
The referendum, with which we are concerned, is the cptional
plan.
The constitution reserves two powers of referendum to the
voters of Ohio. The optional referendum is made applicable to
the action of the general assembly in ratifying any proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.'8 This provision
has been a dead letter since the Supreme Court of the United
States decided that the federal constitution, in providing for rati-
fication by the legislatures of the states, means action by repre-
sentative assemblies and not the electors.!*!
175 Onto Const. Art. XVI.
176 Dearborn v. Northwestern Savings Bank, 42 Ohio St. 617 (1885); Ford-
ham, Some Aspects of Constitutional Revision in Ohio, 23 Omo Bar 181, 189
(1950).
177 State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St.
464, 473, 166 N.E. 407 (1929). See Note 76 A.L.R. 1053 (1932) on the problem
of whether a referendum may be permitted on a general statute in the absence
of a constitutional authorization.
178 State ex rel. Godfrey v. O’Brien, 95 Ohio St. 166, 115 N.E. 25 (1917);
State ex rel. Allison v. Garver, 66 Ohio St. 555, 64 N.E. 573 (1902); Railway
v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
179 Gassman v. Kerns, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 626 (C.P. 1908), affirmed in 81
Ohio St. 496 (Mem. 1909); Ely v. Williard, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 571 (C.P. 1904).
180 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1.
181 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). This doctrine was extended to
preclude a referendum on an act of the general assembly calling a conven-
tion for the purpose of deciding upon the ratification of a proposed amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. State ex rel. Donnelly v.
Myers, 127 Ohio St. 104, 186 N.E. 918 (1933). But certain state acts affecting
the federal sphere are subject to referendum. Thus, in State of Ohio ex rel.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 525
The electors may, through the optional referendum, reject
any law, section of any law or item in any law appropriating money
passed by the general assembly,'*? except laws providing for tax
levies, appropriations for the current expenses of the state, and
emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health or safety.!*} These exceptions from the gen-
eral rule, it has been said, must be construed strictly though
reasonably.!84
The exemption as to tax statutes has been confined in appli-
cation to state tax levies which are self-executing imposts. The
exemption does not apply to acts, which relate to taxation, as by
regulating tax procedure or by authorizing or limiting local tax-
ation, but do not actually impose tax levies.'*5 Thus, an act
imposing a tax limitation upon local governments and creating a
taxing agency is not excepted from the referendum provisions of
the constitution.'** The fact, moreover, that an act contains certain
sections which might be subject to referendum probably does not
control as to the act as a whole.'8? While there are no actual deci-
sions on the point, the attorney general has taken the view that
an otherwise referrable section of a measure might be subject to
referendum even if combined with sections excluded from the
device.'88 The referendum would doubtless be available as against
a measure repealing a state tax. This observation is offered de-
spite its academic ring!
With respect to the second exception, that for current ex-
penses of the state, the court, by Robinson, J., has said, “Our
conception of the phrase, as used in our constitution, is that ‘cur-
rent expenses’, in addition to including the expenses incident to
officering (sic) and maintaining the state government, includes
the preserving in repair and maintaining of the property of the
state government, and, as applied to roads, includes the main-
taining and repairing thereof, as distinguished for new construc-
Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), it was held that a congressional
redistricting act was referrable. And see 1917 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No.
153, wherein it was ruled that an act of the general assembly extending suf-
frage to women in presidential elections was subject to the referendum.
182 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1. The referendum is limited to “laws” and bills
not passed may not be referred. 1913 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 248.
183 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d.
184 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 N.E. 16 (1923).
185 Ibid.
186 State ex rel. Schrieber v. Milray, 88 Ohio St. 301, 102 N.E. 959 (1913).
187 State ex rel. Keller v. Forney, 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 NE. 16 (1923).
188 1943 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 6207.
526 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
tion.””!8°
In the only case in which the court was directly faced with
the problem of divisibility of an act, the court held that none of
its provisions were subject to the referendum. Thus, where an
appropriation bill for current expenses included a condition that
certain vouchers must show that competitive bids were secured,
it was held that this condition was effective immediately upon the
passage of the bill and would not be subject to the referendum.'”
While a capital outlay item in a general appropriation bill would
be subject to referendum the court considered a condition attached
to a current expense item a part, in effect, of that item.
An entirely different attitude of the court is seen in its con-
struction of the third exception— that dealing with emergency
laws. The constitution provides that “emergency laws upon a yea
and nay vote must receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each branch of the general assembly, and the reasons
for such necessity shall be set forth in one section of the law, which
section shall be passed only by a yea and nay vote, upon a sepa-
rate roll call thereon.”!®! It will be seen that there is no specific
requirement that there be a two-thirds vote on the emergency
clause, but that is not a matter of moment since that quality of
vote must be had on final passage.'®? It is the practice to have a
two-thirds vote on the emergency clause before it is added to the
proposed bill for final vote.'93 Should an emergency bill be passed
by both branches of the general assembly in varied forms and
neither house would accept the other’s version, the second vote in
each house, after a conference committee had ironed out the dif-
ferences, would again be subject to a two-thirds majority.’
The real difficulty encountered with respect to this exception
is whether a legislative determination of an emergency is justi-
ciable. In the first case in which this question could have been
answered, the supreme court simply held that the reasons given
for declaring the Conservancy Act to be an emergency measure
‘
189 State ex rel. Janes v. Brown, 112 Ohio St. 590, 601, 142 N.E. 37 (1925).
The attorney general has ruled that the costs of construction of a building
for women at a state university cannot be deemed to be current expense.
1919 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 308.
190 State ex rel. The Davies Manufacturing Co. v. Donahey, 94 Ohio St.
382, 114 N.E. 1037 (1916).
191 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1d.
192 But see 1915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 159 to the effect that there
must be a separate two-thirds vote for an emergency clause.
193 See, e.g., Rule 63, Rules of the Senate of the Ninety-Eighth General
Assembly of the State of Ohio (1949).
194 Rule 16, Joint Rules of the Ninety-Eighth General Assembly of the
State of Ohio (1949).
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 527
were valid.'°5 Shortly thereafter the court by dictum, carried into
the syllabus, stated that the emergency character of an act could
be challenged “in a proper proceeding and at a proper time.”!%
When first directly faced with the problem, the court split into
three camps.'9?7 Two members believed that if the legislative
formalities required were met, the determination of an emergency
by the assembly would be conclusive. These two, joined by two
others, were of the opinion that if the legislative determination
were not conclusive, it should be presumed valid and any repug-
nancy with the true situation must be obvious. In three strongly-
worded dissents, the minority favored a complete examination
and review of the determination of emergency. One saving element
in the majority opinion (and undoubtedly approved by the minority
judges) was the dictum that certain features of an emergency
clause are justiciable; namely, that the necessary two-thirds vote
was had, that the general assembly has set forth the reasons for
such declaration,'®® and that the emergency clause passed upon
a yea and nay vote on a separate roll call.'°% Sixteen years later,
the court by a four-to-two vote, definitely held that the courts will
not review a legislative determination of an emergency.” The
court relied on the earlier case and a case”! dealing with an
analogous code section.
Further limitations upon the referendum power of the people
might be found in the distinction between statutes purely legis-
lative in character and those of an administrative or executive
nature. No Ohio cases relating to statutes have been found. On the
local level, it has been held that an ordinance fixing the rate for
the furnishing of natural gas to a city, notwithstanding that it
contained additional related matters concerning service, was neot
subject to the referendum.”°? As already noted, the municipal
195 Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ohio St. 407, 110 N.E. 1068 (1914).
196 Miami County v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915).
197 State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921).
For a review of the Ohio and other state cases on this problem, see Comment,
1 Onto Sr. L. J. 40 (1935).
198In an analogous case involving a municipal ordinance, it was held
that failure of the council to set forth the reasons for its declaration of
emergency was fatal. A mere statement that the ordinance was necessary
for the preservation of public peace, health and safety was considered but a
conclusion, without reasons, and not sufficient. Goodman v. Youngstown,
24 Ohio L. Abs. 696 (1937).
199102 Ohio St. 591, 598, 133 N.E. 457 (1921).
200 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937).
201 Holcomb v. State ex rel. Coxey, Sr., 126 Ohio St. 496, 186 N.E. 99 (1933).
202 The Union Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 33 Ohio Law Rep.
214 (1930). It has been held that where a city has determined to construct
a public utility, ordinances incidental to and in furtherance of the original
measure are not subject to referendum under Section 5 of Article XVIII of
528 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
initiative and referendum are apart from home rule charter pro-
visions, controlled by statute. Even if the Ohio courts do adopt
the general theory of excluding ordinances of an administrative
nature, this should not affect their holdings on state legislation.
There is no more basis here than in the case of the initiative for
restricting the scope of electoral action by interpretation. The
statute exempting certain ordinances from the referendum is
worded much differently from Section le of Article II.?°> While
the constitution reserves to the electors of the state the power to
adopt “any law” the provision as to municipalities reserves the
power “on all questions which such municipalities may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action.”?™
(italics ours).
Referendum Procedure
Generally, the provisions, both constitutional and statutory,
dealing with the initiative and referendum treat related features
of each together. While the two systems are quite separate many
of the procedural steps for the initiative apply equally to the
referendum. Particular note will be taken here only of features
of the referendum peculiar to that device.
The initial steps of a one-hundred signature petition, summary
and certificate of that summary by the attorney general are re-
quired. A referendum petition, however, is limited to one act or
part thereof.2°5 The printing, control, and payment for petitions is
handled as in the case of initiative petitions. The secretary of state
may, however, refuse to issue blank petitions against laws not
subject to referendum and mandamus will not lie against him.?°
The form of referendum petitions is slightly different. The
words “referendum petition” are placed at the top of the petition.?°’
Unlike the initiative, the constitution requires no particular cap-
tion for referendum petitions; this gap has, however, been filled
by a statute requiring that following the date of issuance of the
petition must come, the words, “To be submitted to the electors
for their approval or rejection.”?°° Then follows the title, which
must contain a brief legislative history of the law, section or item
the constitution. State ex rel. Didelius v. Commissioner, 131 Ohio St. 356,
2 NE. 2d 862 (1936), overruling State ex rel. Diehl, Jr. v. Abele, 119 Ohio
St. 210, 162 N.E. 807 (1928). If the later ordinances materially modified the
basic one that would be another matter.
203 On10 Gen. Cove § 4227-3.
204 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1f.
205 State ex rel. Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933).
206 State ex rel. Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 9 N.E. 2d 278 (1937);
State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921).
207 Onto Gen. Cove § 4785-176.
208 Ibid.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 529
of law sought to be referred. The remainder of the petition follows
the form of initiative petitions,?°° except that following the text
of the law to be referred appears the certificate of the secretary
of state that the law, section or item of law, as shown, has been
found to be a true copy of the enrolled bill or the pertinent part
of it.
The issuance of blank part-petitions to circulators and the
related procedures are exactly the same as for initiative petitions.
The constitution provides that petitions seeking to have a
law or part of a law referred shall bear the signatures of six per
centum of the electors.?!° Again, it is required that there be signa-
tures of not less than one-half of the designated percentage of
electors of each of one-half of the counties in the state.
The requirements and qualifications for signers of these peti-
tions are exactly the same as for initiative petitions. So it is with
respect to the circulation and verification of petitions.
Although all part-petitions must be filed together, the pro-
visions relating to time of filing referendum petitions are quite
different from those concerning initiative petitions. To be effective
referendum petitions must be filed with the secretary of state
within ninety days after the law which is to be referred shall have
been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary.?!! This
time is to be computed by excluding the date upon which the law
was filed in the office of the secretary of state.?!? Further, the date
of approval by the governor is not important or effective in de-
termining effective dates of referrable statutes.?!5 By excluding
the filing day and permitting petitions to be filed at any time on
the ninetieth day, the petitioners actually have ninety-plus days
in which to file. One court of appeals has taken the view that
should the ninetieth day be a Sunday a further day is given.?!*
While the constitutional provisions seem clear as to bills passed
in the ordinary course and approved by the govenor, there is a
void as to bills passed over a veto or allowed to become law by
lapse of time. Only when the governor approves a bill is he specific-
ally required to file the bill with the secretary of state.?'5 Yet
209 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-176 provides in part: “The general provisions
heretofore set forth relative to the form and order of an initiative petition,
shall be, so far as practical, applicable to a referendum petition .. .”
210 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c.
211 [bid.
212 Heuck v. State ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933).
213 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915).
214 State ex rel. Mack v. Heuck, 38 Ohio Law Rep. 33 (1933). The supreme
court, in affirming, found it unnecessary to pass on this issue. Heuck v. State
ex rel. Mack, 127 Ohio St. 247, 187 N.E. 869 (1933). Contra: 1927 Ops. Att’y
Gen. (Ohio) No. 281.
215 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16.
eee
530 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
referendum petitions must be filed within ninety days after the
governor has filed a bill. In the case of a bill passed over a veto it
would seem logical to say that a petition could be filed within
ninety days after that bill was filed with the secretary by officers
of the general assembly. Since bills becoming law by lapse of time
are in the hands of the governor, the burden of filing must be on
him, and thus the ninety-day period would begin when he did file.
While no authority can be found for these propositions, they have
strong rational support. Measures not signed by the governor are
not within the express exceptions to the referendum and the ques-
tion here derives simply from a gap left in the drafting of the
ninety-day clause.?!¢
As with supplementary initiative petitions, used when the
initiated proposal is amended and passed, the filing of a refer-
endum petition suspends the effective date of an act to be re-
ferred.?!7 Whether the general assembly may repeal or amend an
act while in this state of suspension has not been adjudicated.?'*
When a referendum petition attacks only part of a law, the re-
mainder goes into effect in the regular manner. If the voters approve
the measure or part, as the case may be, it takes effect when the
election results are determined.?!°
The examination and rejection of petitions or signatures are
administered in the same manner as those for the initiative.??°
The same is true as to protests and supplementary petitions used
for the ten-day period granted to obtain additional signatures.
The provisions relating to information for the electors are
the same as for initiative proposals save that the persons pre-
paring arguments or explanations, or both, against a measure may
be named in the petition while those preparing the material for
the measure are named by the general assembly if in session, or if
216 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16 reads in part: “No law passed by the general
assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by
the governor in the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided
. .” Since this last clause has been held to refer to Art. II, § 1d, which
exempts certain legislative acts from the referendum, State v. Lathrop, 93
Ohio St. 79, 112 N.E. 209 (1915), a very strict interpretation of the section
would not only exclude bills passed over a veto from the referendum, but
would also preclude such bills from ever becoming effective.
217 Compare Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c with Art. II, § 1b.
218 The attorney general has ruled that the assembly may amend an act
after the governor has approved and before the ninety-day waiting period
has elapsed, at least until a referendum has been ordered on it. 1915 Ops.
Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 325.
219 Onto Const. Art. II, § Ic.
220 The secretary of state may, however, refuse to submit to referendum
an act containing an emergency clause. 1914 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 1124.
1950] INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 531
not, by the governor.??! Various code sections, including the one
dealing with publicity pamphlets,??? call for a printing of the
text of the law to be initiated or referred. In the case of the refer-
endum, confusion may result when but a section or item of a law
is attacked. For publicity pamphlets the constitution requires that
the secretary of state shall cause to be printed “the law, or pro-
posed law, or proposed amendment to the constitution.”’> The
statute, on the other hand, requires the printing of the “text of
each measure to be submitted.’**4 Should but one section or item
of a law be referred, it would be very confusing to have the whole
law printed without clear identification of the part under attack.
On the oter hand, the reading of one section of a law, without
seeing the remainder, would usually not be very enlightening. A
better method, and one which would doubtless be substantial com-
pliance, would be to print the complete act, italicizing the parts
to be deleted should the referendum be successful.
The ballot is governed by the same provisions as in the case
of the initiative. Referred bills are treated as initiated measures
in that a “yes” vote is used to support the law. Due to the old
voter’s creed, “in case of doubt, vote no,” this might seem inad-
visable. The record of Ohio referrals might be shown to substantiate
this danger; out of the ten bills referred to date, only one has
been ratified. The ballot is printed so that the issue can be submit-
ted to the voters at the next succeeding general or regular election
in any year occurring subsequent to sixty days after the filing of the
petition.2*5 It will be recalled that the attorney general has inter-
preted a similar provision as to constitutional amendments to
mean that the issue must be submitted in the year the petition
is filed.226 This becomes important as to a protracted session of
the legislature since one hundred fifty days from July 1, for ex-
ample, would carry beyond election day.
Should the voters reject a referred act designed to repeal
or amend a law, that law would remain effective.??’
As already noted, a referred measure does not become effec-
tive unless and until approved by the voters. There is no express
provision making the veto applicable to the referendum, but it
does not fit. If the governor had approved the measure the voters
would simply be concurring. If the governor had failed to act or
disapproved the bill he would already have had his chance and no
221 Ouro Const. Art. II, § 1g; Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180a.
222 Onto Gen. Cone § 4785-180b.
223 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1g.
224 Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-180b.
225 Onto Const. Art. II, § 1c.
226 See note 87, supra.
2271915 Ops. Att’y Gen. (Ohio) No. 725.
amas
532 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
reason can be found for giving him two chances to kill a measure.
In contrast to the initiative provision, there is no express
clause dealing with conflicting provisions caused by the referen-
dum. Such a conflict might be caused, for example, by two petitions,
one of which referred section one of an act and the other referred
sections one and two. Should the first submission be approved,
the voters would be expressing a desire that section one be the law;
should the second submission be rejected the voters would be say-
ing that section one should not be the law.
CoNCLUSION
In a paper of this character it behooves the authors to leave
the reader to draw his own conclusions. The latter will readily
discern, for example, that the initiative can be used to submit
constitutional amendments without sifting by any deliberative
body and, thus, that, in an important sense, Ohio takes greater
care in legislative action than in modifying the organic law. He will
observe, further, that the processes of popular legislation are rather
ponderous but that the general assembly has considered it neces-
sary to add refinements in procedure to preserve the integrity
of the process.
There are deeper policy considerations which should be ex-
plored. We shall conclude by merely suggesting one or two of
them in the form of questions. Is popular legislation any more
free than representative action from the influence of pressure
groups? Is it calculated to increase or decrease responsibility in
our legislative assemblies? Does it consist with modern develop-
ments, which provide various research and drafting aids for our
legislatures and enable them to conduct the policy-making function
on a more continuous non-fragmentary basis? Can the voters be
expected to exercise informed judgment except on proposals in-
volving clear-cut, easily understood issues? There is much interest
in the short ballot. Are the short ballot and popular legislation
consistent? ,
Continuous Code Revision in Ohio
Wruarp D. CAmMpPpBELL*
The history of code revision in Ohio clearly demonstrates the
need not only for a complete revision which is now in progress but
also a continuous recod:fication and revision of the statutes enacted
by our legislature in years to come.
Prior to March 27, 1875, there had been no legislation providing
for a commission to revise the statutory laws of Ohio. While there
had been a number of professed revisions before that date, nothing
more had been attempted than the compilation in one chapter of
the various provisions on any one subject and the collection of
such chapters into a volume. The first such revision was made
during the session of the Legislature which was held at Chillicothe,
in the years 1804 and 1805. At the same session all the laws, with
few exceptions, adopted by the Governor and Judges of the North-
west Territory under the Ordinance of 1787, or enacted by the
legislature under the territorial government, were repealed. That
revision included statutes for the administration of justice, the
conveyance of property, the collection of revenue, the organization
of the militia, the punishment of crime, and other statutes prev-
iously adopted or enacted which were being amended and re
enacted. Succeeding legislatures made similar revisions of the laws.
Then, beginning in 1833, several authors prepared editions of
the statutes of a more permanent character. Salmon P. Chase pre-
pared a chronological editian in 1833. From 1841 to 1868, Judge
Swan made several compilations of the statutes, setting them up
under 131 chapter headings alphabetically arranged.
In the Constitution of 1851, provision was made for a commis-
sion to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge the practice of the
courts of record, and the 50th General Assembly, on March 11,
1853, enacted a code of civil procedure prepared by such commis-
sion.! In 1869, acts “providing for the organization and govern-
ment of municipal corporations” and “establishing a code of Crimi-
nal Procedure” were enacted.”
Finally, in 1874, a bill was introduced by Representative
George W. Boyce, of Hamilton County, to provide for a general
revision of the statutes. Such bill failing of enactment, Senator
Lucian C. Jones, of Trumbull County, introduced a similar bill
in 1875, which was enacted.’
* Director Ohio Bureau of Code Revision.
151 Ohio Laws 57 et seq.
266 Ohio Laws 149 et seq.
372 Ohio Laws 87 et seq.
533
534 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
The title of the act of March 27, 1875, was “To provide for
the revision and consolidation of the statute laws of Ohio.” In
conformity with the act the Governor appointed three commis-
sioners to revise and consolidate the general laws. They proceeded
to divide their work, “The Revised Statutes,” into four parts, “Po-
litical, Civil, Remedial, and Penal.” An act of June 23, 1879,* pro-
vided for printing and distributing the Revised Statutes, which
were edited and annotated by the commissioners and were pub-
lished for the state in two volumes. These Revised Statutes, as
amended, supplemented, and repealed by succeeding general as-
semblies, were in force from 1880 to the time of the adoption of
the General Code of 1910.
The 77th General Assembly, by an act passed on April 2, 1906,5
provided for the appointment of three commissioners to revise and
consolidate the general statute laws of Ohio. In December, 1906,
the commissioners were appointed and began the codification of
the laws of Ohio. Their work was submitted to and adopted by
the legislature on February 14, 1910, as Senate Bill No. 2 of the
78th General Assembly. The “General Code” was divided into the
same four topical parts as the “Revised Statutes” had been.
On March 23, 1910, the general assembly passed an act “to
supplement section 779 of the General Code, by enacting Section
779-1, relating to the publication of the laws,” and pursuant to
such act the Commissioners of Public Printing published the
“General Code of the State of Ohio.”
On March 28, 1911, the 79th General Assembly enacted Sec-
tion 772 of the General Code,° which authorized the Attorney
General to prepare an appendix to the General Code to consist of
certain acts and parts of acts not included by the commission in
the General Code. The Attorney General, Timothy S. Hogan, em-
ployed James E. Campbell and Lewis C. Laylin to prepare such
appendix, which later became a part of the General Code by a
supreme court decision.’
After a lapse df 34 years, the 96th General Assembly, in 1945,
created the Bureau of Code Revision to provide for an additional
service to the general assembly and its committees for the purpose
of facilitating the continuous codification and revision of the statute
law by the general assembly and the adaptation of new legislation
to the form and arrangement of the General Code.
The Bureau of Code Revision of the state of Ohio is made up
of the Director and his staff and the Commission which is composed
of three appointees of the Governor, three members of the Senate
476 Ohio Laws 192.
598 Ohio Laws 221.
6102 Ohio Laws 46.
7 State ex rel. v. LeBlond, 108 Ohio St. 41.
1950] CODE REVISION 535
and three members of the House of Representatives, which includes
the Chairman of each Judiciary Committee of the two branches
of our state legislature. The appointments of the Governor are
for a period of six years, with one appointment being made each
two years, thus assuring a continuation of the program and a con-
tinuity of policy through the changes of legislative personnel and
the leadership of each administration. The Commission selects its
own chairman and appoints its director for a six year period. At-
torney Charles D. Fogle of Marietta, an appointee of Governor
Frank J. Lausche, is serving as Chairman of the Commission and
the writer as Director of the Bureau.
During the regular session of the 97th General Assembly in
1947 the legislature repealed 898 sections of law upon the recom-
mendation of the bureau.’ The legislature further passed a joint
resolution? approving the plan presented by the bureau for the
order, classification, and arrangement of the General Code, and
another resolution!® directing the bureau to draft and submit to
the general assembly, legislation consolidating the 39 separate
municipal court acts.
In the regular session of the 98th General Assembly 305 ad-
ditional sections were repealed upon the recommendation of the
bureau,'! and by resolution!” the legislature directed by the bureau
to make research of the court opinions and needs of the state in
the field of domestic relations and to draft and submit a bill re-
flecting the recommendations resulting from this study.
Under the act creating it,'!’ the bureau has taken over the
former functions of the Attorney General as the codifier of the
laws of the state, and each law passed since 1945, before being
filed with the Secretary of State’s office, has been referred to the
bureau and, if of a general and permanent nature, numbered by
the Director of Code Revision so as to conform to the General Code.
It becomes apparent from the above survey of our state his-
tory that there is a great need for revision and that work on it is
long overdue. It is much in order to note that before the turn of
the century the legislature required that all petitions filed by a
plaintiff in any cause of action must contain a statement of facts
constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language.'*
This legislative requirement for simplicity of language in petitions
to be filed in our courts could well be applied to instruments of
8S.B. 18, 19, and 25 (122 Ohio Laws 25-7).
°9S.J.R. 10 (122 Ohio Laws 774).
10$.J.R. 17 (122 Ohio Laws 767).
11$.B. 119 (123 Ohio Laws).
12$.J.R. 32 (123 Ohio Laws).
13 Onto Gen. Cone §§ 76-1 to 76-8 inc.
14 Onto Gen. Cope § 11305. '
536 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
their own creation. No one disputes the fact that our laws should
not only be uniform, but constructed in ordinary and concise
language devoid of complexity and free from ambiguous phrases.
A great need for revision, rearrangement, and renumbering
of the code is occasioned by a recognized change in the thinking of
lawyers and the nature of the practice of law. The general practi-
tioner has been in many instances replaced by attorneys in spe-
cialized fields of law. Lawyers practicing in the fields of adminis-
trative, labor, probate, criminal, or taxation law naturally desire
that such be made available to them within one grouping and con-
ceivably within one separate volume of the published code. There
has been within recent years a definite trend to make a placement
of law according to subject matter rather than under the political
unit dealing with its administration. Schools, libraries, law en-
forcement, taxes, drainage, and conservation have become state
problems and pertinent legislation is no longer largely administered
by local political units. These subjects, accordingly, require new
placement under general headings rather than under the topics
concerning districts, townships, and counties. The consecutive
numbering system in the state of Ohio has occasioned many gaps
in the numbering system by repeal of former enactments. These
groups of unused section numbers have been frequently filled by
former codifiers of the law without regard to illogical placement.
Before discussing the effect of revision in Ohio and the nature
of the work of the bureau, it seems desirable to make clear certain
underlying principles governing the subject matter of revision of
statutes which frequently are lost sight of by those who have not
dealt thoroughly with the subject. The first of these principles is
the distinction between “compilation of statutes,” as has been
chiefly done in Ohio heretofore and a “revision of statutes” as is
now authorized by the legislature for the bureau.
A “compilation of statutes” is a mere bringing together of pre-
existing statutes in the form in which they appear upon the books
at the time, with the substitution of the latest amendments for
the material amended, under an arrangement designed to facilitate
consultation of them. No change in wording can be made in such
a work. At times, by editorial authority only, statutes assumed to
be superseded by later statutes are omitted from such a work,
but the omission does not affect the actual efficacy of the material
so omitted, and accordingly laws existing prior to the codification
of 1910 and not repealed or reenacted thereby, have been checked
by the bureau. Confusion of expression and inconsistency in stat-
utes cannot be remedied in a compilation. Its one advantage is
the bringing together of the statutes of a certain class, or those
which deal with a certain subject matter, under a logical arrange-
ment, usually in a publication which can be indexed and in which
1950] CODE REVISION 537
the difficulties of consultation are minimized. Compilation of
statutes makes no change in their effect either upon other statutes
or upon each other.
“ ‘Codification’ is the process of collecting and arranging the
laws of a state into a code, that is, into a complete system of positive
law, scientifically ordered and formulated by legislative authori-
ty."45. There is, accordingly, considerable difference between a
code of laws in a state and a compilation of its statutes. The code
is broader in scope and more comprehensive in its purposes. Its
general object is to embody all the laws of the state from whatever
source derived. When the General Code of Ohio was adopted by
the legislature in 1910, it had the same effect as one general act
containing all the provisions embraced in the three volumes. The
General Code became then more than evidentiary of the law; it
became the law itself.
“Revision of statutes,” on the other hand, cannot be accom-
plished except by enactment or reenactment of the finished product.
It involves change in expression, and its purpose may be either
to accomplish substantive change in the statute law or to improve
its form. Viewed from the standpoint of the treatment of its sub-
ject matter, revision is of two types, which are often confused.
“Substantive revision” is the process by which the meaning
and effect of preexisting statutes are changed so as to accommo-
date them to changing conditions. This involves change in their
effect, and the standard in such revision is that of the policy adopt-
ed. Such revision should be,.and usually is, accomplished under the
aegis of special commissions or groups interested in the activities
controlled, or to be controlled, by the statutes to be revised. The
revision statutes themselves usually are drafted by experts skilled
in the law of the field affected. This type of revision is not the
province of the bureau and in order to clarify any misapprehen-
sion and to safeguard against any abuse of the general powers of
the bureau, its functions are confined clearly to deal only with
matters of form and not of substance. In all matters of recommen-
dations for revision by amendment or repeal the bureau will not
take any position with respect to changes in substantive law. State
policies originate in the legislature and at no time will the bureau
suggest changes in substantive law unless requested so to do by
formal resolution or law enactment. Revision deals with details,
not with fundamentals.
“Formal revision of statutes,” on the other hand, deals solely
with their form and expression and is carried on for the purpose
of producing certainty and conciseness in expression and logic in
arrangement of pre-existing statutes, so that they can be found
1S Worps AND Purases, Vol. 7.
538 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
readily and, when found, can be understood easily. Consolidation
of overlapping provisions, correction of inaccurate, prolix, or re-
dundant expressions, elimination of obscurities and conflicts, and
the collection and enactment of the whole into a logical arrange-
ment and compactness without change in effect, are the aims of
the bureau in completing this type of revision in Ohio.
From the standpoint of subject matter covered, formal revision
of the statutes may be either topical or general.
“Topical revision” is revision of those statutes which, by rea-
son of their relationship one to the other, conveniently can be re-
vised together as a topic or logical subdivision of the statute law.
“General revision” is revision which includes all or a large body
of the statutes in effect at a given time. This latter type of review
has become necessary in Ohio by reason of the magnitude of the
revision work to be done.
“Continuous revision,” of course, is effected on a year-by-year
or other continuous basis, usually in the form of topical revision,
while “periodic revision” is that performed at given periods, and
it usually is general in character. The continuous revision in Ohio
necessarily contemplates a bulk revision followed periodically by
topical revisions to conform to future legislative needs.
The greatest obstacle encountered by the bureau in revising
the code is the constitutional requirement in Ohio that all statutory
changes be shown on the draft of the proposed enactment, and the
deletions and additions to each sentence and word of the existing
law must be marked so that the new measure can be compared
with the old. Ohio, unlike most other states, has a provision in
its Constitution which requires that “no law shall be revived or
amended, unless the new act contains the entire act revived or
amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be re-
pealed.”!6
This makes it impossible in Ohio to draw short revision bills
by merely changing words or phrases of certain sections or para-
graphs, Instead, it’is necessary to set forth the entire section in
order to correct defects in any part of the section. In practice, if
the section contains other provisions which are controversial, leg-
islators do not like to bring such a bill out on the floor where the
entire section is subject to amendment and debate. It is apt to
take up too much of the legislature’s time in order to accomplish
its original purpose. Consequently, legislative committees are slow
to recommend such bills for passage unless there are serious defects
which need immediate attention. This condition not only makes it
difficult for the revisor to reconstruct an awkwardly-phrased sec-
tion of law, but it necessitates the listing of all the thousands of
16 Onto Constr. Art. II § 16.
1950] CODE REVISION 539
deletions and supplying the sections with language to conform to
the remainder of the section. Every one of the present 19,722 sec-
tions has te be rebuilt to show the deletions and additions made
to each section. Some sections have as high as two hundred amend-
ments and it is estimated that seventeen thousand require at least
two amendments. A restatement of each of these sections of law
covering its essential purpose would be far simpler than rebuild-
ing the sections of the old statute by amendment in conformity
with the constitutional requirement. Some sections of our law are
beyond repair and must be repealed and new ones enacted, but
this is exceptional and will be given special reference when the
revised code is presented to the general assembly for their con-
sideration.
There are seven main objectives of a complete or bulk revi-
sion which the Bureau of Code Revision seeks to accomplish.
The first requisite in approaching the problem was to deter-
mine what statutes were in effect and to establish a convenient
master file containing true copies of the approximately 23,000
original sections of the statutory law in the state. Some of these
laws are not of a general and permanent nature, and hence have
been improperly placed in the General Code, and others are omit-
ted and contained only in the session laws of our state when they
should be numbered and recognized in the General Code. The
publishers correct many such omissions by giving them an unof-
ficial number placed within brackets. The General Code of Ohio
should contain all the statutory law in the state that is of a per-
manent and general nature. If special in character, or limited in
time to within two years operation by its own terms, it is neither
general nor permanent, and hence is unnumbered and is to be
found only in the session laws of the state published by the sec-
retary of state after every regular legislative session.
The second objective and logical step in a complete revision
is to eliminate from the statutes the obsolete, unconstitutional,
antiquated, and unnecessary sections of law. Over 1,400 of those
recommended by the Bureau have been repealed by the past two
sessions of the legislature.!’
Laws pertaining to passenger service on canal boats, or the
creation of societies for the apprehension of horse thieves have no
applicability to our present day economy. Many awkward and
amusing statutes still remain in our code by reason of the contro-
versial nature of their subject matter, but in the absence of their
outright repeal will be amended to relate them to modern society.
The third objective of the bureau is to determine, list, and cor-
rect the many partially-obsolete sections contained in our laws.
17 Senate Bills 18, 19 and 25 in 1947, and Senate Bill 119 in 1949.
540 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
Over the years the legislature has made many changes in the names
of different departments of government and the names of many
abolished offices and departments have been inadvertently left in
the statutes, causing imperfection in our law and confusion within
the departments as to their proper functions. In many cases, duties
and responsibilities of an abolished office still remain as part of
our law. In some instances such duties were absorbed by another
office or department, while in others they were ignored. One has
only to refer to the office of state geologist to illustrate such an
instance. That office has been abolished and its duties absorbed
by other departments. It is the observation of the bureau that no
greater need exists in the state today than that of a clarification
and a simplified outline of the functions and duties of each depart-
ment of our state government. The bureau has uncovered in the
code 2,640 sections, which have been briefed and declared to be
partially-obsolete to the extent that they contain obsolete phrases
that require correction. Inasmuch as this would require separate
amendments which would be a burdensome task for the legislature
to consider in so many statutes, it is the opinion of the bureau that
correction should be effected in connection with the general re-
vision of the code rather than by the amendment of each section
prior to the general revision. The so-called “partially-obsolete”
are of six types.
The first type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con-
tinues to use the names of offices, boards, commissions, and de-
partments which have been legally abolished. Illustrative of this
group are sections in Part I (Political) of the General Code which
contain phraseology made obsolete by the enactment of the Ad-
ministrative Code in 1921.18 Many of the offices, boards, commis-
sions, and other agencies of the state were abolished and new
departments took over remaining powers by the provisions of the
new law. Many sections, containing the original names, have not
been amended to conform to the new names given the departments.
This condition prevails in about 1,000 sections of the statutes.
Further examples of this type are those sections that contain a
reference to a specific “officer,” “board,” or “institution,” the
name of which has been changed or abolished by a later enactment.
Such names are obsolete and confusing when continuing to appear
in other sections of the statutes. For example, the office of “county
surveyor” was changed to “county engineer.”!® The legislature
abolished the “Tax Commission of Ohio” in 1939 and vested its
powers in the new “Department of Taxation,”?° which was com-
18 Onto Gen. Cone § 154-1 et seq.
19 Ouro Gen. Cope § 2782-1.
20 Onto Gen. Cone § 1464.
1950] CODE REVISION 541
posed of the tax commissioner and the board of tax appeals, but
the words “Tax Commission of Ohio” still persist in numerous
sections of the code, and are confusing. The name “county infirm-
aries” was changed to “county homes,” in 1919,?! which necessitates
that numerous sections now using the term “county infirmaries”
be changed by the bureau in the process of revision.
A second type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con-
tains “ambiguous” phrases. An outstanding example is the phrase
“and/or” which appears in numerous sections of the code even
though the courts have generally held such phrase to be “ambigu-
ous” and “meaningless.”?? Most authorities have stated that while
the use of the term “and/or” does not ordinarily invalidate a statute
its use in statutes has generally been condemned.
A third type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con-
tains phrases such as “in sections one and two of this act.” These
phrases have been used by the legislature in identifying parts of
lengthy acts, the sections of which were not given code numbers
by the legislature. Since the codifier of the laws of the state as-
signed to such sections appropriate code numbers, and had no
power to change or alter the language within a section, it resulted
in the section references losing their identity when official numbers
were assigned.
A fourth type of partially-obsolete sections is that which con-
tains paragraphs which have been held to be unconstitutional by
a court of last resort, and yet the invalid phrases are separable
from the remainder of the. section.”’
A fifth type of partially-obsolete sections consists of those
which refer to other sections that have been subsequently repealed.
Sometimes these sections are rendered totally “obsolete” by reason
of the fact that the repeal of the section referred to renders the
dependent section wholly ineffective. In most cases, however, the
statute containing the reference to another section is not deemed
totally obsolete but rather “partially obsolete.”?*
A sixth type of partially-obsolete sections appears in acts
creating boards or commissions in which the provision is made
for the governor to appoint its members for original terms to be
staggered so that they expire at successive intervals. After the
provision concerning the expiration of these first terms, the acts
further usually provide that succeeding members be appointed for
22154 A.L.R. 869.
23 On10 Gen. Cone §§ 504-3, 1081-17, and 1579-308.
24See Onto Gen. Cope §§ 2293-86, 2293-14, 2435-1, 3005, 3108-2, 3196, 3203-
33, 3298-53a, 6346-14, 8974.
542 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
pointees, such sections retain these then meaningless provisions.
There are many other statutes which contain provisions that are
made applicable for a limited time and thereafter are of no effect.
The fourth general objective in any revision is to bring to-
gether, under a logical classification system, those statutes and
parts of statutes which, because of similarity of subject matter,
properly belong together. The proposed plan adopted by the legis-
lature?5 divides the subject matter of the code into titles, chapters,
and sections. The title represents the major and most general
classification of subject matter in the new code which will be
recognized as the Revised Code. Each title is divided into chapters,
which are in turn composed of individual sections. The classifica-
tion of our present code into four parts, fifty-eight titles, forty-two
divisions, and six hundred and twenty-four chapters, with consecu-
tive numbering of the sections has been abandoned by the proposed
plan in order to gain greater simplicity and to apply a numbering
system that will be both elastic and operate as a key to the arrange-
ment of the titles and chapters. The present designation of the
parts to the General Code as Political, Procedural, Civil, and Crimi-
nal is in no way helpful in arriving at a logical plan of arrangement
of our law or the classification of its subject matter. The titles in
the new revision cover all the important concepts of our law and
can become readily ascertainable by the users.
The Revised Code will contain 29 titles, 511 chapters, and ap-
proximately 18,500 sections of law. In rearranging the material
from the 58 main titles into an understandable and useful classi-
fication system of 29, it was necessary to transfer from one main
title to another, and from one classification unit to another, not
only whole chapters but frequently numerous sections or portions
of sections of statutes in order to effect an orderly arrangement.
Since the various statutory subjects, when they have been agreed
upon, must be arranged in some kind of order in the statute pub-
lication, it would seem desirable, in selecting the subjects, to fol-
low a logical patterh. In other words, the main titles or subjects
should be of equal magnitude, rank, or dignity, so as to indicate
to the user of the statutes a distinct separation of the law into
definite independent groups. The subjects should be such as to
express by their very titles, the logic and reasoning which prompted
their selection.
The purpose of a statute classification is to make the statutes
convenient and readily accessible, and if the user of the statutes
cannot understand why the statutes have been separated into dif-
ferent groups the classification will not perform its function. In
this respect, the strictly alphabetical system of statute classification
25$.J.R. 10-1947.
1950] CODE REVISION 543
fails to meet the test. The limitations imposed by the necessity of
selecting a heading or title that will fit into an alphabetical order
prevent the selection of broad, general subjects that are commonly
known to the user. For example, there is no alphabetical heading
that will adequately cover a group containing the statutes relating
to the functions of state government, counties, or townships. Logi-
cal considerations require these statutes to be brought together,
but under an alphabetical system the functions of each political
unit must be separated under several alphabetical headings. The
alleged conveniences of the alphabetical system of classification
rest in the fact that the alphabetical headings enable the user of
the statutes quickly to find the particular subject for which he is
searching. This necessarily implies that the headings are ones
which would occur to the ordinary person. If that kind of heading
is to be used, then the statutes cannot be brought together under
main subjects of equal rank, because the English language does
not supply suitable words with which to express such subjects
(keeping in mind that the first word in the heading is the only
one that counts in an alphabetical arrangement). On the other
hand, if broad title headings are selected to cover major subjects,
and those broad title headings are arranged in an alphabetical
order, the alleged convenience of the alphabetical system is lost
because the headings are not ones that the ordinary user of the
statutes would think of from an alphabetical standpoint. The pro-
posed Revised Code combines the logical with the alphabetical
listing of its titles and lists the first four titles logically and the
remaining 25 titles are run alphabetically with the use of short
titles that anyone would think of as pertaining to the subject. The
29 titles selected to cover the major fields of law in Ohio are as
follows:
TITLE
ei cie 5 acca wise State Government
BN obs ioe eae arte Counties
A Ces Townships
ds peckdgak Coane Municipal Corporations
si ¢tenkhwedes meee’ Agriculture, Animals, and Fences
SP sucha bt edasuasouen Banks and Building and Loan
Associations
CR ie tat iiciia hte bane de Commercial Transactions
| Ee ere Conservation, Mining, Waters, and
Watercraft
iA tins triebaxedad Corporations and Partnerships
cob awn seas uke Courts—Municipal, Mayor’s, and
Justice of Peace
A fi ira a's ial ak we Courts—Probate and Juvenile
Re Courts—Common Pleas
aig ee als od ale Courts—Appellate and Supreme
RR ee General Court Provisions and
Special Proceedings
544 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
eee Crimes and Procedure
ee Domestic Relations and Children
5... siemens iecall Education and Libraries
a oss cdwn ated Elections
ere Health, Safety, and Morals
(0 + Se Insurance
reer Labor
re Liquor
ina a ct crenaiiiel Motor Vehicles and Aeronautics
a akcwaie'eo-acmiba nein Occupations and Professions
EG ss vccccssceeede Public Utilities
ESTER ee Public Welfare
reer ee Real Property
ial Ni at gal made Roads and Bridges
I ink edie tint alain Taxation
All the existing law of our state of whatever nature can be
logically placed within one of these twenty-nine titles. It has been
argued that while the main subjects in a statute classification may
be arranged either alphabetically or logically, the subordinate
subjects or chapters should be arranged alphabetically under each
title. This argument loses sight of the fact that a number of laws,
such as the laws relating to civil procedure, contemplate that cer-
tain steps will be taken in chronological sequence, and it is far
better to arrange such laws in the contemplated sequence of the
steps set forth in the laws. Also, an alphabetical arrangement of
subordinate subjects would prevent arranging of laws in the order
of their importance.
In selecting the chapter headings, an effort has been made to
provide for the grouping of sections according to the subject dealt
with by the sections rather than according to the political unit or
agency affected. The chief advantage of this is that it permits the
elimination of duplications and lays a foundation for future uni-
form legislation on the subjects among the various kinds of political
units as the district, township, county, and state, whose boundaries
are rapidly becoming less important in their effect on general
governmental functigns.
The pattern followed by the bureau was, first, to select the
subjects under which the statutes are to be brought together, and
second, to indicate to the users of the statutes, through the classi-
fication headings and arrangement, the reasoning which influenced
the selection of the subjects. If the classification accomplishes these
two purposes the burden which the index must carry is substan-
tially lessened. If a code is logically arranged and the numbering
system keyed in with the subject matter the bench and bar will
soon be able to ascertain and find any statute without resorting
to an index.
The fifth objective of the bureau is to simplify and clarify the
statutes by restating them in clear and simple language, and apply-
1950] CODE REVISION 545
ing to their construction a uniformity of expression, capitalization,
spelling, and punctuation. The revision of each of the present sec-
tions of the statutory law of this state consists of amending the
partially-obsolete sections, correcting misspelled words, incorrect
grammar, ambiguous phrases, and applying consistent punctuation
and paragraphing within the section of law. In order to make uni-
form and facilitate the work of the research attorneys in the bureau,
and to prevent any changes in language from affecting the sub-
stantive law of the state, the bureau has promulgated extensive
and detailed code revision rules? which must be rigidly complied
with by the attorneys making any proposed changes in our present
statutes. The work on each section of law is checked in three
operations before being approved by the commission.
Frequently in our present code, superfluous and redundant
words appear and add to its complexity. In almost every section
of the revised material some simplification of expression has been
accomplished. Such phrases as
“it is its duty to;”
“are hereby required to;”
“is hereby authorized and it shall be his duty to;” and
“is hereby vested with power and authority and it shall be
its duty in carrying out the provisions of this act to”
can all be replaced by the word “shall” without any danger of
misinterpretation of the meaning. Likewise the word “void” is
just as explicit as the much used expression “absolutely null and
void, and of no effect.” “Shall have power to” has been changed
to “may.” The law of our.state should be relieved of complexity,
redundancy, ambiguity and duplicity and should be set forth in
plain language with a uniformity of expression and convenient ar-
rangement. A modern code is just as important a working tool
to the lawyer as modern equipment is in the factory or to the
skilled workman.
The sixth objective of the bureau is to apply a numbering
enactments and yet supply a key for the ascertainment of the sub-
system that will allow for a maximum of elasticity for future
ject matter immediately by the citation of the number. The decimal
system of numbering has long been recognized as the most adap-
table type of numbering system arid has been adopted by many
states and the Federal Government in various forms. Present
section numbers like 5542-13b-1 of the General Code could be
avoided in our proposed decimal numbering system. The number-
ing system adopted by the Bureau of Code Revision and approved
by the legislature is a system which uses only one decimal and not
to exceed six digits for present existing sections. In the approved
numbering system the digits to the left of the decimal indicate the
261949, Report of Bureau to the Senate and House of Representatives, p. 38.
546 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
number of one of the 29 titles, the number of each of which will
become of common knowledge to those using the code. The first
and second digits to the right of the decimal designate the chapter
number, while the third and fourth digits to the right designate
the section numbers. The first section in the first chapter of the
first title will be numbered 1.0101. The last section of the last
chapter of the last title will be numbered 57.4529. Applying the
rule stated above, it is seen that the last section in the Revised
Code is the twenty-ninth section in the forty-fifth chapter of the
fifty-seventh title. In order to allow for the later insertion of re-
lated new matter, the plan skips a title or chapter number after
each title or chapter in the Revised Code. Because of this proce-
dure the number of the final title in the Revised Code is LVII de-
spite the fact that there are only twenty-nine titles. The system
will accommodate an unlimited number of new sections by carry-
ing to the right of the decimal additional digits. The plan thereby
places at the disposal of the codifiers one million section numbers.
Likewise, it is possible, to add entire chapters, either between ex-
isting ones or after the last chapter in any title. The skipping of
title and chapter numbers provides space for the insertion of ap-
proximately ten thousand sections between any two titles, or of
ninety-nine sections between any two chapters. It is believed that
this plan represents a system of classification and numbering
which will accommodate an ever-expanding body of laws for gen-
erations to come. It is further advantageous in the fact that the
revised titles and chapters will carry odd numbers which will
allow not only unlimited expansion, but will afford the user the
opportunity of ascertaining new legislation in years to come by
its attachment to the presently unused even numbers.
The seventh and final present objective of the bureau is to
obtain the approval of the legislature of its work on the bulk re-
vision as it will be presented during the next biennium. While
the bureau can make a reclassification, rearrangement, and revision
of the General Code, its work is meaningless and only a feeble
gesture without enactment into law and a repeal of those laws
which the bureau seeks to replace.
In the consideration of a complete revision of our code the
question arises whether to undertake a bulk revision or a topical
revision. By bulk revision is meant a revision of the whole code,
withholding the re-enactment of any part until the entire work is
completed. By topical revision is meant revision topic by topic
in accordance with the plan approved by the legislative and the
re-enactment of the various topics as the revision of each is sepa-
rately completed. Each method has advantages. The revisors of
1910 after the completion of four years’ work recommended a
547
1950] CODE REVISION
bulk revision. The entire General Code of 1910 was presented to
the 78th General Assembly in a single bill which was immediately
enacted. The work of the revisors must have been accepted by
the General Assembly largely on faith, for it is doubtful if even
the most zealous legislator could have given the bill careful study.
The present revision of our code is of necessity a bulk revision as
was the revision of 1910. The bulk enactment by the legislature
during that year repealed all the existing statutes and enacted
13,767 sections of new law.
The past forty years have proved that bulk revision without a
continuous revision following its passage is not enough and not
only proves to be inadequate but also precipitates much criticism.
No rules of revision or statutory construction were adopted and
published by the codifiers of 1910, so that their efforts were soon
nullified by subsequent enactments and amendments during the
eighteen succeeding sessions of our legislature without the assist-
ance and direction of a permanent continuous service of revision
and research. Elimination and prevention of verbosity, redundancy,
and duplicated provisions cannot be accomplished in the next five,
ten, or twenty years if hundreds of different individuals with in-
adequate facilities for research in governmental functions and
without knowledge of statutory construction and the rules govern-
ing the style of the revised laws are independently drafting legis-
lation.
Uniformity cannot be maintained and a revised code will be-
come a hodge-podge of statutory enactment if subsequent legisla-
tion is to be passed without being screened and checked as to form.
A bulk revision of statutory law receives some criticism by reason
of the change made in the placement of particular statutes in the
code, and changes of numbers necessitating the use for a time of
cross references and comparative tables. It is to be noted that
this temporary inconvenience would result from any rearrange-
ment of the code irrespective of the type of numbering system
adopted. The size of the work involved in a bulk revision and the
expense incurred require that great consideration be given to a
continuous revision in the state of Ohio after the immediate task
of general revision is accomplished. The legislature provided in
the creative act establishing the bureau that it become a perma-
nent authority of legislative service. The legislature further pro-
vided that after the bureau has formulated and prepared the
definite plan for the order, arrangement, and classification of the
code, it should prepare, and at the beginning of each regular ses-
sion of the general assembly recommend the introduction of such
bills to the general assembly, for the consolidation, revision, and
other matters relating to the Generali Code or any portion thereof
548 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
as may from time to time be completed.”’
The bureau presently is charged with the responsibility of a
continuous or a permanent revision of law in this state by the
codification of each law after it is passed by the legislature and
signed by the governor, the revision of statutes enacted at each
session of the legislature, initiation of the repeal or amendment
of unconstitutional laws as soon as possible after the court’s pro-
nouncement is given, and research in connection with new legisla-
tion after enactment to eliminate conflicts, duplications, ambigui-
ties, and obsolete provisions. Unless requested by legislative reso-
lution or committe action, the bureau has no authority to render
any service in passing on the matters of form of pending legislation
prior to enactment. This condition necessitates the reconsideration
of each enactment by the legislature after two years to correct
merely errors of form.
In order to facilitate permanent revision it seems essential
that every bill not only be codified after enactment as the law
now provides, but that it be reviewed and checked as to form by
the Bureau of Code Revision before enactment for the purpose
of suggesting improvements designed to render the whole statute
law clear and harmonious, so that bills enacted in the future be
made to conform to the style and rules of construction established
by the bureau. If the bureau were to render this service there
would be no occasion for resubmitting each enactment for formal
corrections.
In addition to Ohio, systems of continuous revision of law
now exist in at least nineteen other states.?8 The objective of such
a system in most states like Ohio is to obviate the necessity of
ever having to repeat in the future the arduous task and tempor-
ary disruption of a bulk revision.
Sutherland’s Statutory Construction?? recommends the main-
tenance of official statutory revision by the following statement:
Although few states now maintain official and continuous
revision of their ¢odes this should be the objective of every
state. The publication of session laws is not enough. Each
state should establish an official code and incorporate the
product of each legislative session into the code. The cost
of infrequent code revisions is enormous while the cost of
continuous code revision is relatively slight. It provides
an efficient and thoroughly reliable source of statute law.
Until the day is reached when every state has an official
code which is brought to date after each legislative session
27 Onto Gen. Cope § 76-6.
28 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, lowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin.
293rd Ed. Vol. 2, p. 258.
1950] CODE REVISION 549
the improvement in the judicial process founded as it is
today upon the statutes cannot be achieved.
The initial task of code revision, long overdue, is so great
that it has deterred most states from the undertaking. Sat-
isfactory beginnings may be made, however, if codifications
—— branches of the law were begun and contin-
ued.
To supplement the regular revision program, the legislature
in 1947, not only authorized but directed the bureau by resolution*®
to draft and submit to the General Assembly legislation consoli-
dating the 39 municipal court acts of the state into standard acts,
with such variations as local conditions require. The enactment
of such a measure into law would not only afford the attorneys
and jurists uniformity of practice and procedure in all municipal
courts, but would eliminate from the code 1,584 sections of law
which are of a special nature. Likewise in 1949 the legislature by
resolution*! directed the bureau to analyze the laws of the state
and decisions of the courts pertaining to the subject of domestic
relations and the adoption of children. The bureau has made ex-
tensive research, conducted public hearings, and will submit to
the 99th General Assembly a drafted measure to reflect its work
and resultant recommendations. In such cases the bureau makes
findings and presents to the legislature changes in the substantive
law, but as noted, only upon formal request.
It becomes apparent during the course of the work that cer-
tain types and groups of statutes are not suitable for revision be-
cause of their controversial character, or cannot be properly re-
vised in the course of a general revision of statutes because of
their extreme complexity and the danger of making unanticipated
substantive changes in bringing them into order. Such segments
of our law can be corrected by the bureau in a separate topical
revision after receiving a special mandate of the legislature or in
conjunction with the work of a separate legislative commission or
administrative authority.
Necessary and recognized changes should be made over a
period of time in the field of taxation, the functions of governmental
departments, and the unification of the system of trial courts and
law enforcement authorities. Laws pertaining to the functions
of state, county, and township government are recognized as being
inadequate, and yet deal with fundamental problems that go
unsolved by reason of old statutory enactments which remain un-
changed from one legislative session to another. Complacency and
blind acceptance of statutory and some constitutional provisions
which were adopted about a century ago (1851) have “proved to
30 Am. S.J.R. 17.
31S.J.R. 32.
550 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
be the greatest weaknesses of our democratic system. We should
not turn a deaf ear to reasonable requests upon the part of inter-
ested citizens and groups for reform in our law concerning the
executive branch of our government, or in the legislative procedure
and judicial process as well as in other branches of human activity.
There is much to be done by the legislature in future sessions in
Ohio by the establishment of a pattern for a systematic topical re-
vision of distinct fields of our law. Such can only be accomplished
after much research, public approbation, and diligent study on the
part of a permanent agency which is thoroughly familiar with the
entire body of the statutory law and which has adequate facilities
to conduct research and obtain pertinent facts.
OHIO STATE
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 11 AUTUMN 1950 NUMBER 4
Published Quarterly by the Faculty and Students of the College of Law
The Ohio State University
Subscriptions: $4.00 per Year $1.00 per Copy
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Joun A. Brown
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
ALLEN H. BecHrTex Rosert W. PHILLirs Georce W. STUHLDREHER
EDITORIAL BOARD
Ricuarp H. CHRISTIANSEN Jesse L. JENNINGS
Jack V. DANAHER Rosert J. LEAVER
Joun D. Durry FREDERICK D. Puckett
James D. HAPNER WriiiaM E. RANcE
Donato H. Hauser James H. TILBERRY
Joserpx S. WIsE
BUSINESS MANAGER
G. Det Bates
Ohio Participation in Interstate Compacts
The interstate compact procedure was little used before the
twentieth century. From the year 1789 to 1900, only sixteen com-
pacts were adopted by the states. Since the turn of the century
however, several times as many compacts have been contracted
and the compact procedure is steadily taking on new significance
as a means of interstate cooperation.!
The United States Constitution? absolutely prohibits the entry
by the states into any treaty, alliance or confederation. The same
section of the constitution conditions the entry by the states into
any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign
power upon the consent of congress.
The distinction between treaties, alliances or confederations
and compacts or agreements is a very fine one and the differences
have never been exactly or concretely defined. Justice Story dis-
tinguished them in the following way:
Perhaps the language of the former clause may be more
plausibly interpreted from the terms used, ‘treaty, alliance
or confederation’ and upon the ground that the sense of
each is best known by its association (noscitur a sociis) to
apply to treaties of a political character; such as treaties
of alliance for purposes of peace and war; and treaties of
confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual
government, political cooperation, and the exercise of po-
litical sovereignty; and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or
conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external politi-
cal dependence, or general commercial privileges. The lat-
ter clause, ‘compacts and agreements’ might then very
properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed
mere private rights of soverignty; such as questions of
boundary; interests in land situate in the territory of each
other; and other internal regulations for the mutual com-
fort and convenience of states bordering on each other.
Such compacts have been made since the adoption of the
constitution .. .°
As stated before, a state must have the consent of congress to
legitimately enter inté a compact. This constitutional provision has
been interpreted however, as meaning that the congressional con-
sent may be either express or implied from congressional action
and either prior or subsequent to the adoption of the compact by
the states. In Virginia v. Tennessee,* the boundary line between
Virginia and Tennessee was ascertained and adjusted by commis-
1 Comment, 34 Yate L. J. 684 (1925).
2U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10.
32 Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, sec. 1403 (5th ed. 1891).
4 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1892).
552
COMMENTS 553
1950]
sioners appointed in the two states. The boundary thus adjusted
by the commissioners and confirmed by the two states was treated
by congress as the true boundary when congress districted these
states for judicial and revenue purposes. Although congress did
not expressly give its consent to the adoption of this compact by
these two states, the required consent was implied from the con-
gressional action. In Green v. Biddle,’ a promise by a newly formed
state to preserve the title to certain lands within its borders was
upheld on the ground that congress had given its consent to the
states entering into the compact by subsequently admitting the
state into the Union.
There is some authority supporting the proposition that con-
gressional consent is not required at all unless the compact or
agreement is “political” in nature.° The term must have a different
meaning in this sense than it has in distinguishing compacts and
agreements from treaties, alliances and confederations or the con-
sent requirement would lose all its meaning. The result would
otherwise be that congressional consent is required only when the
agreement is a treaty, alliance or confederation, in which case it
is invalid regardless of congressional consent.
An interstate compact can be terminated in several different
ways. The easiest and most definite method of termination is to
specifically provide for the termination of the compact after the
expiration of a certain length of time from the date of entry. But
a compact may also be terminated by subsequent inconsistent
federal legislation. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Company,’
Virginia and Kentucky had entered into a compact with the con-
sent of congress regarding the free navigation of the Ohio River.
Still, subsequent federal legislation requiring officers and crews
of vessels navigating the Ohio River to regulate their vessels so
as not to interfere with the elevation or construction of bridges at
Wheeling and Bridgeport at their then height and position, was
held to be the legitimate exercise by congress of its constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce. This legislation was not
invalid by reason of the interstate compact entered into with the
consent of congress.
If an interstate compact is terminated by subsequent federal
legislation inconsistent with the terms of the compact on the theory
that the consent of congress is thereby withdrawn and that the
continuing consent of congress is necessary for the existence of a
valid interstate compact, congress could terminate a compact merely
5 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
6 Note, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 618 (1938).
7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U.S.
1855).
a en
wicncicnsitnily Toate naan
: .
554 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
by withdrawing its consent. Inconsistent legislation would be un-
necessary. But if congressional consent is only a condition prece-
dent to the existence of a valid interstate compact, congress could
not terminate the compact merely by withdrawing its consent.’ In
Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company,’ the supreme court
held that citizens of states which were parties to a compact were
not parties and could not object to the termination of the compact
by the mutual consent of the state parties.
Subsequent inconsistent legislation by one of the state parties
cannot terminate an interstate compact. It was held in Green v.
Biddle,'° that the legislation was invalid on the theory that inter-
state compacts are within the contracts clause of the federal con-
stitution."
An interstate compact can be enforced or its validity ques-
tioned by the state parties to the compact!? or by individuals,'’ who
would otherwise be injured. Subject to the usual requirements
for jurisdiction, an action to enforce or question the validity of an
interstate compact may be brought in the state'* or lower federal
courts.'5 The action may also be brought in the United States
Supreme Court when the state is a party under the constitutional
provision!® granting original jurisdiction to the supreme court of
any suit to which a state is a party.
The Ohio Legislature, in 1937, established the Ohio Commis-
sion on Interstate Cooperation.'’? This statute was amended in 1949
and, as amended, the commission consists of the seven members
of the senate committee on interstate cooperation, a similar house
committee and the seven members of the Governor’s committee on
interstate cooperation. It is expressly made one of the functions
of this commission'® to endeavor to advance cooperation between
Ohio and other units of government whenever it seems advisable
to do so by formulating proposals for and by facilitating the adop-
tion of interstate compacts. Also in 1937, Ohio adopted the Pyma-
tuning Lake compact." This compact was the first to which Ohio
8 Note, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 618 (1938).
9The Mayor, Recorder, Alderman and Common Council of Georgetown v.
The Alexandria Canal Co. and William Turnbull, 12 Pet. 91 (U.S. 1838).
10 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
11U.S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 10.
12 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
13 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823).
14 State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76 (1912).
1S Aicheson v. Endless Chain Dredge Co., 40 Fed. 253 (E.D. Va. 1889).
16U.S. Constr. Art. 3, sec. 2.
17 Onto Gen. Cope §§ 1379-1 to 1379-12.
18 Onto Gen. Cope § 1379-6.
19117 Ohio Laws 508 (1937-1938).
1950] COMMENTS 555
was a party.” It was entered into with Pennsylvania for the pur-
pose of establishing a recreation district with concurrent penal
jurisdiction and also to conserve water. On September 17, 1937,
Ohio entered into another compact.?! Under the terms of this
compact, the judicial and administrative authorities of a state, a
party to the compact, are to permit a person convicted of an of-
fense within such state and placed on probation or released on
parole to reside in any other state party to this compact under
certain conditions contained in the compact. All the states except
Nevada, North Carolina and Texas adopted this compact. Con-
gressional consent was previously granted on June 6, 1934.
Since 1937, Ohio has adopted two other compacts. One was
entered into with the twenty oil and gas producing states to prevent
the physical waste of oil and natural gas from any cause.?? This
compact was to expire September 1, 1947, but was extended for
four years to September 1, 1951, by the Governor who was author-
ized in the original bill to extend the expiration date of the com-
pact. The other was the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Com-
pact,?5 the purpose of which is the control of future pollution in
and the abatement of existing pollution from the rivers, streams
and water in the Ohio River basin which flow through or border
upon any of the states, parties to this compact. Congress author-
ized the adoption of this compact on June 8, 1936. Conditioned
on the adoption by New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, Ohio
entered this compact on August 31, 1939. Ohio, West Virginia,
New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Virginia are the
parties to this compact.
In the case of State v. Sims,?4 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia rendered a decision in connection with this compact which
could make it practically impossible to achieve interstate coopera-
tion by use of the compact procedure. This was a mandamus ac-
tion to compel the auditor of West Virginia to honor a requisition
for West Virginia’s contribution to the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission which was appropriated by the legislature
of West Virginia. The majority of the court held that legislation
authorizing West Virginia to become a party to this compact was
invalid as violative of the West Virginia Constitution because the
state by entering the compact would delegate to the commission a
substantial part of the state’s police power and the compact, if
valid, would create a contract binding on future legislatures.
Judge Given, in a strong dissenting opinion, stated that inter-
20 Comment, 73 U.S. L. Rev. 75 (1939).
21 Onto Gen. Cope § 108.
22120 Ohio Laws 203 (1943-1944).
23 Onto Gen. Cone § 14881.
24 State ex rel. Dyer et al. v. Sims, 58 S.E. 2nd 766 (1950). Certiorari to
US. Supreme Court.
means ena
- we 9 p> na np
oo rood Se eee eet
556 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
state compacts are an essential and often-used part of our form
of government. He argued that granting to the commission the
power to enforce its orders as to the disposition of sewage against
municipalities, corporations, persons and entities of the member
states was not an unconstitutional delegation of the state police
power because of the following limitation on this power in Article
9 of the Compact: “No such order shall go into effect unless and
until it receives the assent of at least a majority of the commission-
ers from each of not less than a majority of the signatory states;
and no such order upon a municipality, corporation, person or
entity in any state shall go into effect unless and until it receives
the assent of not less than a majority of the commissioners from
such state.” The commissioners from each state are representatives
of that state, responsible only to the authority of that state and
are subject to removal as such commissioners by the governor of
that state.
It was also argued by Judge Given that entering the compact
did not “create a debt” or bind future legislatures to make appro-
priations since the last clause of Article 5 of the compact provides:
The commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind
prior to the making of appropriations adequate to meet the
same; nor shall the commission pledge the credit of any of
the signatory States, except by and with the authority of
the legislature thereof.
The majority opinion states that the creation of a state com-
mission which requires an appropriation of public funds to carry
out its purpose is usually not treated as the creation of a “debt”
within the constitutional provision that no debt shall be contracted
by the state except to meet casual deficits and other specified sit-
uations, although the continuation of such commission for an in-
definite period necessarily involves future appropriations. In the
majority opinion however, they held the compact to be entirely
different because it was between sovereign states and the Federal
Government, treating it as a contract which the Supreme Court
of the United States, in a suit between states has power to en-
force. They said it was a contract binding on all the parties thereto,
the obligation of which continues so long as that contract exists.
Although late in initiating its participation in interstate com-
pacts, Ohio may still become a leader in the field due to the estab-
lishment of the Ohio Commission on Interstate Cooperation unless
Ohio follows the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia
in State v. Sims. This is not likely however, due to the fact that
interstate cooperation is becoming increasingly more important
because of improved methods of transportation and communication
and the greater complexity of our society. The future will probably
see interstate compacts, along with uniform and reciprocal state
legislation, take on greater and greater significance.
John Duffy
Lobbying—A Definition and Recapitulation of
Its Practice
For lack of an appropriate word the law is sometimes prevented
from changing, but when a good word is coined and it catches
on, often times it has a catalytic effect on legal growth.! Some
words become so popular to law’ and laity alike’ that they event-
ually come to mean all things to all people. This results in such
ambiguity that any attempt to use the word intelligently must
necessitate retreat to such a level as to render the word impotent
if not altogether meaningless. The term lobby is an example of
just such a word that has “caught on”, and wide and indiscriminate
use has so broadened its meaning as to require re-definition for
the purposes of this article.
Although the historical origin of the term lobbying connotates
the buttonholing of elected representatives to government office,
even in its infant days the term was ambivalent.’ Today lobbying
1 Lev1, AN Intropuction To Lecat REasoninc 6 (1949).
2See FepeRaAL AND StaTrE Laws On Lossyinc, prepared for the Assembly
Interim Committee on Government Efficiency and Economy (1949), for an
insight as to how our law makers interpret the word.
3 See 28 Lire (June 12, 1950), in which America’s children are depicted
as the country’s most ruthless pressure group against their own parents for
the purchase of Hopalong Cassidy paraphernalia; The Right to Petition, 28
Lire 34 (June 26, 1950). J
4Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying in THe Boox or THE States 124
(1948-49), “Few statutes provide clear specific, and meaningful definitions of
what constitutes lobbying. In Louisiana and Texas a person is guilty of lobby-
ing who privately or secretly attempts to influence a legislator except by
appealing to his reason! In addition, actual practice in Georgia and California
is in direct contradiction to their constitutions which still contain the obsolete
language that lobbying ‘is declared to be a crime’ (Georgia) or seeks ‘to in-
fluence the vote of a member of the legislature by bribery promise of reward,
intimidation or any other dishonest means’ (California).” Although lobbying
is a crime in Georgia, lobbyists are allowed to register as such by the payment
of a $250.00 fee. Ga. Cope § 92-508 (1933). Although registrations number
as high as 900 per year (Wisconsin), in 1947 the Georgia secretary of state
reported “that the State of Georgia did not have anyone to register under
the State Lobbying Law.”
5 Note, Federal Regulation of Lobbyists, 15 Gro. Wasu. L. Rev. 455 (1947).
“The late Senator Caraway from Arkansas once said, ‘There are no good lob-
bies—I have made up my mind. It is all wrong.’ Bellows once wrote, “The
very term lobbying is in itself suggestive of sinister methods.’”
Comment, Improving The Legislative Process: Federal Regulation Of Lob-
bying, 56 Yate L. J. 304 (1947). “Whereas the old style lobby, confined almost
entirely to representatives of business interests, operated secretly and depend-
557
558 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
labels create even more confusion because they cover not only a
multitude of sins, but also embrace an equally commendable num-
ber of worthwhile and necessary activities. Actually there is noth-
ing any more fundamentally evil and sinister about the use of lobby-
ing than there is for instance in the use of our national currency.
However, there is not so much widespread confusion as to what
our currency is and how it operates as exists concerning lobbying.
One reason for such misunderstanding is the attempt to treat
lobbying as an isolated problem rather than as a problem so funda-
mental that it is virtually a segment of our way of life. Another
reason is the failure to understand the political and economic de-
velopment of this country. When drafted, the Federal Constitution
provided in theory that the interest of individuals be expressed
through their elected legislators. These representatives were elec-
ted on a geographical-political basis, and if it is true that this was
an adequate means of evaluating the various interests of the com-
ponent members of society in 1789, it is patently clear that this
is not the situation today. The failure of the constitution to provide
group representation lies in an overlooking of the fact that individ-
uals identify themselves and their interests not only with state or
political sub-divisions but more importantly with their business,
economic, social, professional, religious, and fraternal groups. As
the country’s means of communication and transportation im-
proved, its citizens’ group interests have proportionately expanded
and interests confined to political or geographical boundaries have
correspondingly decreased. Increasing complexity of legislation
today — legislation which often is only fully understood by the
affected groups—has given rise to extra-legal machinery for
achieving group aims, and the survival of geographical-political
representation to a large measure obscures the real basis for legis-
lative action today.’ The failure of our two party system to pro-
ed for its success upon personal solicitation of legislators, often corrupted by
bribes, such methods are obsolete today.”
In the old days, impecunious Senators were said to have received outright
bribes passed to them across card tables in the form of card winnings in the
old Hall of the Bleeding Heart Pool Room on Pennsylvania Avenue in the
nation’s capital. 2 Poore, Pertey’s REMINISCENCES 515 (1886).
6Lerner, Minority Rule and the Constitutional Tradition, 86 U. or Pa.
L. Rev. 457 (1938).
7 Two groups have advanced remedies designated to reconcile the existing
fact situation with political theory. See MacDonatp, A New CONSTITUTION FOR
A New America (1921); GatLoway, ConcrEss aT THE Cross Roaps (1946);
Simmons, Reorganization of the Federal Government, 31 A.B.A.J. 63 (1945).
The first group seeks a means by which group interests can be fitted into the
formal pattern of government, a system of functional representation as a sub-
stitute for, or supplement to, existing political institutions. A second group
regards the problem of representation as subordinate to a rationalization of
1950] COMMENTS 559
mote opinion and policy, together with very real obstacles placed
before embryo group interest political parties to qualify for state
and national elections*® has created a need which coupled with the
people’s constitutional right to petition their government?’ has not
unstrangely resulted in various forms of group petition. Thus a
basic legislative problem is the adjustment of the conflicting in-
terests represented by state and national organizations of “interest
groups”: teachers organizations, labor organizations, farm organi-
zations, religious organizations, veteran organizations, pension or-
ganizations, business organizations, real estate organizations, public
utility organizations, etc.
Consequently, today the term lobbying embraces three general
areas of activity for the purpose of defeating or influencing pas-
sage of legislation: (1) citizens expressing individual opinion on
legislation,'® (2) citizens organized into groups for the purpose
of expressing collective opinion on legislation; and (3) the paid
legislative agent, against whom most lobbying regulation is di-
rected. Since the privilege of the individual to express his opinions
on legislative matters is such a time honored custom as well as a
fundamental constitutional right,'’ group one of the above three
categories can be dismissed without further consideration. It is
within groups two and three that the real lobbying problems exist.
Thus lobbying may be defined as being the processes used by or-
ganizations to stimulate such activity by their members (and by
the general public as well) as will impress legislators with their
serious interest in the sponsored legislation. The word lobbyists,
on the other hand, may be defined as being those organizations and
their employees (who may be individuals, firms, or corporations)
who utilize the above lobbying processes.
The most highly publicized activity is that of the professional
lobbyist!? who undertakes to “buttonhole” congressmen, but this
the whole legislative process. Their emphasis is upon administrative efficiency,
extension of federal research, and information services.
American history is full of examples of legislation passed at the instance
of and for the benefit of special interests. Odegard, Lobbies and Current
History, 31 Current History 690 (1930); Zetier, Pressure Powirics in New
York (1937); Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation, 61 Pot.
Scr. Q. 42 (1946); Herrmnc, Group REPRESENTATION Berore Concress (1929).
8 Onto Gen. Cope, § 4785-61.
9U.S. Const. Amenp. I. “Congress shall make no law abridging the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.”
10 See note 9, supra.
11 See note 9, supra.
12 Sometimes referred to as legislative counsel if a member of the bar
and therefore exempt from lobbying registration requirements in many states.
See Onto Gen. Cone, § 6256-5.
pene
i
;
i
-
re
}
t
'
560 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 11
is considered by some writers’? as being the least important phase
of lobbying activity.'* Of primary importance, it is thought there-
fore, are the activities which encourage members of organizations
(or members of the general public) to write or speak to their con-
gressment in behalf of a particular point of view.'®
Legislators are not usually seriously concerned with attitudes
of particular interest groups but if voters of their own districts
display serious concern as to a particular legislative issue they
may, and probably will be spurred to action. For this reason state
and national pressure group organizations spend considerable time
and money in efforts to stimulate their members (and members of
the public) to display great interest in their sponsored legislation,
so that the legislators may become aware of “grass roots” interest
in the measure.!®
It probably bears re-emphasis at this point that lobbying, prop-
erly conducted, is not only a perfectly legitimate exercise of con-
stitutional prerogative, but can be a benefit both to legislative
bodies and to the country at large.'!’ In addition to providing an
unofficial form of functional representation, pressure groups which
throw light on current legislation, call attention to the voting rec-
ords of our legislators, and inform the members of their organiza-
tions and incidentally attempt to so inform the general public as
to the meaning of legislative proposals, are quite a benefit and
service to our society.!8
13 Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 Fev. B. J. 366
(1949).
14 Comment, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 Cot. L. Rev. 98 (1947).
“The perennial problem of legislative lobbying has changed significantly during
the past sixty years. Where the lobbyist once bribed he now uses public opin-
ion as a lever.”
15In 1935, the excesses of the utility lobbies attracted nation-wide atten-
tion. Of their activities, the House Rules Committee said on Feb. 27, 1936:
“|. . the campaign to influence utility holding company legislation was prob-
ably as comprehensive, and as well financed as any in the history of the coun-
try.” Hearings before Congress on House Rules on H.R. 2081, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1936).
16 Passage of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act came after dis-
covery that the bulk of the opposition came from trumped-up Utility propa-
ganda. The holding companies spent about $134,000 instigating last minute
telegrams and phone messages. Names were taken directly from phone direc-
tories and signed to telegrams. Discovery of fake messages may have turned
the tide and made possible the passage of the bill. It passed the Senate by a
single vote. Hearing before a special Committee to investigate lobbying activi-
ties. 74th Con., Ist Sess. 1007 (1935).
17 Witness the fight of the oleomargarine lobby at both state and national
levels to have repealed discriminatory taxes on this product.
18 Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying in THe Boox or Tue Srates 124
(1948-49). “Under our democratic form of government, lobbies have a legiti-
COMMENTS 561
1950]
Today, legislative agents or counsel represent every conceiv-
able business, economic, and social group. They usually perform
their services openly and frankly, and to some measure rely upon
genuine public opinion, oftentimes of course, stimulated through
judicious use of publicity and propaganda, whether to influence
or merely to expedite legislative action.!? Legitimate pressure
groups depend on the number of votes which they can control and
consequently have nothing to gain from concealing their identity.
Fake lobbyists, on the other hand, try to work both ends against
the middle. They either solicit contributions from gullible sources
for a cause they do not or cannot represent, or they attempt to in-
fluence legislation on behalf of non-existent organizations created
for their own purposes. These lobbyists, therefore, do not welcome
publicity about their activities, and are forced to resort to consid-
erable subterfuge.
The problem then is of balancing two opposing interests: pre-
venting lobbying abuses without at the same time hindering the
right of citizens to petition their representatives. The evils dis-
closed by legislative investigations of lobbying fall roughly into
two categories: (1) activities which leave the public and legislat-
ors with inadequate or unbalanced information on which to make
decisions, and (2) activities which coerce or corrupt legislators.
Since almost universal bribery statutes cover this latter activity,
it need not be considered further in this article.
In considering the activities of the paid legislative agent it is
first necessary to understand at least in a cursory manner the pro-
cess by which our laws become enacted. For illustrative purposes,
let us consider a typical bill as it goes through the Ohio House of
Representatives. With but a few minor differences, the procedure
is the same in the Ohio Senate. In Ohio, laws may be initiated in
two ways: (1) by introduction of a bill in either house by a mem-
ber of that house,?° or (2) by petition of electors under our Ohio
constitutional provisions for the initiative?! This discussion will
be limited to the more usual legislative process of our legislator
sponsored measures.
The order of business of the Ohio House of Representatives
provides, besides other matters, for introduction of bills,?? introduc-
mate and indispensable role to play . .. (but) Because some pressure groups,
as organized minorities, thwart the public will, or act generally in a predatory
fashion, some governmental control is necessary.
19 Logan, Lobbying, 144 Annats 73 (1929 July Supp).
20Rule 39. Rutes or THE House OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOINT RULES OF
THE 98th GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF Onto. Hereinafter called Oxto
House RULEs.
21 Onto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, 1b. Onto Gen. Cope § 4785-175.
22 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 8.
Dae es
“me
ant pete:
562 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
tion of motions and resolutions,?5 and introduction of petitions and
memorials.?4 Since, procedurally, motions, resolutions, petitions,
and memorials are introduced in much the same manner as bills,
only bills will be discussed further. A bill must be either authored
or sponsored by a legislator in the house of which he is a member.
A constitutional requirement?’ provides that the bill must be read
three times, each reading to be on a separate day. When a bill is
introduced it is read the first time by title only. If opposition to
the bill at this time is expressed by any member, the question is
put by the speaker of the House, “Shall the bill be rejected?’”’® If
the bill is not rejected by a majority vote of the members present,
it has survived its first test, but as a practical matter seldom is
this question ever put to the members on introduction of bills.
After a bill has been read the first time it is then sent to the
Reference Committee which at its discretion may either report
the bill back to the House for its return to its author,?” with reasons
for its rejection, or report it back to the House with recommenda-
tion for reference to the proper standing committee of the House.’®
At this time the bill is read the second time by title only. Generally
if the Reference Committee does not approve the bill, it takes no
action at all and merely holds onto the bill. If the bill is returned
to its author, the House may still by a majority vote order it re-
ferred to an appropriate committee.”°
Let us assume that the bill is reported back to the House fa-
vorably by the Reference Committee, and its recommendation is
followed as to which standing committee shall further consider
the bill.3° The committee now holds hearings on the bill at which
time the general public is permitted to appear and testify. If the
bill is not reported out of committee it is dead. However the
House, by a majority vote of all the members elected, may relieve
the committee of the bills! If the committee reports back to the
House any measure referred to it, it may make amendments, or
may even submit a complete substitute bill. Whatever is reported
back then goes to the Rules Committee which has the duty of
placing it on the daily calendar for a third reading. However, due
to the press of daily business, the Rules Committee schedules the
bills which are to be heard on particular days. These are accord-
23 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 9.
24 Onto House Rutes Rule 3, Sec. 10.
25 Onto Const. Art. II, § 16.
26 Onto House Ru es 39.
27 Ouro House Rutes 40.
28 Onto House Rutes 41.
29 Outro House Rutes 40.
30 Onto House Rutes 66.
31 Ibid.
1950] COMMENTS 563
ingly placed “above the black line” printed on the calendar. All
bills listed below this black line may not be considered by the
House until placed above the line by the committee. Thus, if a
bill is never placed above the black line on this daily calendar by
the Rules Committee, it dies a natural death, unless the Committee
is relieved of the bill by the House by a majority vote of all the
members elected.*? If the bill is placed above the black line it is
read for the third time by title only and is now up for House con-
sideration. The House itself may now amend it in part,>> substitute
a new bill, or have the original bill recommitted to the same com-
mittee or another committee** where it once again must face and
overcome all the obstacles originally encountered, plus the ob-
jections of the House. If not recommitted, the question presented
by the Speaker of the House is, “Shall the bill pass?” If the bill,
after its third reading, passes the House, it is then sent to the Senate
where it must be subjected to practically the same procedure as
above described.
Following passage by both houses, the bill then becomes an
“act’”’3® and is sent to the governor for his signature. If the governor
signs the act, it then becomes a law but does not go into effect
until ninety days after it is filed by the governor in the office of
the secretary of state.’ However, within this ninety day period,
unless the bill is an emergency measure or an appropriation mea-
sure, a petition signed by six per cent of the electors of the state,
filed with the secretary of state, can order that this law be sub-
mitted to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection.**
If the governor disapproves the bill and returns it to the
House unsigned, with his objections to the measure, the Speaker
of the House then presents the question: “Shall the bill pass, not-
withstanding the objections of the governor?”3? If both houses pass
this bill without the governor’s signature by the required margin
it becomes a law but is still subject within ninety days to the Refer-
endum under the conditions referred to above. Without investigat-
ing the many parliamentary procedures, dodges, and stalling tech-
niques available to opponents of a bill, the above account, then,
describes briefly the gauntlet which a bill must run in order to
become a law of the State of Ohio.
With the above discussion in mind, let us now consider just
32 Onto House Rute 20 provides for 22 standing committees.
33 Onto House Rute 51.
34 Onto House Routes 52.
35 Onto House Rute 53.
36 Onto House Rute 57.
37 Oxto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1c.
38 See note 35, supra. Emergency laws are not subject to Referendum.
Onto Const. Art. II, Sec. 1d.
39 Onto House Rutes 50.
=<
eee ane
Pc BS
SS aS SR a SF
Pate dep aaliEes . lealeeyn Rae SoS
564 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
where the professional lobbyist fits into the picture. If he doesn’t
have permanent offices at the state capital, he probably will set
up temporary headquarters in a convenient downtown hotel and
then swing into action. Armed with a bill either written by himself
in his own office, or drafted with his assistance and advice, the
lobbyist’s first move is to contact a friendly legislator, show him
his bill and ask him to sponsor it. If the bill is not objectionable
to the legislator or is not against the interest of his constituents,
he may agree to sponsor the bill. Once this has been taken care
of, the lobbyist must then contact members of the Reference Com-
mittee if he can and attempt to prevail on this committee to refer
his bill to the standing committee most favorably disposed toward
the measure. If the House wishes, however, it can send the bill
to a committee unfriendly to the measure and that will be the
end of the bill. If the lobbyist is successful, however, in steering
his bill to a friendly committee, his next task is to get before this
committee when it has a hearing on the bill in order that he may
impress them with its meritorious content, and persuade them to
report the bill out favorably.*° Once it is reported out favorably,
getting the Rules Committee to place the bill above the black
line on the daily calendar is his next job. When the bill is finally
read for the third time, the lobbyist must be alert to avoid crippling
amendments from the floor, or opposition inspired motions to
recommit to another committee, to table, or to postpone to a day
certain, or indefinitely.*!
While the lobbyist is thus keeping his eye on the progress of
his bill at the state capital, the lobbying organization is getting
its heavy artillery into action. Their job is to focus the attention
of the legislators on carefully molded and articulate public opin-
ion, in an attempt to persuade them that what they want is what
the public wants.‘? The techniques and devices available for this
job are only limited by the imagination and integrity of the lobby-
ing organization involved. Utilization may be made of mass chan-
nels of propaganda provided by the newspapers, the radio, the
school, the theatre and the church.*? Constituents are prompted
to bring pressure to bear by writing letters or sending telegrams.**
At election dates, candidates, regardless of part affiliation, con-
sidered favorably disposed toward group interests can be supported
40 The Lobby’s Part in Democracy, Nations Business Mar. 1946, p. 78.
41 Onto House Rutes 62.
42 Comment, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 Cor. L. Rev. 98 (1947).
431 Pusiic Opinion QuarTerty 64; SmirH, LasswELL AND CaAsEy, Propa-
GANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PusBLic OPINION (1946).
44 Zeller, Modern Pressure Groups, 29 Am. Las. Lec. Rev. 152; Bellows,
In Defense of Lobbying, 172 Harpers 96 (1935); 26 Wortps Work 540 (1913).
1950] COMMENTS 565
by the organization.45 When the measure is up for consideration
and the issue is in balance, refreshments and services may be
provided in a nearby hotel for those legislators amenable to such
conveniences.
It can be readily seen that such tactics at the disposal of un-
scrupulous groups can be used against the best interest of the
public. Worthy organizations, in order to get results, must of ne-
cessity fight for their measures with the same weapons used by
their opposition. What then is the answer to this lobbying prob-
lem? Every state and at least one territory has struggled with
it.46 In 1946, for the first time in its history, the federal govern-
ment enacted a law which it hoped would cope with lobbying
abuses. Unfortunately, the measure was hastily drawn and did
not draw upon the experience of states who have been legislating
against lobbying for over one hundred years!*”? State lobbying
provisions*® have at least established the principle that the public
has a right to know who are the paid lobbyists and what is the
source of their funds. The majority of lobbying statutes require
registration of paid professional lobbyists, and sometimes their
employers; a filing of expenses incurred in lobbying; and provides
for fines, and imprisonment, or both for failure to comply.*? These
provisions are all right as far as they go, but unfortunately they
do not go far enough.
Publicity has proved to be the most effective means of com-
bating sinister lobbying practices, but only a few states make any
effort to keep even their own legislators posted as to lobbying ac-
tivities5° Ambiguous wording of lobbying statutes also makes en-
45 Odegard, Political Parties and Group Pressures, 179 ANNALS (1935).
46 See the tabulation of state measures for enforcement of lobbying fol-
lowing this comment.
See Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying, THe Book Or Tue States (1948-
49), THe Boox Or Tue Srartes (1949-50).
47 For excellent analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act of 1946 see Futor,
An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 Fen. B. J. 366 (1949); Zeller, The
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 48 Am. Pox. Scr. Rev. 239 (1948).
48 See FepERAL AND STATE LAws ON LOBBYING PREPARED FOR THE ASSEMBLY
InteRIM COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND EcONOMY OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE OF CALIFORNIA (Dec. 1949).
49 See note 45, supra.
50 Wisconsin in 1945 amended its statute to provide for detailed weekly
statements of disbursements of lobbyists during the season.
Onto Gen. Cope § 6256-4 provides for an itemized statement to be filed
within thirty days after the final adjournment of any session of the general
assembly. It does not provide for publicizing this information, analyzing it,
or even checking the truthfulness of the statements filed. An examination by
the writer of 281 financial statements filed following the 98th General Assem-
bly revealed general confusion as to the information required to be disclosed.
Apparently, filing a statement regardless of its disclosure is accepted as being
PN SD ect II
566 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
forcement difficult,5! but failure to appropriate funds for enforce-
ment, coupled with failure to designate a specific enforcement
agency, makes the job just about impossible.*?
Experience has shown that regular enforcement agencies are
not suited for enforcement of lobbying laws, and without special
staffs to analyze registrations and expenditures, prosecutors are
reluctant to prosecute and courts are not prone to convict violat-
ors.53 In states such as Ohio where supervision of registration of
lobbyists is delegated to a single clerk, in addition to her other
regular duties, and where her only duty in this regard is limited
to placing these registrations and financial reports in a filing cabi-
net, it is safe to conclude that lobbying laws can be and probably
are violated with impunity.*4 Furthermore, most state lobbying
laws are directed at the paid professional lobbyist, whereas there
is practically no attempt to control what is considered by some
writers to be the most important phase of lobbying — those lobby-
ists who initiate propaganda without necessarily being present in
the state capital.55
Another source of lobbying which is usually overlooked is
that done by our own state representatives. A large number of
in compliance with the statute. Such statements as “the usual fee”, “full time
employee”, or the overworked “no receipts, no expenditures” are accepted as
disclosures of lobbying expenditures!
51 This writer could find no true case in Ohio of a prosecution or a con-
viction for violation of any lobbying statute!
52It is perhaps unrealistic to expect appropriations for the enforcement
of lobbying statutes in states which are not even adequately interested in the
collection of back taxes.
53 See note 48, supra.
54It is clear that the secretary of state, to whom custody of these records
are relegated, does not have the administrative organization to analyze relevant
information submitted under lobbying statutes, make pertinent extracts from
it, and adopt an efficient classification and index system. But efficient ad-
ministration would be merely a prerequisite to preparing the data revealed
into concise and comprehensible statements which would be made available
to press and radio services. If the public is to be informed of the facts dis-
closed by registration, these facts must get the widest possible circulation in
a simplified and intelligible form.
55 Pressure group propaganda aimed primarily at influencing the public
is often characterized by misrepresentation or distortion of fact, made more
effective by concealment of source —thereby making an evaluation of possi-
ble bias very difficult. Special interests have often employed such question-
able practises as controlling newspaper editorials by placement or with drawal
of advertising. See Williams, Mr. Cleveland, 28 LIFE 130 (Mar. 13, 1950);
sending free “canned copy” to country presses which is used as cheap fill,
31 Current History 690 (1930); hiring radio commentators and columnists to
express favorable views; educators to write text books; speakers to address
clubs, schools, and churches, without revelation of the contract of employ-
ment.
1950] COMMENTS 567
state legislators are practicing lawyers. The controversy over the
activities of law-legislators who write laws for clients or represent
them in transactions with the state government led the state of
Michigan to enact a statute declaring it a felony for legislators
to be employed by persons interested in current legislation for
more pay than non-legislators would receive, or to accept payment
for services in connection with the passage or defeat of bills.‘’
Any improvement in legislative reference services designed
to supply legislators with data impartially collected will diminish
the likelihood of lobbying abuses. Legislators are incapable of
personally investigating every legislative proposal, especially those
which require technical knowledge of complicated subjects. In the
absence of such a service legislators have no choice but to rely on
experts for information in the fields of their special interest. This
information is of course many times biased.
CONCLUSION
A few states such as Wisconsin are taking the lead in coping
with this lobbying problem, but whether or not other states will
follow their lead will depend on results obtained. At the present,
however, results are too inconclusive to evaluate. The first requisite
is a will to see the law work — sometimes this is all that is nec-
essary. When this is the climate of opinion, appropriations to es-
tablish adequate research facilities, investigating staffs, accounting
and auditing staffs, and publicity staffs, coupled with laws which
are flexible enough to stay abreast of new and improved lobbying
techniques, are all steps in the right direction. When, however,
there is no interest in the intent and objectives of such regulatory
legislation either by the people or by their representatives, no mea-
sures in this area can be expected to be undertaken.
To get the ball rolling when this is the case probably requires
a “lobby for the regulation of lobbying”, but apparent disinterest
in correcting the system as it functions today indicates remedial
measures to be unlikely in the foreseeable future.
James H. Tilberry
56 Micu. Acts, § 41lb (No. 146) (1945).
57“One is reminded of the statement of ex-Governor Lehman of New
York when he called public attention to the fact that several lawyer-legislators
were blocking his anti-crime program: ‘One perceives in them a still more
sinister conspiracy than that of politics— the conspiracy of lawyer-legislators
to perpetuate for their profession the obstructions to justice by which it pros-
pers.” Zeller, State Regulation of Lobbying, in THe Boox or Tue States 124
(1948-49).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING
[Vol. 11
Improper Registra- “Counsel” Financial
Fines
Penalties for Violations ——____,
Imprison-
ment
*
+ + e+ F
*
Not less than
500 and
Not over
$1,000° and/or
Not over
$1,000 and/or
Not over
$200 and
$200-
$1,000 or
Not over
$5,000 and/or
Not over
$5,000 and/or
Not over
$1,000¢
$200-$2,000
and
$100--$500
$100-$1,000
$100-$1,000
$200-$1,000
or
Not over
$1,000 and/or
$100-$500
an
Not over
$1,000¢ and/or
1-2 yrs.
Not over
5 yrs.
Not over
yr.
Not over
20 yrs.4
Not over
mos,
Not over
mos.
3 mos.-
1 yr.
Not over
1 yr.
Not over
yrs.
6 mos.-
2 yrs.!
3 mos.-
1 yr.
Not over
3 yrs.i
Not over
6 mos.
10 da.-
1 yr.
Not over
5 yrs.
Not over
i yr.
RSS EAS a SY NT OSE LOS Fh Oa RA RET
ae
A Ria Ol PN ae gy EC
Nevada
New Hz
New Je
New Me
Rhode |
South C
South I
1950] COMMENTS 569
STATE REGULATION OF LOBBYING*—Continued
Laws Legal — Penalties for Violation_——-
Limited Distinction: Three Years
to Registra- “Counsel Financial Disbarment
Corrupt tion and Report ; Imprison- After
State Practicesn Required “Agent” Required Fines ment Conriction
Nevada............ nee < .% cane ean
New Hampshire.... ae ” ead * Not over Not over
$1,000 5 yrs.4
New Jersey.......-
New Merxico........
New York.......... oa Not over Not over
$1,000¢ and/or 1 yr.
North Carolina..... * * $50-$1,000 Not over
and/or 2 yrs.
North Dakota...... ces ak aie pied $100-$ 1,000i ee *
$200-$5,000¢
ieee vedseaes * -_ $200-$5,000 1-2 yrs,
and/or
Oklahoma......... re 5 a ees ape $200-$1,000 10 da.-
or 1 yr.
Ds 60606008600 * — Sai pees $50-$500 or |3 mos.-1 yr.
Pennsylvania...... nee eves eevee oes cove -
Rhode Island...... — * * * $100-$1,000 Seite *
$200-$5,000° er oeon
South Carolina.... wines _ er * $25-$100 or - qver
da.
South Dakota...... fas * * * $100-$1,000 we *
$200-$5,000¢
Tennessee......... m bane none ae’ nen 2-5 yrs,
rer ooe8 we one chee $200-$2,000 6 mos.-
and 2 yrs.
sb d0guse obese oe ene ae ee $500-$10,000« Not over
yrs.
Vermont........... woee * * _— $100-$500 on
Virginia........... ese * meee * $50-$ 1,000 Not over
and/or 1 yr.
Washington........ sue ‘ies é<av enaie ence eee
West Virginia...... . ana otis ions $50-$200 and 10 da.-
6 mos.
Wisconsin......... oeee _ sees * $100-$1,000! Sess *
$200-$5,000¢
Wyoming ......... bone ee ie jase ies ey enue
.
RD 66668 08v0i ro _ * — $100-$1,000° Not more a
$200-$1,000 or than 1 yr.
* Reprinted from THe Book or THE StTaTEs 1950-51, pp. 135-6.
Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw — APPLICATION Or FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
Procepure Act To Heartncs In Deportation CASES
Plaintiff, a native and citizen of China, was arrested on a
charge of being unlawfully in the United States through having
overstayed shore leave. A hearing was held before an immigra-
tion inspector who recommended deportation. This was approved
by the Acting Commissioner and affirmed by the Board of Immi-
gration appeals. Plaintiff sought release by habeas corpus on ground
that the hearing was not in conformity with the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Srar. 237,
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Held, reversing the District Court for the
District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals, writ sustained.
Deportation proceedings must conform to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act if resulting orders are to have valid-
ity. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
Plaintiff relied on Section 5 of the APA, which provides, “In
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,...(c)...
No officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of in-
vestigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in any case
shall, in that or in factually related cases, participate or advise
in the decision. ...” 60 Srar. 237, 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (c), and
§ 11, 60 Srar. at 237,244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010, which provides for the
appointment of examiners.
The Government admitted noncompliance, but asserted, first,
that Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917,
39 Star. 874, 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) — which author-
izes deportation—does not expressly require a hearing, and
therefore deportation proceedings are not an “adjudication re-
quired by statute” under Section 5; and, second, even if they
are, Section 7 (a),,”...but nothing in this Act shall be deemed
to supersede the conduct of a specified classes of proceedings in
whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially pro-
vided for by or designated pursuant to statute....” 60 Srar. 237,
241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, excludes such proceedings from the require-
ments of the Act. This argument is based on the assertion that
immigrant inspectors are “specially provided for by or designated
pursuant to” Section 16 of the Immigration Act, which provides,
“..and the examination of aliens arrested within the United States
under this Act, shall be conducted by immigrant inspectors, ex-
cept as hereinafter provided in regard to boards of special in-
570
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 571
quiry...” 39 Srat. 874, 885, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 152.
The court, in holding that this was an instance of “adjudication
required by statute,” pointed out that without a hearing there
would be no constitutional authority for deportation. An admin-
istrative officer, when executing the provisions of a statute in-
volving the liberty of persons, may not disregard the fundamental
principles of due process of law as understood at the time of
the adoption of ‘the Constitution. The Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U.S. 86, 100, 101 (1903); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S.
454, 459 (1920); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1945) (con-
curring opinion). The constitutional requirement of procedural
due process of law permeates every valid enactment of Congress.
The limitation to hearings in Section 5 exempts only those hear-
ings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule,
custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion.
The limiting words exempt hearings of less than statutory author-
ity, not those of more than statutory authority.
In determining the second question, that of whether Sec-
tion 7(a) excludes deportation hearings, the court stated that
nothing in the Immigration Act specially provides that inspectors
shall conduct deportation hearings or be designated to do so. The
language directs them to conduct border inspection and author-
izes functions which are indispensible to investigations and in
preparation of complaints for prosecutive purposes. If hearings
are to be had before employees whose responsibility and author-
ity derives from a lesser source—than those whose responsi-
bilities and duties as hearing officers are established by other
statutory provision — then they must be examiners whose inde-
pendence and tenure are so guarded by the Act as to give the
assurances of neutrality which Congress thought would guarantee
the impartiality of the administrative process. Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting, found it obvious that the exception in Section 7(a),
of the APA covers immigration inspectors dealing with the ar-
rest of an alien for violation of the Immigration Act.
Thus the Court, in its first interpretation of the many prob-
lems raised by the Hearings section of the APA, has resolved
a lower court conflict in favor of the minority. See Orlow, Habeas
Corpus In Immigration Cases, 10 Onro Sr. L. J. 319, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 1060 (1949).
The case which caused the greatest disturbance to the Immi-
gration Service was Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D. C. 1948),
cert. denied sub nom. Potash v. Clark, 338 U.S. 879 (1949).
There, in holding the APA applicable to deportation proceedings,
the decision was based entirely on Section 5, that a hearing is an
integral part of the Deportation Act, and no mention was made
572 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
of the exception, “specially provided for by or designated pur-
suant to statute,” in Section 7 (a).
The problem of applicability of the APA to the Immigration
Act also has become significant in determining what form of judi-
cial review is available in immigration matters. Orlow, supra, 328-
334. Section 10 makes available any applicable form of legal action,
“Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion...”. The
question has been whether the Immigration Act, 39 Srar. 890
(1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946),” .. . the decision of the Attorney
General shall be final. ..,” precluded judicial review. Cases which
have held the APA Section 10 not applicable are: Prince v. Com-
missioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 87 F. Supp. 53 (N. D.
Ohio 1949); Valenti v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 167 (D. C. 1949) and
Yiakoumis v. Hall, supra. Other cases have allowed judicial re-
view under the APA on the ground that the due process concept
has always made habeas corpus available to those adversely af-
fected by deportation orders. These cases include United States
ex rel. Camaratta v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1948);
United States ex rel. Trinler v. Caruse, 166 F. 2d 458 (3d Cir.
1948); United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp.
216 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United
States ex rel. Poetau v. Watkins, 164 F. 2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947).
In view of the court’s argument in the principal case — quali-
fying the Immigration Act with the judge-made requirements of
a hearing, so as to bring the Act within the APA — it would seem
that the same argument applies to the judge-made requirement
of review, thus bringing the Act within Section 10 of the APA,
on the ground that the Attorney General’s decision is not final
within the exception in Section 10.
A similar problem as that in the principal case has been
raised in connection with the mail fraud order statutes. 39 U.S.C. §§
259, 732 (1946). Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F. 2d 494 (D. C. Cir.
1949), held that since the fraud order statutes do not in terms
require a hearing, Sections 5 and 8 (b) of the APA are inappli-
cable. Here the Postmaster General issued a fraud order after a
hearing before a trial examiner, and plaintiffs sought to enjoin
enforcement of the order alleging that they could not file ex-
ceptions to the recommended decision of the examiner, as pro-
vided by Section 8 (b) of the APA. The case is discussed in 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1949). In this field courts, without directly
holding, have indicated a hearing would be required. Pike v.
Walker, 121 F. 2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
625 (1941); Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C. C.
E. D. Mo. 1907). Cf. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D. C. Cir.
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 573
1945). It would seem that here, as in the principal case, “the con-
stitutional requirement of procedural due process” would per-
meate the fraud order statutes, thus making them an instance of
“adjudication required by statute,” and thereby bringing them
within the requirements of the APA.
The present APA was introduced in 1945. S. 7, H.R. 1203,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. It is largely a compromise between the two
reports of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure, which was named by presidential direction in 1939.
The Act adopted the recommendations of the majority, rather than
the more thoroughgoing separation of agency functions recommend-
ed by the minority. See S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-60
(1941). One purpose of the Act was to secure a greater uniform-
ity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice.
McFar.tanp, ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Act, FepeRAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AGENCIES 16, 22 (N.Y.U. 1947). More fundamental, how-
ever, was the problem of the commingling of functions, and the
desire to separate the prosecution, investigation, and adjudication
functions as pointed out above. See Sung, supra, 450. For argu-
ments both for and against such separation see, CARRow, BAcK-
GROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE Law 95. It is with these considera-
tions in mind that one should approach the instant decision.
As the court pointed out, the legislative history of the Act is
very conflicting. However, the exception in Section 5 was meant
to exclude “ . . . the great mass of administrative routine as well
as pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in which
Congress has usually intentionally or traditionally refrained from
requiring an administrative hearing.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1946). Deportation hearings traditionally have been
required by the Immigration Act as interpreted under the proce-
dural due process requirement.
Section 7 (a), at first appearance, would seem to include immi-
gration inspectors provided for in Section 16 of the Immigration
Act. Senator McCarran, in commenting on Section 7(a), stated,
“. . the committee desires that Government agencies should be
put on notice that the provision in question is not intended to
permit agencies to avoid the use of examiners, but only to pre-
serve special statutory types of hearing officers who contribute
something more than examiners could contribute, and at the same
time to assure the parties fair and impartial procedure.” S. Doc.
No. 248, supra, at 325.
The question then turned on an interpretation of Section 16,
and the decision was that immigration inspectors conducting de-
portation hearings were not specifically provided for in Section
—
574 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
16. That this was the basis of the decision was pointed out in
United States ex rel. Frisch v. Miller, 18 U.S.L. Weex 2466 (1950),
decided subsequent to the principal case. There it was held that
Section 7(a) excluded alien exclusion proceedings before a special
board of inquiry provided for in Section 17 of the Immigration Act.
In view of the long history of the APA, the great desire and
the stated necessity of separating the adjudicating functions, the
court in the instant case followed the stated intent of the framers
of the Act. To have held otherwise would have allowed Section
7(a) to have become the loophole for avoidance of the examiner
system which the legislators warned against. The decision retains
the uniformity of procedure and the separation of functions which
the Act was framed to accomplish.
“The immediate effect of the . . . decision was to bring into
question the validity of certain other hearings in deportation pro-
ceedings in which the subject alien has not been deported.” Jef-
ferys, The Wong Yang Sung Decision, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION Service Montuiy Review, April, 1950, p. 131, 137. The
number of cases decided since September, 1946, and thereby af-
fected, was found to be 10,000. Newsweek, March 6, 1950, p. 18,
19.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has adjusted its
regulations to conform to the APA, with Hearing Examiners ap-
pointed under Section 11. 15 Fen. Rec. 1297-1302; 18 U.S.L. Week
2405 (1950).
Several bill were introduced in the last two sessions of
Congress attempting to exempt the Immigration Service from the
APA, but Congress adjourned without taking action.
Thus the battle rages in the administrative branch of govern-
ment, the battle which dates from 1610 when Coke, in Dr. Bon-
ham’s Case, said, “one cannot be Judge and attorney for any of
the parties.” 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652.
Richard E. Bridwell
‘
PROCEDURE—SUIT TO COMPEL DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS—
JOINDER OF PARTIES
Defendant corporation is a citizen of Delaware doing business
in Pennsylvania. It had outstanding 100,000 shares of $6 cumu-
lative preferred no-par stock, 120 of which were held by plaintiff,
a citizen of New York. Also outstanding were 456,576 shares of
no-par common stock, 92% of which were held by four large
users of defendant’s products. Defendant defaulted on dividend
payments for several consecutive periods, until dividend arrearages
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 575
on the preferred shares amounted to $57.75 per share. Plaintiff
then brought action to compel the declaration of dividends. In
his complaint plaintiff alleged and offered to prove that defendant’s
financial condition would easily permit the payment of dividends,
and he further alleged that the directors of the corporation were
“unreasonable and arbitrary” in that they were expanding pro-
duction facilities in order to benefit the four large customer-
stockholders. At the commencement of the action plaintiff served
the corporation but not the individual directors. The trial court
held that a majority of the board of directors must be served, and
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Only three out of a total
of twelve could be served in Pennsylvania, and in no other single
jurisdiction could a majority be served. Held, on appeal, that
the directors are not necessary parties. Kroese v. General Steel
Castings Corporation et al, 179 F. 2d 760 (C.A. 3rd 1950); certio-
rari denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
A failure to pay dividends when due, even those on preferred
shares, is not an uncommon occurrence in the financial world.
Aside from the most obvious precluding factor, that of insufficient
surplus out of which dividends can be paid, there is an added
reason why the stockholder may not realize any income from his
investment in a corporation. This is the fact that the declaration
of dividends is, with very few exceptions, a function of the board
of directors, and whether or not they are declared is a matter
within the board’s discretion. 1935 Det. Rev. Cope Section 2066;
Outro Gen. Cope Sections 8623-38 and 8623-55; Jones v. Van Heu-
sen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y.S. 204 (1930); Hastings
v. International Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N.Y.S. 815 (1919).
Prior to this declaration of dividends by the board of directors, the
individual stockholder has no legal right in the surplus of the cor-
poration. In re Goetz’s Estate, 236 Pa. 630, 85 A. 65 (1912). Thus,
so long as the power of discretion is wielded in good faith, the fact
that the directors have decided upon another legitimate use for an
existing surplus should not give rise to judicial intervention. 1
MoraAweEtz, Private Corporations (2nd Ed. 1886) Section 460.
However, if the failure to pay dividends, assuming sufficient
surplus, is part of a general scheme to defraud the stockholder,
or if there is any bad faith or arbitrary use of the power of dis-
cretion, it is well settled that a stockholder may invoke the aid of
equity in a suit to compel the declaration of dividends. Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Barclay v.
Wabash Railway Co., 30 F. 2d 260 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Mitchell
v. Des Moines and F. D. R. Co., 270 F. 465 (C.C.A. 2d 1920);
Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N.Y.S. 1033
(1917); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In the Dodge
576 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
case supra, the court went so far as to order that a common
stock dividend of a specified amount be declared. Whether or
not a court goes too far when it actually determines the amount
of the dividend is a serious question, but one that is not presented
by the instant case because it is an action on preferred stock with
a dividend rate of $6 per share.
The court of equity, acting in personam, cannot invade the
province of the directors by actually declaring a dividend. The
judgment of the court must take the form of a mandatory injunc-
tion, ordering that a dividend be declared. Kales v. Woodworth,
32 F. 2d 37 (C.C.A. 6th 1929). It still remains the function of
the board, therefore, to meet and go through the motions of a
formal declaration in compliance with the decree of the court,
and also to satisfy the statutory requirement of most states that a
dividend must be voted upon and passed by the directors. For
this reason the courts, prior to the instant case, have consistently
enunciated the rule that there must be personal jurisdiction over
at least a majority of the directors, in addition to jurisdiction over
the corporation. Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537,
200 N.W. 550 (1924); Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952
(C.C.A. 6th 1947); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In
the opinion of these courts, there was no other method by which
the directors could be forced to “exercise their discretion” by
declaring a dividend by the required number of votes. Schuck-
man v. Rubenstein, supra. The problem then would seem to be
one of enforcement only.
In the opinion of Judge Goodrich the question of how to make
the decree effective is not a difficult one to answer. He said: “To
doubt its effectiveness is to doubt the power of a court of equity
wielded by a chancellor with legal imagination.” Kroese v. Gen-
eral Steel Castings Corporation et al, supra, p. 764. The case holds
that so long as the court has jurisdiction over the corporation and
its property lying within the state the decree of the court becomes
the controlling factor. The corporation is no longer guided by the
discretion of its directors but is instead bound by the court’s in-
junction. It continues to be subject to the power of the court even
though the directors fail to comply with the order. The court points
out the fact that a creditor of a corporation does not need a meeting
of the board of directors to make his judgment valid. Even though
in the present type of case the directors must still perform the
ministerial function of making a formal declaration for the sake of
the records and to satisfy the statutory requirements, their failure
to do so would certainly not vitiate the court’s power over the
corporation. Since the corporation is so affected by the decree,
what is to prevent the court from using enforcement procedure
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 577
against the corporation itself, even though jurisdiction over the
directors is lacking? The court suggests that sequestration of the
corporation’s property lying within the jurisdiction should prove
to be a very effective means of coercion. Continental Mortgage
Guarantee Co. v. Whitecourt Construction Corp., 164 Misc. 56, 297
N. Y. S. 338 (1937). It would seem that as to the directors of a
corporation this method of enforcement should be just as compel-
ling as any that could be used by a court with personal jurisdiction.
The court in the instant case recognized the Schuckman case,
supra, as a contrary holding by another federal court, but an at-
tempt was made to distinguish the two cases on the basis of a dif-
ference between the statutes of Delaware and those of Ohio. 1935
Det. Rev. Cope Sections 2041 and 2066, and Onto Gen. Cope Sec-
tions 8623-38 and 8623-55. These sections, aside from specifying
the funds out of which dividends may be paid, also provide that
if dividends are declared the declaration shall be made by the
board of directors. It is a matter of discretion with the board in
either case and it is difficult to see wherein the statutes differ
in their application to the present problem. It would seem, there-
fore, that the two cases are definitely in conflict and that a choice
will have to be made between the two opposite holdings. The
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court adds some weight to
the instant case but leaves the matter still unsettled.
It would appear that the decision in the present case is to be
preferred over those of the older cases. The rule so consistently
adhered to in the past placed too great a burden on the stockholder
with an otherwise justiciable case. It is common knowledge that
the large corporations of today may be governed by directors who
are citizens of widely scattered jurisdictions. To serve a majority
may often be an impossibility, and to leave the stockholder without
a remedy would be inequitable. It is true that hard cases should
not make bad law, but the rule of the instant case should not be
labeled as such. Although sequestration was never before used in
this field, it is certainly not a device that is unknown to courts of
equity. 2 Danrett, CHancery Practice 690 (Am. Ed. 1846). There
would seem to be no hardship inflicted upon the corporation by
the rule of this case, other than to make it amenable to suits by
persons with legitimate causes of action.
Frank E. Kane
Torts—Lasetinc A Man A CommunistT—Liset Per SE
Plaintiff, Ward in his petition stated, inter alia, that he is
a member of the American Federation of Labor. That he earns
his livelihood from his employment as Secretary of the Painters
District Council No. 6 in the city of Cleveland and that said posi-
578 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
tion is subject to election by the free and popular vote of the
members of the Painters Union. That defendant, League for Jus-
tice, under the direction of defendant, John P. Moran, caused
to be published a pamphlet entitled, “League For Justice Informa-
tion For Americans”, in which the plaintiff was depicted as one
of the most active and treacherous Communists in Ohio and further
charging that he was affiliated with Russian Communism and had
performed various acts as a tool for Stalin in the furtherance of
his objectives. Plaintiff made no averment of special damage.
Defendants filed a general demurrer which was sustained by the
Court of Common Please of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on the ground
that the words published were not libelous per se, and there being
no averment of special damage an action in libel was not main-
tainable. Held, reversed on appeal to the court of appeals. The
appellate court holding that it is libelous per se to write of a man
as a Communist, that label tending to taint him as a man of dis-
repute. Ward v. League for Justice et al, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 197 (1950).
Early in the common law both written and oral defamation
were included under slander. Later in 1690 libel was recognized
as a separate branch of the law of defamation. Slander, in modern
usage, has been limited to defamation by words spoken, and in
this sense may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory
words which tend to the prejudice of the reputation, office, trade,
business, or means of getting a living of another. 53 C.J.S. Libel
& Slander, § 1, b, p. 33. Libel is broader than slander and em-
braces many things affecting reputation which are not slanderous
when spoken. Libel is frequently defined as a malicious publica-
tion, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pic-
tures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead or the
reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, § 1, p. 31. From
its inception libel has been considered written defamation and has
been treated as a more serious wrong because of permanence of
form or potentiality df harm.
In the law of defamation the words per se were first used to
designate those slanderous words which would be actionable
without proof of special damages, namely: the imputation of seri-
ous crime, the imputation of certain loathsome diseases, and im-
putations affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession
or office. All other unprivileged, slanderous words were action-
able upon proof of special damages. 8 Mont. L. Rev. 76, 78 (1947).
However, at early common law any libel, as opposed to slander,
was actionable without allegation and proof of special damage.
Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916);
Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corn.. 242 N.Y. 208, 151
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 579
N.E. 209 (1926); see Neweitt, SLANDER AND Lisex § 775 (4th ed.
1924).
Today, the words per se and per quod are being applied to
libel law by many courts and the distinction is expressed in two
forms. Some courts make the differentiation on the basis of evi-
dence and define libel per se as words defamatory on their face
while libel per quod is said to be words defamatory only in the
light of extrinsic circumstances. Others distinguish the two on
the basis of pleading and hold that words libelous per se do not
require allegation and proof of special damage, while those libel-
ous per quod do require such allegation and proof. Prosser,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAw oF Torts 790, § 91 (1941); Harper, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw oF Torts 518, 519, § 243 (1940). In the
majority of jurisdictions, however, any libel is still actionable
per se, irrespective of whether any special harm has been caused
to the plaintiff’s reputation. Prosser, Torts 797 (1941); ResTate-
MENT, Torts § 569, comment c (1938).
Many criteria exist for determining what libelous words fall
into the category of libel per se. As a general rule words, written
or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose a person to
public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an
evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and
deprive him of their friendly intercourse and society. 53 C.J.S.
Libel and Slander, § 13, p. 57.
Courts have long held that a political epithet might tend to
defame. In 1889 it was libelous per se to write of a man as an
anarchist. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E.
692 (1891). To write of one as a socialist was considered libelous
per se in 1915. Ogren v. Rockford Star, 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587
(1919). Similarly in 1926 it was libelous per se to write of a
man as a “red.” Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736
(1926). When these cases were decided such affiliations were
considered contemptible in that they advocated lawless methods
in sabotaging and attempting to overthrow the American political
and economic system. Likewise, the term “Nazi” or “Fascist”
before or during World War II was held to be libelous per se since
anyone characterized as such suffered immediate loss of reputa-
tion and prestige, with exposure to hate and possible violence.
Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F. 2d 305 (C.C.A. 10th 1948); Levy v.
Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (1941); Devany v. Quill,
187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S. 733 (1946); Luotto v. Field, 49 N.Y.S. 2d
785 (1944).
In 1929, the first case appeared indicating that labeling a
man a Communist might be libel. Hays v. American Defense So-
ciety, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929). In 1939, a lower New
580 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
York court held that charging a man with being a Communist
would not support an action in libel. Garriga v. Richfield, 174
Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (1940). Russian-United States rela-
tions had improved in the interim. In 1941, another New York
lower court refused to follow the Garriga decision. Levy v. Gelber,
175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1941). At this time the German-
Russian Pact of August, 1939 was in effect. A little later in 1942,
a New York court in Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35
N.Y.S. 2d 760 (1942), adopted the view of Levy v. Gelber and is
now generally considered the law in New York on the subject.
Elsewhere, in other jurisdictions, because of the obloquy
and reproach connected with such affiliations, it has almost con-
sistently been held to be actionable in libel or slander to charge
a person with being a Communist. Whether or not it is libelous
per se is determined by the effect of the word “Communist” upon
the ordinary person of average intelligence in the light of the
then public attitude toward Communism. See Note, 171 A.L.R.
709. In sounding this public opinion the courts have looked to
polls, studies and legislation relevant to Communism. In a For-
tune survey, Fortune, February, 1940, p. 136, of these disposed
to curtail free speech, approximately 40% would prohibit Com-
munism as a subject and Communists as speakers. Exec. Order
No. 1835, Part V, § 1, 12 Fep. Rec. 1938 (1947) outlined a pro-
cedure for the discharge of those employees as to whom reasonable
grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to
the government. For a list of others see 24 Notre Dame Law.
544 (1949), notes 11 and 12; 32 Minn. L. Rev. 413 (1947), notes
6, 7, 8 and 9. The recent “Communist Control Bill” will also aid
in pointing up the public attitude toward Communism. Pub. L.
No. 831, Internal Security Act 1950. There are those who believe
that under the theory of the prosecution in the recent trial of
eleven Communist leaders and as a result of conviction in that
case, membership in the Communist Party is now a crime. 50
Cou. L. Rev. 526, 528 (1950). Notwithstanding the above, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court very recently held that to call a
man a Communist is not libel per se. McAndrew v. Scranton Re-
publican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A. 2d 180 (1950). This
decision, however, was based on dictionary and logical connota-
tions of Communism and did not take into account the existing
social norms and antipathies in ascertaining whether a falsification
has the capacity to bring another into disrepute. 98 U. Pa. L. Rev.
931 (1950).
In the instant Ohio case, the court of appeals relied consider-
ably upon State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881), which stated that
although the matter published might not, without averment and
proof of special damage, be actionable, if only spoken, yet if pub-
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 581
lished, and it be of a character, which, if believed, would naturally
tend to expose the person concerning whom the same was pub-
lished, to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or deprive him of
the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse such pub-
lication is a libel, and an action will lie therefor although no special
damage is alleged. The court then passed to a consideration of
cases from other jurisdictions, some of which have already been
mentioned, and concluded that the publication concerning plain-
tiff, Ward, if believed, would naturally tend to expose him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, and deprive him of the
benefit of public confidence and social intercourse, and such pub-
lication is therefore libelous per se and an action will lie therefor
although no special damage is alleged.
Defendant gave notice of appeal, but although the Ohio State
Supreme Court had not passed upon the question of calling a man
a communist as libelous per se, it did, on October 18, 1950, overrule
defendant’s motion to certify the record, and in effect, upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. Notwith-
standing the fact that the case law in Ohio is somewhat precarious
relevant to this question, it is submitted that had the court passed
directly upon the matter, it would have had little difficulty in
rationalizing its present position. A consideration of some of the
Ohio cases will tend to indicate the pattern that has been develop-
ing in Ohio with respect to libelous statements.
In an action for libel the question whether the publication is
or is not libelous per se is a question for the court. Mark v. Brund-
age et al, 68 Ohio St. 89 (1903). “Libelous per se” embraces
words of three classes: imputing an indictable offense involving
moral turpitude or infamous punishment; imputing a contagious
or offensive disease or condition tending to ostracize; or tending
to injure one in one’s occupation. Hunt v. Meridian Printing Co..,
320 Ohio C. D. 151, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N.S.) 293 (1910). To be
libelous per se the publication must reflect upon the character of
a person by bringing him into ridicule, hatred or contempt, or
affect him injuriously in his trade or profession. Cleveland Leader
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 89 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911).
More recently, a publication which charges one with utterances
that bring him into contempt, ridicule or hatred, is not actionable
without alleging special damages, unless it liberally and not tech-
nically construed charges utterances which are a violation of the
laws of the land or of good morals. Sweeney v. Beacon Journal
Pub. Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d 471 (1941). Later in West-
ropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947),
the court quoted with approval 1 Coo.ey, Torts (4th Ed.) 491, §
145, words to the effect that any false and malicious writing pub-
lished of another is libelous per se when its tendency is to render
582 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him
to public hatred. Also on page 501 of the same authority, that “in
determining whether the words charged are libelous per se, they
are to be taken in their plain and natural import according to the
ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are
addressed, reference being had not only to the words themselves,
but also to the circumstances under which they were used.” Fur-
ther insight into the Ohio pattern may be obtained through a
study of still more recent decisions. Writing of a man as a Com-
munist is libelous per se and special damages need not be alleged.
Burrell v. Moran, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 82 N.E. 2d 334 (1948). It
is not a crime in Ohio to be a member of the Communist Party.
Fawick Airflex v. United Electrical Workers et, Kres., 56 Ohio
L. Abs. 432 (1950). And finally, courts now take judicial notice
that whoever is a Communist is by reason of that fact a member
of an organization the international purpose of which is to destroy
the Government of the United States. Dworken v. Board of Edu-
cation (Cleveland), 57 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (1950).
Some of the above holdings seem to indicate that there is
a tendency to harmonize libel per se with slander per se. Be that
as it may, the definition of libel per se adopted by the supreme
court in the Westropp case seems to be broad enough to include
the label “Communist” imputed to a plaintiff. Likewise, if damage
to character, violation of law or morality is to form the test, the
growing willingness to recognize communistic affiliation as synony-
mous with governmental overthrow would seem to satisfy these
criteria.
The major obstacles which deter the holding that calling a
man a Communist is libel per se have been overcome by most
courts. The fact that the Communists may function as a legally
recognized party is immaterial. 32 Munn. L. Rev. 412, 414 (1947).
Illegality of the act charged is not a requisite of libel. Stevens v.
Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62, 214 Pac. 968, 969 (1923). That the word
“Communist” has no definite meaning is untenable. 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 513, 516 (1947).
Another difficult question is the one of policy. Can we expect
a greater net gain by protecting reputations of individuals at the
expense of making it more difficult to detect subversive communist
elements, than would result if we relaxed the enforcement of the
law of libel per se with respect to a charge of Communism and
thereby make it easier to expose these groups and individuals?
Also in our political make-up there are left-wing liberals who are
not Communists but who stand to have their reputations ruined
by being portrayed as such. Their protection negatives any re-
laxation in the enforcement of the rule of libel per se when applied
to the Communist epithet.
1950] RECENT DECISIONS 583
The Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to review Ward v. League
for Justice constitutes a revelation of Ohio’s judicial attitude on
this current policy question. Ohio has recognized that in the
present era a Communist label can ruin a reputation, ostracize
one from society, and in some cases lead to the individual’s physical
abuse. However, as times change, relationships vary, and words
take on new meanings. Only the future can disclose when the
Communist label will be shorn of its ephemeral capacity to damage
a reputation and thence be relegated to the habitude of words of
libelous impotency.
Cornelius W. Dillon
OHIO STATE
LAW JOURNAL
COLLEGE OF LAW
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY